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ARTICLES—*Maoist Strategy* * *North Viet-Nam* * *Party Reorganization* * *Soviet Leadership*

REVIEWS—*Revolutionaries* * *Russian Scenes* * *Eastern Europe* * *China and the U.S.* * *The Soviet Economy* * *The Military Machine* * *Aragon's Un-Book* * *Communism in Greece*

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Maoism at Home and Abroad

By Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin

Despite its political implications, the explosion on October 16, 1964, of Communist China's first atomic device, and of a second device (or possibly a bomb) on May 14, 1965, has not greatly altered China's military position vis-à-vis the West. By all standards except size and population, Communist China is still not a first-rate power; yet the fact is that she has proceeded to challenge—simultaneously and from a position of relative military and economic weakness—not just one but both of the world's superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an equally undeniable fact that Peking's success to date in this dual struggle, though limited and perhaps only temporary, nevertheless considerably exceeds what might have been anticipated on the sole basis of Communist China's military and economic strength.

The contention of this paper is that an explanation of these two striking facts must be sought in the nature of the revolutionary strategy developed and applied by Mao in the Chinese internal political-military struggle, and in his belief that this same strategy can be applied not only to other individual countries, particularly those in the underdeveloped areas, but also to the world struggle between the Communist and anti-Communist camps. Mao dared to challenge the superior military and economic strength of the United States because his revolutionary experience proved to his own satisfaction that his integrated and comprehensive strat-

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egy would enable him both to score present, if partial, political gains from a position of military inferiority and also to achieve highly ambitious ultimate objectives with initially meager means in a protracted struggle. This conviction also explains in part his willingness to challenge the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" even at the cost of losing Soviet economic aid and risking an open split in the international Communist movement.

Thus, the key to Communist China's foreign policy lies in Mao's revolutionary strategy and the projection of that strategy to the international arena. The present paper begins with a brief examination of the various factors facilitating the effort of the Chinese Communists to project their revolutionary strategy abroad and an enumeration of some items of evidence bringing out the close relationship between this strategy and Chinese international behavior. It then seeks to define the nature of Mao's revolutionary strategy and to show how the various elements of that strategy form a unified and intelligible structure.

Revolutionary Strategy and International Behavior

All violent political revolutions have been originated by groups of men initially weak in numbers and strength. But no other group of successful revolutionaries in the modern world was confronted with greater odds, waged a more protracted armed struggle, and survived greater defeats than did Mao Tse-tung and his comrades. In his tortuous road to ultimate victory, Mao followed a pattern of action and formulated a set of principles which, on many occasions, helped him to achieve political gains from a position of military weakness, and which over a period of time enabled him to bridge the enormous gap between his highly ambitious goals and his early military-political impotence.

This pattern of action and set of principles followed, in time and logical sequence, Lenin's substitution of the conquest of political power in place of socialism as the end-in-view of the Communist movement, and his use of military analogy for the purpose of analyzing the revolutionary situation and developing a theory of political strategy. The effect of the latter was to obliterate the analytic difference between political and military forms of the class struggle and to call attention to the relevance of military analysis as a method of formulating programs to deal with political conflict.[1] Unlike Lenin, however, Mao was engaged in an intermittent civil war over a period of more than twenty years before the final conquest of power. Consequently, Mao went beyond Lenin in emphasizing the importance of military power. He laid down precepts for coordinating its use with political policies, developed a doctrine of protracted war and a military strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside, and exemplified, in his strategic and tactical thinking, a combination of prudence and revolutionary enthusiasm. While Mao's doctrines and precepts are by no means profound, they were perfectly adapted to the objective conditions confronting him and proved instrumental in enabling the Chinese Communists to win the most bitter and protracted internal war in the 20th century.

The Communists' theory of revolution, however, is a theory not merely of domestic but of world revolution. To them the analytic categories relevant to internal and international politics are identical.[2] From the Chinese Communists' viewpoint, their revolution to overthrow the Kuomintang government was, among other things, a fight against "the lackeys of Western imperialism," particularly American imperialism in the last few years of the struggle; and they have viewed their attacks on the West, particularly the United States, since their capture of power as merely a continuation of their previous struggle. The recent precarious balance of power in the Far East and Southeast Asia within a worldwide context of American military superiority must have seemed to them analogous to the situation that had prevailed in China during the larger part of the civil war, when overall Nationalist superiority existed in juxtaposition to local Communist strength in particular areas.

The predilection of the Chinese Communists to project the now sacrosanct principles of their own revolution into the international arena is

[1] Andrew C. Janos, "The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution," in *Communism and Revolution,* edited by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 32-6.

[2] Janos, *loc. cit.,* p. 40.

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further reinforced by Communist China's relatively short but highly traumatic experience as a member of the family of nations. This experience militates against wholehearted acceptance of the system of national states and the rules governing nations in that system. The moral unanimity existing among Chinese Communist leaders who claim to know the absolute and universal truth reinforces traditional Chinese ethnocentrism and strengthens the tendency of those leaders to view the foreign scene in the Chinese image and to judge alien things by Chinese standards. Thus, it is not surprising that many of Mao's principles and precepts of political-military action have underlain Peking's policies, strategies, and tactics in the international arena generally and in specific encounters with other nations.

As early as August 1946, Mao set forth four theses on the international situation which, with some modifications, have continued to guide his foreign policy: First, an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union in the immediate future was improbable. Second, the struggle between the socialist and imperialist camps in the period immediately ahead would take place in "the vast zone" outside the United States and the Soviet Union and embracing "many capitalist, colonial and semicolonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa." (This thesis was the origin of the controversial concept of an "intermediate zone.") Third, the atomic bomb is a "paper tiger" because "the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons." Fourth, all reactionaries, including "the United States reactionaries," also are paper tigers: "In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful from the long-term point of view."[3] These four theses, enunciated in what amounted to Mao's first independent assessment of the global situation confronting the international Communist movement,[4] reflected to a striking degree his unified strategy in the Chinese revolution, particularly in the period between 1937 and 1945. At the same time, this assessment constituted Mao's justification, from the viewpoint of the international Communist movement as whole, of his acceptance (in July 1946) of all-out war with Chiang and placed the revolutionary war in China within the context of the world struggle between the socialist and imperialist camps.

Soon after the establishment of their regime, the Chinese Communists began to apply Mao's political-military strategy outside of China. In November 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i, already the second-ranking leader of the Chinese Communist Party, declared that the peoples of colonial and semicolonial countries should follow the "path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys," and he specifically identified this path as consisting of Mao's three magic weapons: the united front, armed struggle, and the building of a strong party organization.[5] Subsequently, in Korea, the Chinese Communist forces successfully turned back MacArthur's drive to the Yalu by the use of Mao's strategy of retreating deep into his own base area, waiting for the enemy to commit mistakes, and then fighting a battle of quick decision as a prelude to a general counter-offensive.[6] In Indo-China, the Viet-Minh applied to its own revolutionary war those Chinese methods and precepts which were suitable to Vietnamese conditions, perfected some new tactics of its own, and ultimately defeated the modern, fully-trained, and excellently-equipped French Expeditionary Corps.[7] In the Quemoy crisis of 1958, a timely retreat, an early offer to negotiate, and

[3] Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," *Selected Works*, Vol. IV Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963, pp. 97-101. Hereafter cited as Mao, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV (Peking), in order to distinguish it from the fourth volume of Mao's selected works published by Lawrence and Wishart (London), which covers the period from 1941 to August 9, 1945.

[4] Prior to that time, Mao's pronouncements on international questions generally followed the twists and turns of the Soviet line. See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963, pp. 209-16.

[5] "Opening Speech by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Trade Union Congress of Asian and Australian Countries," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Dec. 30, 1949, p. 14.

[6] For Mao's doctrine on this point, see Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1955, pp. 210-53. On the actions of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea, see Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Maktong, North to the Yalu*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 667-776; S.L.A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet*, New York, 1953.

[7] George Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," in *Communism and Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 207-9; George K. Tanam, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare, the Viet Minh in Indo-China*, New York, 1961, pp. 23-8.

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a unilateral cease-fire declaration by Peking kept military risks and political costs to a minimum and achieved some political gains.[8] In the military clash over the border with India in 1962, China inflicted a stinging defeat on the Indian forces and then declared a unilateral cease-fire, once again illustrating Mao's strategy of limited victory and restraint. In Laos, the strategy and tactics of the Pathet Lao, both in the coalition government and on the battlefield, seem to have been influenced by Mao's principles and precepts. Finally, several documents issued by the CCP in its dispute with the CPSU confirm that Mao is pursuing against the West a global, long-term strategy of encircling the developed areas from the underdeveloped areas, which amounts to an international projection of his strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside in the Chinese civil war.[9]

The Chinese Communist leaders are highly conscious of their global revolutionary mission. The late Marshal Lo Jung-huan, for instance, told cadres at the Chinese Communist political Academy in October 1960:

At present, revisionism is spreading. The world revolution relies on the thought of Mao Tse-tung . . . [which] belongs not only to China but also has its international implications.[10]

Again, at a conference of top Chinese military leaders, Marshal Yeh Chien-yin declared:

No other nation in the world has more experience in fighting a war than we . . . The nations which have not yet been liberated also want to overthrow imperialism and feudalism . . . and to wage armed struggle. They very much need our experience. Therefore, we should sum up our experience in order to hand it down to posterity and present it to our friends.[11]

As this experience is most relevant to the "national liberation movements" in underdeveloped areas, Peking accords high priority in its foreign policy to support of these movements. A Chinese Communist military journal implicitly contrasted Peking's attitude on this issue with that of Moscow in the following terms:

Toward national liberation movements in colonial and semicolonial countries, there are two different attitudes. One makes the improvement of relations with the West a primary concern and does not support, or gives meager support to, the national liberation movements. The other makes support for national liberation movements a primary concern; it permits some proper dealings with the Western countries but considers this a secondary question. Our country adopts the latter attitude, firmly supporting the national liberation movements and opposing colonialism and imperialism. We may have dealings with Western countries, but do not bargain away our support for national liberation movements.[12]

Thus, Communist China actively seeks to cultivate close relationships with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but not with the "imperialist" powers, particularly the United States. Even the Taiwan question is viewed by Peking in the broader context of the worldwide struggle against Western imperialism. If Communist China should yield to the United States and let imperialist forces retain their hold on part of her territory, a Chinese statement warns, "her international prestige will drop ten thousand feet" [13]; on the other hand, by refusing to compromise on this issue and keeping Sino-American relations in a stalemate, "we can keep aloft the anti-imperialist banner, freely support the national liberation struggle in the colonial and semicolonial countries, preserve our ability to attract political support, and stimulate our morale." [14]

[8] Robert W. Barnett, "Quemoy: The Use and Consequences of Nuclear Deterrence" (mimeographed), Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1960; Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era,* Englewood, N.J., 1962, pp. 119-30; Tang Tsou, *The Embroilment of Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles,* Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1959.

[9] Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," *Orbis,* Spring, 1964, pp. 36-51. For an interpretation of the struggle for power in China, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, op. cit.,* pp. 48-56, 127-141, 186-92, 300-311, 401-40.

[10] *Kung-tso t'ung-hsun* (*Work Correspondence*) No. 8 (Feb. 2, 1961), pp. 16, 17. This is a secret journal for study by cadres of the People's Liberation Army at the regimental level and above.

[11] *Ibid.,* No. 12 (March 10, 1961), p. 4.

[12] *Ibid.,* No. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 22.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 24.

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Marshal Chen Yi, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, neatly summed up Peking's approach to world affairs when he affirmed in September 1964 that Mao's strategic and tactical thinking, together with the policies and general line of the party center, have been the principal guides to Communist China's analysis of international problems over the past fifteen years.[15] Hence, it is not surprising that the revolutionary strategy employed by Mao in the internal struggle for the control of China is a recurrent element in Peking's international behavior.

Maoist Strategy of Revolution

Mao's success as leader of the Communist revolution in China stemmed largely from two basic qualities: the ability to face reality squarely and the determination to change that reality. On the one hand, he fully realized the gap between his goal and the means at his disposal and harbored no illusions about the relative military strength of the Communists and the Kuomintang, but at the same time correctly discerned the contrast between the Kuomintang's military power and its political weakness. On the other, his determination led him gradually to evolve a set of political-military doctrines, principles and precepts which would enable the Communists first to survive the attacks of vastly superior Nationalist forces, then to expand their power, and finally to swing the balance of social forces in their favor and attain ultimate victory.

While stressing the indispensability of military power to achieve political purposes and implement political policies, Mao emphasized the primacy of such purposes and policies in order to provide military power with the necessary foundation and direction and to exploit the political weakness of the Kuomintang, thus compensating for the Communists' military inferiority. As his grand strategy, he evolved the concept of surrounding the cities from the countryside and the doctrine of protracted war. Concerning the form of military operations, he developed a doctrine of guerrilla warfare and its gradual transformation into mobile warfare. In military tactics, he stressed retreat and dispersal of forces when necessary to avoid defeat, but concentration of forces when opportunities arose to win battles of quick decision. As his objective on the battlefield, he subordinated the holding or conquest of territory to the annihilation of the enemy's effective strength and the preservation of his own forces. In evaluating the factors making for military success, he advanced the notion of the decisive importance of men rather than of weapons. Regarding appraisal of the enemy's strength, he emphasized the principle that the Communists should not underestimate their enemies with respect to each particular struggle, but on the other hand should not overestimate them from the viewpoint of the overall strategic situation. He stressed the need to combine prudence with revolutionary spirit. To stave off irreversible defeat, he turned the united front doctrine into a rationale for seeking temporary peace with the Kuomintang. To expand Communist influence while avoiding an all-out conflict, he practiced limited war. To transform partial military success into legitimate political gains, he sought a political settlement through negotiations in a favorable climate of opinion created by astute propaganda and a moderate political program. To clinch final victory when the balance of forces could be altered in his favor by large-scale fighting, he accepted all-out war. These doctrines, principles, precepts, and practices were consistent with one another and formed a coherent whole.

The Primacy of Politics

The conquest of political power by armed force required a military strength superior to that of the Kuomintang. But the Kuomintang's greatest strength lay precisely in its military power, while its weaknesses were political, economic and social. To develop military power in the service of the Communist revolution, it was necessary for the Communists to adopt certain policies designed to exploit the political chaos, economic stagnation, social ferment, and nationalistic sentiments fostered by foreign encroachments. These policies, directed at the most vulnerable chinks in the Kuomintang's armor, would provide the Communists with a political foundation on which to build up their own military power and, in the meantime, would

[15] Chen Yi, "Commemorating the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Publication of *Shih-Chieh chih-shih*," *Shih-chieh chih-shih*, Sept 10, 1964, p. 1.

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compensate for their military weakness through expanded political influence. Thus, necessity and political expediency reinforced the imperatives of a revolutionary ideology in impelling Mao to stress the paramount importance of the political purpose and policies which military power was employed to achieve.

According to Mao, political purpose gave direction to the armed struggle, differentiated real friends from the real enemy, legitimized the political leadership of the armed forces, and laid the political foundation on which military power must be built. "Without a political goal," he warned, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must [also fail] if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." [16] He further stressed that "any tendency . . . to belittle politics, to isolate war from politics, and to become advocates of 'war is everything,' is erroneous and must be corrected." [17] To assure the primacy of politics, a strong Communist party must take command of the army.[18]

Mao's political strategy prescribed, first of all, Communist espousal of the agrarian revolution in order to win the support of the peasants.[19] A workers' and peasants' political power must be established in the base areas, he held, to carry out social and economic reforms, to mobilize the masses, and to give support to the army. During the Sino-Japanese War, nationalism provided another powerful tool for mobilizing the masses.[20] The army, Mao taught, not only must fight to destroy the enemy's military strength, but also must "shoulder such important tasks as agitating the masses, organizing them, arming them, helping them to set up revolutionary political power, and even establishing organizations of the Communist Party." [21] In this manner, Mao laid the political foundations for building the military power which would in turn become the chief instrument for carrying through the Communist political revolution.

While there were many twists and turns in the implementation of Mao's political strategy, the essence of that strategy was to "develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, and isolate the die-hards."[22] Once the intermediate classes were won over and the archenemy isolated, the revolutionary forces, it was calculated, would enjoy such overwhelming popular support that their military power could be progressively developed and the balance of military power eventually tipped in favor of the revolution. Mao's mobilization of the peasants and his efforts to win over the intermediate classes did, in fact, draw new groups into the political arena, extended the base of political participation, and ultimately created a coalition of social forces larger and stronger than those supporting the Kuomintang. And, as the balance of armed strength tipped in their favor, the Communists' mounting military success enabled them to win over those whose chief concern was to be on the winning side.

From the Countryside to the Cities

While political goals and policies could provide the foundations for developing Communist military power and direct it towards certain general objectives, they furnished no guidance as to how this power could be used most effectively in terms of military strategy and tactics. On the basis of the lessons taught by both the early successes of Communist forces and the defeats they suffered in the Kuomintang's fifth campaign of encirclement and annihilation, Mao formulated and gradually systematized a strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside and a doctrine of protracted war.

Mao had first adopted or advocated some of his ideas in opposition to the early leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, which insisted on adhering to policies based in part on Soviet experience and backed by the Communist International. Mao argued that the mechanical application of Soviet military doctrines in China would lead to Communist defeat, and he urged

[16] Mao, "On Guerrilla Warfare," trans. by Samuel B. Griffith, New York, Praegar, 1961, p. 43.
[17] Mao, "On Protracted War," *Selected Works,* Vol. II, p. 158.
[18] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," *ibid.,* p. 228.
[19] Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works,* Vol. I, pp. 74, 80; "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," *ibid.*, p. 117.
[20] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962.
[21] Mao, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works,* Vol. I, p. 106.
[22] Mao, *Selected Works,* Vol. III, p. 194.

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the adoption of a strategy based on the peculiar conditions and characteristics of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army.[23]

In Mao's view, a basic characteristic of the Chinese revolutionary war differentiated it from revolutions in capitalist countries, including the October Revolution in Russia. In the latter, the first step had been to seize the cities, where proletarian strength was greatest, and then advance into the countryside. In China, however, the correct strategy was "to employ our main forces to create rural bases, surround the cities from the countryside, and use the bases to expedite the nationwide revolutionary upsurge."[24] Mao set forth the rationale for this strategy:

Since powerful imperialism and its allies, the reactionary forces in China, have occupied China's key cities for a long time, . . . they [the revolutionary forces] must build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural revolutionary bastions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who utilizes the cities to attack the rural districts, and, through a protracted struggle, gradually win an overall victory for the revolution.[25]

If the Kuomintang's hold on the urban centers was strong, its control over the vast rural areas was weak. By devoting themselves "mainly to rural work,"[26] the Communists exploited this fatal weakness and gradually built up a peasant army strong enough to defeat the Kuomintang.

Mao realized that the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside would take a long time, and he therefore developed his doctrine of protracted struggle. As Mao envisaged it in 1936, the struggle would take the form of a prolonged alternation between Nationalist campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" directed against the Communists and Communist countercampaigns.[27] This pattern, he predicted, would come to an end when the Red Army finally became stronger than the enemy and could launch its own campaign of encirclement and annihilation, against which the Kuomintang would be powerless because it lacked the political requisites for a successful countercampaign. This forecast was eventually borne out in late 1948 and 1949.

Mao's doctrine of protracted war rested upon simple principles governing tactics and battlefield objectives. The tactics prescribed for the period of Communist military inferiority were summed up in the now famous formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." Implicit in these tactics was the principle that the Communists' priority objective in battle was the preservation of their forces rather than the defense of Communist-held territory. Similarly, as Communist military strength increased and the guerrilla bands developed into regular units, greater stress was to be placed on the annihilation of enemy forces rather than the mere expansion of Communist territorial control. Mao's general plan of operations was to execute a strategic retreat deep into the Communist base areas in order to facilitate the concentration of his forces and create favorable conditions for defeating the enemy in a battle of quick decision, to be followed by a strategic counteroffensive.[28]

The doctrine that men rather than weapons are the decisive factor in war was fully consistent with the nature of guerrilla warfare, in which popular support is an essential ingredient of success. This doctrine, in turn, required a complementary set of psychological attitudes: on the one hand, cautious realism in estimating the enemy's present strength; on the other, confidence in his ultimate vincibility. Mao, in 1948, synthesized this balance of psychological elements as follows:

If, with regard to the whole, we overestimate the strength of our enemy and hence do not dare to overthrow him and do not dare to win victory, we shall be committing a right-opportunist error. If, with regard to each part, each specific problem, we are not prudent, do not carefully study and perfect the art of struggle, do not concentrate all our strength for battle . . . we shall be committing a "left"-opportunist error.[29]

[23] Mao "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 177, 192.
[24] Mao, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 178, 193-4, 197.
[25] Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Selected Works*, Vol. III (London, 1954), p. 85.
[26] Mao, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 190-5.
[27] Mao, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 198-203.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 203-48.
[29] Mao, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV (Peking), pp. 181-2.

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In 1957, he restated this thought in the principle that "strategically we should take all enemies lightly, but tactically take them seriously." [30]

Armed Struggle and Political Struggle

The overriding questions of political-military policy in a protracted struggle were when to seek peace, when to fight a war, and what form the war should take. In the course of the Communist revolutionary struggle against the Kuomintang, Mao found himself confronted by three different political-military situations and adopted three different policies to cope with them. In a sense, these policies paralleled the usual alternatives open to states acting on the international plane under analogous circumstances: to seek peace, to fight a limited war, or to accept all-out war. But on a deeper level of analysis, Mao's conception of these alternatives was demonstrably different. For him, seeking peace meant merely the cessation of all-out war and did not preclude limited armed clashes. Conversely, limited war was waged under the concept of "peaceful struggle": the threat or use of force on a limited scale was a fairly constant feature of Mao's practice of "peaceful struggle" rather than a last resort employed only when non-violent measures failed.[31]

Thus, in Mao's view, peace was as much a form of struggle as war, and emphasis could be shifted from one to the other in varying degrees depending upon the precise requirements of the existing situation. The essence of Mao's thought on this question has been succinctly summed up by Li Wei-han in the following words:

In order to defeat the enemy we must . . . be adept at choosing the most advantageous forms of struggle. The working-class party must arm itself to the teeth . . . with all the means and methods of struggle so as to be able to make timely changes in the form of struggle to suit changes in the situation. The forms of struggle can be divided into main and secondary, and which should be the main and which should be secondary differs under different historical conditions in different countries. The working class and the Communist Party must be good at mastering the main form of struggle under the historical conditions of the time and properly coordinating it with other forms of struggle; only by so doing can they deal the enemy effective blows and firmly maintain the leadership of the revolution.[32]

From 1927 up to the establishment of the second united front in 1937, the main form of struggle employed by the Chinese Communists was armed struggle, primarily as an instinctive response to the Kuomintang's policy of suppressing the Communists by force. From 1937 to July 1946, "peaceful political struggle" supplanted armed struggle as the main form, Mao's policy and initiative playing a large role in the transition, as we shall see. From July 1946 the main emphasis reverted to armed struggle, principally in response to the Kuomintang's postwar attempt to expel the Communists from stategic areas and its use of relentless military pressure to force the Communists to accept a political-military *fait accompli.* This Kuomintang policy was itself a response to Mao's prior resort to limited military actions (under the aegis of "peaceful struggle") for the purpose of expanding the territory under Communist control. Mao in 1946 shifted to all-out war when he saw that "peaceful struggle" was no longer advantageous to the Communists and that there was now a good chance of defeating the Kuomintang in a prolonged armed conflict despite continued Nationalist superiority in number of troops and arms. Limited war was therefore escalated into all-out war. The transitions in both 1937 and 1946 marked the culminations of fluctuating events and Communist moves over fairly long periods during which Mao had been preparing for the next main form of struggle.

Mao was adept not only in alternating the main form of struggle in the light of changing conditions, but also in blending and coordi-

[30] *Comrade Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,"* Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961, pp. 25-6.

[31] Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China and Nuclear Force,* RAND Corporation, p. 9.

[32] Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," *Peking Review,* March 2, 1962, p. 12. The first installment of this article appeared in the Feb. 23, 1962, issue. The article is one of the most significant and revealing published by the Chinese Communists on their revolutionary strategy and tactics.

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nating the methods of peaceful (*i.e.*, political) and armed struggle in an integrated course of action. This coordination of the two forms of struggle to achieve a political objective was one corollary of Mao's general principle that military power is indispensable to the accomplishment of a political purpose and that, conversely, political purpose must govern the use of military power. Its effect was to make force a constant instrument to be used in conjunction with other methods.

Thus, in the period from 1927 to 1937, when the main emphasis was on armed struggle, political struggle—in the specific form of appeals and agitation for cessation of the civil war—was intensified and broadened as the military fortunes of the Communists ebbed and the possibility of total defeat drew closer.[33] This Communist political effort was facilitated by the political conditions created in China by Japan's aggressive actions: *i.e.*, by the rising tide of Chinese nationalism demanding internal unity in the face of foreign aggression and opposing Chiang Kai-shek's policy of subordinating resistance against Japan to suppression of the Communists, and by consequent policy divisions within the Kuomintang. Mao's political maneuvers were instrumental in bringing about the Sian Incident of December 1936, which forced Chiang to agree to an informal truce in the civil war against the Communists.

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937, the informal truce between the Kuomintang and the Communists developed into a formal united front, officially established in September 1937. The united front agreement, on its surface, committed the Communists to full political and military support of the Kuo-

[33] Mao, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 153-74, 354-7, 368-74; Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1936*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, pp. 64-5.

Mao on Limited War

[We]must pay attention to the following principles of self-defense. We shall never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we shall certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation; but once we are attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. As to the military attacks of the die-hards, we must resolutely, thoroughly, utterly and completely smash them. Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilize the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Thirdly, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows, we should make a truce with them. Then we should on our own initiative seek unity with the die-hards and, upon their consent, conclude a peace agreement with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are "justifiability," "expediency" and "restraint." Persisting in such justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hards chary of heedlessly attacking us . . . or heedlessly starting a large-scale civil war. And we can in this way win a favorable turn in the situation.

—Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 199.

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mintang in the war against Japan, but Mao never intended it to mean wholehearted Communist cooperation with, or unconditional obedience to, the Nationalist government. Rather, it was to be merely a temporary alliance based on the "independence and autonomy" of the Chinese Communist Party.[34] Thus, the Communists never relinquished their absolute and exclusive control over the Communist military units and base areas, and the Communist armies were instructed from the outset to conduct guerrilla operations on their own initiative and independently of the Nationalist military command.[35] Nor did Mao's united front policy exclude continued Communist "struggle against the Kuomintang." On the contrary, it called for the active pursuit of " 'peaceful' and 'bloodless' struggle waged along ideological, political and organizational lines," [36] and even—in certain situations—for resort to limited armed struggle. Thus, for the Communists, the united front meant merely that "peaceful political struggle" was for the time being the main form of struggle, and armed struggle the secondary or subordinate form.

An essential feature of Mao's doctrine of limited armed struggle was the requirement that Communist military activity be carefully regulated so as to achieve a strengthening of the Communist position vis-à-vis the Kuomintang without incurring undue risk of all-out war. Thus, the doctrine stressed that limited armed struggle must be primarily defensive in character (though not excluding counterattack); that it must be undertaken only when the Communists were adequately prepared and certain of a favorable outcome; and that the Communists, after gaining the advantage in a particular armed conflict, should quickly take the initiative in seeking to negotiate a temporary peace in order to limit the duration of hostilities and conserve Communist strength. The effect of this policy in practice was to punctuate armed clashes between the Communists and the Kuomintang with periodic "peace" negotiations in which "peaceful political struggle" temporarily supplanted armed struggle as the immediate method of advancing Communist aims. The fourfold objective of such negotiations was to prevent the escalation of limited conflict into all-out war; to gain formal recognition of some of the gains achieved by force of arms; to influence public opinion by a show of restraint and moderation; and finally to win time and political support for an all-out civil war, if it did come. Political bargaining thus became an inseparable complement to the military struggle. Mao's policy of seeking a political settlement while using military power to strengthen the Communist bargaining position and preparing for all-out war was clearly in evidence during the period between the summers of 1945 and 1946.

The Chinese Communist decision to shift to armed conflict as the principal form of struggle can be traced to a Central Committee inner-party directive of July 20, 1946, drafted by Mao, which called on the Communists to smash Chiang's offensive. Yet even the placing of primary emphasis on armed struggle was not incompatible with further negotiations provided they could be turned to Communist advantage. The negotiations which the Communists conducted with the Kuomintang in the latter half of 1946 and again in the early months of 1949 obviously represented a secondary resort to methods of "peaceful political struggle" simultaneous with and supplementing the use of armed force as the main form of struggle. Other examples of the secondary use of political methods of struggle were the Communist efforts to induce defections through secret contacts and understandings with Kuomintang officers; attempts to secure the piecemeal surrender of local Nationalist commanders through separate peace agreements; and the consistent Communist policy of granting lenient treatment to prisoners of war as part of an effort to induce them to join the Communist forces.

The central aim of the political struggle waged by the Communists in this period of the civil war was to build up a "very broad united front of the whole nation" against Chiang's government by winning over "all those who can be won over." The front was to embrace 90 percent of the people, isolating the small remaining group of "reactionaries," and was to be led by the

[34] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works,* Vol. II (new ed., London, 1958), pp. 67, 69, 218-22. For a discussion of this principle in its historical context, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, op. cit.,* pp. 137-41.
[35] Mao, *Selected Works,* Vol. II, p. 67.
[36] Mao, "Introductory Remarks to The Communist," *Selected Works,* Vol. III, p. 59.

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Communist Party.[37] The effectiveness of this political effort was such that, by the time the Communists were preparing to organize a new central government in 1949, Mao could declare, not without some justification:

The Chinese revolution is a revolution of the broad masses of the whole nation. Everybody is our friend except the imperialists, the feudalists and the bureaucrat-capitalists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices.[38]

There is little doubt that the Communists' political struggle to forge a united front helped them to gain victory in the armed struggle, while conversely their military success aided them in broadening and deepening the "revolutionary united front."

In waging political struggle as a supplement to armed struggle, Mao also was preparing for the transition once again from war to peace. The united front effort during the final phase of the armed struggle served to rally popular support for the Communists, to enlist non-Communist participation in the new regime, to retain the help of ex-Kuomintang personnel in running various agencies, to reassure businessmen and industrialists, and to minimize economic and administrative dislocation.

Peking's Global Strategy: Prospects and Problems

Since coming to power, the Chinese Communists have vigorously sought to propagate their own successful strategy of revolution as an appropriate model to be followed by revolutionary movements in other colonial or semicolonial countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To what extent is this claim justified? The answer depends, in part, on whether the objective conditions which made the success of the Chinese Communists possible exist or will emerge in these countries.

One of the most important of these conditions was the political weakness of the government in power. There is little doubt that the existing regimes in many underdeveloped countries are characterized by a similar weakness; but, as the example of the Chinese Nationalist regime itself up to 1937 shows, a politically weak but militarily strong government can still manage to consolidate its rule against relatively feeble opposition. In the last analysis, the decisive factor in undermining the Nationalist government in China and enabling the Chinese Communist Party to build up sufficient strength to overthrow it was the Sino-Japanese war. This suggests that a prolonged external conflict, or a war of national liberation, or possibly a civil war between two non-Communist groups, markedly enhances the applicability and chances of success of the Maoist model of revolution. It is perhaps for this reason that the Chinese Communists profess to see a progressive intensification of conflicts and contradictions everywhere in the non-Communist world—conflicts among the capitalist countries, between newly-independent nations and the Western powers, between colonial or semicolonial countries and the "imperialist" powers.

A less important but by no means negligible factor in Mao's victory was the acquisition by the Communists of captured Japanese arms handed over to them by the Soviet forces in Manchuria after Japan's surrender. This points to the role of the geographical contiguity of areas controlled by revolutionary forces to the territory of an established Communist state. In the case of Viet-Nam, this factor admittedly has vital importance today. Finally, Mao's march to power was aided by the fact that Western policy placed very few obstacles in his way. These, then, were the four principal objective conditions which contributed to the success of the Maoist strategy of revolution in China. The extent to which analogous conditions do or do not exist in any particular country must obviously affect the prospects for the successful application of that strategy elsewhere in Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

If one looks beyond the prospects for Maoist-type revolutions in individual countries to the global situation, there are formidable obstacles which Mao must overcome or else face the eventual failure of his foreign policy. Unlike the Kuomintang, his two chief international an-

[37] Mao, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (Report to the CCP Central Committee, December 1947), *Selected Works,* Vol. IV (Peking), pp. 171-2.

[38] Mao, *Selected Works,* Vol. IV (Peking) pp. 220, 225-6, 407.

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tagonists at the present time, the United States and the Soviet Union, represent dynamic forces in the world arena; both are politically and militarily strong. Mao's military strategy and tactics, moreover, were developed for guerrilla and mobile warfare with conventional weapons and are totally inapplicable to all-out war in the nuclear age, even for the defense of the Chinese mainland. While official Chinese doctrine has been modified somewhat in the light of nuclear weapons development, some Chinese military leaders have argued that this adaptation does not go far enough.[39]

The basic obstacle in the path of Mao's attempt to apply his political-military strategy on a worldwide scale is, however, the system of national states itself. It was the inherent conflict between the universalist pretensions of communism and the nation-state system which in the first place produced Mao's own "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China. Yet, Mao now insists upon the correctness, for the whole Communist camp, of a political-military strategy based largely on the particular experience of the Chinese revolution, and this has disrupted the unity of the camp. Again, although Mao effectively exploited the forces of nationalism in his bid for power in China and now seeks to turn these forces against the West in other areas of the world, nationalism is also likely to become a formidable obstacle to his own international ambitions as fear of Chinese expansionism grows. The further he tries to move beyond the area of traditional Chinese cultural hegemony, the more formidable will the barriers of nationalism become.

Thus, the attempted projection of Mao's revolutionary strategy into the international arena is a factor which, quite apart from the Marxist-Leninist ideology, complicates Peking's adjustment to the system of national states. Peking's leaders undoubtedly realize that it will be necessary for Communist China to live with that system for a long time to come, but their tendency to see the international situation and to fashion their foreign strategy in the light of their own revolutionary experience inhibits their understanding of the rules that govern the conduct of national states. Maoist revolutionary strategy was developed in a civil war in which the contending groups were not separated by any national boundaries. Yet the strategy and tactics employed in a conflict within a single country, however moderate or cautious, are not always applicable in the international arena. Indeed, a given strategy or tactic adopted in the struggle against a political group or party may have completely different implications and consequences when applied against a foreign power.

Many of the discrepancies between Peking's professions and actions arise not so much from hypocrisy as from the conflict between the need to live with the system of national states and the tendency to project Mao's revolutionary strategy abroad. Thus, Peking loudly denies that revolution can be exported, yet at the same time it advocates and supports "national liberation movements" everywhere. It proclaims the "five principles of peaceful co-existence," which embody the generally recognized rules of international behavior; yet in its actions it constantly violates the spirit and the letter of these principles.

The Chinese Communists' whole understanding of war and peace is filtered through their revolutionary experience, their concept of armed and "peaceful" struggle, and their propensity to use force as a constant instrument of policy.[40] They denounce solutions of international issues based on the concept of spheres of influence—even if Communist China is given her fair share—and in so doing, they reject a time-honored and widely-accepted method of resolving conflicts within the nation-state system.

The Chinese Communists' projection of their revolutionary strategy abroad is a more systematic and self-conscious expression of the general tendency of many peoples to see others as they see themselves, to judge foreign events and institutions by their own standards, and to

[39] Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb,* New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 24-82. See also Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit.;* David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *China Quarterly* (London), Oct.-Dec. 1961, p. 65.

[40] Marshal Lo Jung-huan claimed that no better discussion of the question of war and peace is to be found than in a speech by Mao in 1945 which dealt with CCP-Kuomintang relations and the civil war in China. *Work Correspondence,* No. 8 (Feb. 6, 1961), p. 17.

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understand developments in other countries and societies in terms of their own experience. This tendency has often produced deleterious results as much for those who have practiced it as for those at whom it has been directed. In the 19th century, Western traders and missionaries, backed with force by their governments, introduced alien ideas and values into China, disrupting the Confucian order; and the disintegration of the traditional social and political system eventually doomed Western hopes of seeing the emergence of a China fashioned after the image of a Christian, democratic nation. Instead, social, political and economic chaos gave rise to a totalitarian regime at odds with the traditions of its own country as well as bitterly hostile to the outside world.

The tendency of a successful revolutionary élite to project its way of life abroad, to view the outside world in terms of its self-image, is particularly pronounced. Such an élite finds adjustment to the international environment difficult. It is given to creating disturbances in the system of national states, and especially in the balance of power. The Chinese Communist Party is no exception to this rule. Mao's revolutionary strategy will tend to make Communist China a disruptive influence in world politics for some time to come and will delay its adjustment to the established norms of international behavior. In the meantime, Communist China will be a formidable force to reckon with, and Mao's strategy will pose a serious challenge to the stability and peace of the world.

North Viet-Nam: A Profile

By Bernard B. Fall

The inclusion of the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam" (DRVN), as Communist North Viet-Nam labels itself, within the scope of military action by South Vietnamese and US forces has suddenly focused world attention on one of the least-known countries of the Communist orbit. Larger geographically than the three Soviet Baltic republics combined, and having—as of 1964—a population of about 18.2 million, North Viet-Nam ranks fourth in both area and population among the countries of the bloc. The DRVN, dating its birth from September 2, 1945, is also the second-oldest "people's democracy" after Mongolia, and it stands alone with Yugoslavia in having come into being without the help of Soviet bayonets or the presence of a larger Communist power.

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These factors alone warrant a close study of the North Vietnamese regime, for they suggest a far greater degree of solidity and cohesion than is usually found in a small Communist country. As one French observer has correctly remarked, the DRVN's "communism is not the result of an alien overlay. . . but the product of a long-maturing and hardening process in the course of the anti-French struggle," [1] and—one may now add—in the equally long fight for the eventual control of South Viet-Nam. The same factors also have a profound influence upon the attitude that Hanoi has thus far taken towards the Sino-Soviet split, as well as upon the DRVN's approach to its confrontation with the United States in the South Vietnamese conflict. A look at the historical, political and economic background of North Viet-Nam will serve to bring the whole problem into clearer focus.

From Clandestinity to Resistance

Like many of the Communist movements in former colonial countries, that of Viet-Nam started abroad—among Vietnamese living in France, Russia, and China. Under the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc ["Nguyen-the-Patriot"], the DRVN's present President, Ho Chi Minh, was a co-founder of the French Communist Party when the latter split off from the French Socialist Party in 1920. By 1923, Ho had risen high enough in the French Communist hierarchy to be sent to Moscow as a delegate to the *Krestintern* (Peasant International), and later to attend the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924 as a French colonial delegate.[2] It is worthy of note that he intervened very strongly in the 1924 Congress debates on two specific points: namely, the importance of the anti-colonial struggle (he asserted that Stalin was one of the few Communist leaders who attached proper weight to the colonial question); and the importance of the peasantry in the revolutionary movements of colonial and semicolonial areas. In the latter connection, Dr. Ernst Kux, noted Far Eastern specialist of the Swiss newspaper *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, recently observed that Ho had been well ahead of Mao Tse-tung in advancing "the thesis that Communist revolutions in the colonial areas must be carried out by the peasant masses under the leadership of the party." Kux goes on to remark:

Ho's assertion that practical acts and leadership of the revolution are more important than the formulation of ringing theses became the mainstream of his own future activities. In fact, he almost repeated it verbatim at the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in 1961.[3]

This pragmatic trait has manifested itself throughout Ho Chi Minh's career to this day, and it has also marked the whole approach of the North Vietnamese party leadership to the thorny problem of relations with the party's competing Soviet and Chinese mentors. Ho's personal loyalty to Stalin during the 1930's perhaps explains why he survived the various purges that sent almost all of his early Comintern associates to death or into exile, and there is absolutely no evidence that the North Vietnamese Communists ever swerved from their pro-Moscow sympathies until Stalin's death in 1953.

Ho's stay in the Soviet Union in 1923-24 marked the first shift of Vietnamese communism away from a West European (mostly French) to a more specifically Soviet orientation. His own assignment in December 1924 to Mikhail Borodin's Soviet mission to Sun Yat-sen's Chinese revolutionary government in Canton as an "interpreter" (actually to work as a Communist organizer of Vietnamese exiles in South China) strikingly underlined this new orientation towards Moscow—the more so because of the Chinese context. Within a few days after his arrival in Canton, Ho addressed a preliminary report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern in which he described his principal future task to be "the unification of various Vietnamese nationalist groups under Communist leadership." [4] The task was not to be an easy one since many of the Vietnamese exile groups

[1] Cheverny, *Eloge du colonialisme—Essai sur les révolutions d'Asie*, Paris, Julliard, 1961, p. 177.

[2] There is no full-length biography of Ho Chi Minh. The author has attempted a biographical essay in *The Two Viet-Nams* (rev. ed.) New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 81-103.

[3] Kux, *Die Satelliten Pekings*, Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1964, pp. 38-39.

[4] Kux, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

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either were hostile to the Communist ideology or, if sympathetic, had come into contact with Communist ideas in France and were reluctant at first to accept the authority of the totally unknown Russian-trained Vietnamese organizers in Canton. But the Canton group had several important assets in its favor: (1) it had official Comintern support; (2) it was able to utilize Chinese Nationalist military academies for training cadres; [5] and (3) it had Ho Chi Minh as its leader.

Vietnamese Communist reliance on Soviet and Comintern support only increased after Chiang Kai-shek's break with Moscow in 1927, which led to the expulsion of the Soviet mission from Canton and the near-destruction of the Chinese Communist party apparatus. Ho and his associates switched operations to the nearby British crown colony of Hong Kong, which offered excellent liaison with the outside world because of its direct location on the shipping lanes to both Western Europe and Vladivostok. It was in Hong Kong that the final differences among the three existing Vietnamese fractions of the Third International (there was also a strong Trotskyite group) were hammered out. Confronted with a communication from the Comintern which stated that the existence of these differences "under present circumstances is a grave error and an even greater danger," [6] the leaders of the various factions finally came to terms. On February 3, 1930, the *Dong Duong Cong San Dang* (Indochinese Communist Party, or ICP) was born in the bleachers of a Hong Kong stadium, where the newly-constituted Central Committee held its inaugural meeting while a soccer game was in progress.

A Chequered Course

The ICP soon experienced its first crisis in the course of a peasant uprising in the Central Vietnamese province of Nghe-An—Ho Chi Minh's province of birth—in the spring of 1930. There has thus far been no definitive account of the uprising, and existing sources conflict as to its interpretation. Basically, it grew out of a totally non-Communist mutiny of native soldiers in Tongking (North Vietnam), which then spread to the peasantry as a consequence of drastically-falling commodity prices caused by the "Great Depression." A Vietnamese Communist, evaluating the uprising in 1960, admits to "serious errors"—notably that the rebellion was entirely based on the small peasantry, rejecting the support, on the side of the French, of all other bourgeois elements. That error was, in fact, duly condemned by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in May 1931 as "leftish and sectarian" and "not in accordance with the principles of communism. . ." [7]

The ensuing repression of the Vietnamese Communist movement rendered it almost leaderless (and well-nigh memberless) for nearly five years until the advent of a Popular Front government in France brought about a softening of anti-Communist police activity in Indochina. Tran-Phu, the first secretary-general of the ICP, was among those arrested by the colonial authorities in Indochina, dying in prison in September 1931. Ho Chi Minh, who was still in Hong Kong, was arrested there by the British in June 1931, but was released later that year and went underground in Shanghai before returning to Russia and Western Europe, where he remained until 1938. The ICP's second secretary-general, Le Hong Phong, stayed abroad until the more lenient Popular Front policy took hold in Indochina.

In July 1936, the ICP Central Committee officially adhered to the "Dimitrov Line" as laid down at the Seventh Comintern Congress and withdrew the slogans "Down with French Imperialism" and "Down with Feudalism." A short period of political collaboration with the French followed, but the honeymoon was interrupted by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 and the outbreak of World War II. Le Hong Phong was arrested and died on the guillotine in 1940. By the end of that year, the whole senior ICP apparatus had again withdrawn to China—but not to the areas held by the Chinese Communists; instead, it chose warlord-held Kwangsi province, bordering on Viet-Nam, as its base of operations.

A new secretary-general, Truong Chinh, was elected by the reconstituted ICP Central Com-

[5] According to North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong (*Le président Ho Chi Minh,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961, p. 52), "more than 200 cadres" were trained during 1925-27 at the Chinese Nationalist military academy at Whampoa and in Russia.

[6] Pham Van Dong, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

[7] Tran Huy Lieu, *Les Soviets du Nghé Tinh,* Hanoi, Foreign Languages, 1960, p. 52.

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mittee in May 1941. (His real name is Dang Xuan Khu, and his adoption of the pseudonym "Truong Chinh"—the Vietnamese term for the "Long March" of the Chinese Communists—reflects his long-standing personal admiration of the CCP.) Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh had rejoined the party apparatus in Kwangsi, but had subsequently antagonized the local Chinese warlords by resisting their pressure for integration of the ICP-in-exile with Vietnamese nationalist elements under their aegis. Arrested by the Chinese, Ho was kept in jail from August 1942 until September 1943. This presumably left Truong Chinh a fairly free hand to staff the party apparatus with his own men. Although he has never, to this day, attained the popularity and charisma of Ho or of General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dien Bien Phu, Truong unquestionably played a major role in the ICP's well-organized takeover of the Vietnamese anti-French revolution in the summer of 1945, which he himself has described in a small book that deserves more attention than it usually gets.[8]

It is vital to remember that, unlike any other successful Communist movement, the Vietnamese party fought its way to ruling power in virtual isolation. In Eastern Europe, Soviet troops were always present in the countries where Communist takeovers took place; in fact, they were an essential ingredient. In China, the turnover to the Communists of vast stores of Japanese arms by the Soviet forces in Manchuria was of vital importance to the CCP's military success, and the Russian military presence in North Korea insured the creation of a "people's democracy" there. In Albania, Tito's partisans played the role of Soviet troops elsewhere. In the Viet-Nam of 1945, on the contrary, the DRVN had no such support from either the Soviets or even the Chinese Communists (then bottled up in the hills of northwestern China); and connections with the French CP, then just emerging from four years of clandestinity, were probably nonexistent for the simple reason that the first postwar ships to go from France to Indochina only reached Saigon in late September 1945—and these were troop transports bringing the vanguard of the French Expeditionary Force. In other words, the Vietnamese Communists literally had to play their revolution alone and "by ear."

With practical political realism, Ho played down the Communist character of his regime and movement. The ICP was formally "dissolved" on November 10, 1945, and replaced by an "Association of Marxist Studies" under Truong Chinh. For a time, Ho also succeeded in getting his followers to adopt what was openly called the "Brest-Litovsk" doctrine, involving readiness to accept a partial and temporary return of French influence to Viet-Nam in order to get rid of a Chinese Nationalist military presence which, by virtue of its sheer numbers, threatened to become permanent. It was largely because the French were unwilling at this stage to consider relinquishment of their colonial sovereignty that the upper hand in Hanoi eventually passed to those who preferred the risk of all-out revolutionary war to the risk of being nibbled to death by ever-increasing encroachments of French military power. Ho's own failure, during negotiations in France in the summer of 1946, to sway even the French CP to support his viewpoint[9] must have heavily influenced his decision to press for a military contest. On December 19, 1946, the first Indochina War broke out. It ended seven and a half years later with the defeat of the French and the Geneva agreement of July 21, 1954, partitioning Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel.

Vietnamese "War Communism"

The war with the French in a way simplified some of the problems of Viet-Nam's Communist leaders. The fact that the struggle was a "resistance" movement against the colonial power made it easier to attract into an *union sacrée* many Vietnamese elements who otherwise would have eschewed association with the Communists. It also removed the ambiguity arising

[8] Truong Chinh, *Primer for Revolt: The Communist Takeover in Viet-Nam,* Praeger, New York, 1963.

[9] The French CP was then a member of the government coalition in France and had solid hopes of taking over the government. In that event, all French colonial areas would automatically have passed under Communist control. *Cf.* Fall, "Tribulations of a Party Line: The French CP and the Indochina War," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1955.

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from the negotiations with the French, which had laid the Communist leadership open to charges that it was ready to negotiate away "true" independence for the sake of short-range political gains. And lastly, it permitted the Communists to take some drastic steps in many fields under the guise of strengthening unity and discipline in the war effort.

The first constitution establishing the formal governmental structure of the DRVN in 1946 was enacted by an assembly from which all but two opponents of the Communists had been removed, but it discreetly made no mention of the Communist character of the state. This document remained in force until 1960 when it was replaced by a wholly new constitution making that character fully explicit.[10] Throughout the period of anti-French hostilities from 1946 until 1954, a Standing Committee of the National Assembly fulfilled all legislative functions, except for the convocation of an Assembly session in 1953 to enact a land reform law. In actual fact, governmental functions were carried out at the central level by Ho's council of ministers, assisted at various subordinate levels by "Committees of Resistance and Administration" (CRA) combining civilian, military and party elements.

Wherever feasible, the village-level CRA's were chosen by election. Needless to say, these elections were strongly influenced by the presence of "Viet-Nam People's Army" troops, although in many instances locally popular village chiefs managed to win positions as committee chairmen. Communist control, however, was ensured by a *can-bo* (cadre), who saw to it that the local CRA chairman did not deviate from the official party line. Furthermore, under a decree of November 11, 1948, the government gave the higher-level CRA's more power not only to override decisions by the local committees "contrary to higher order" (Article XII), but also to designate a provisional local CRA to replace a recalcitrant one (Article XIII).

On the political side, the "League for Revolution and Independence" (better known by its abbreviated title of Viet-Minh), which had been created in Kwangsi in May 1941, was supplemented in May 1946 by an even broader "united front" including non-Communist elements which had not been part of the émigré groups in China. This new front, the "League for the National Union of Viet-Nam" or Lien-Viet, also embraced a large number of subsidiary "national salvation" (*Cu'u Quoc*) groups, such as "Women for National Salvation," "Catholics for National Salvation," etc., thus making it appear that the regime had the backing of a broad variety of parties.

External developments brought the next major political change. In December 1949, Red Chinese troops arrived on the North Vietnamese border, providing the DRVN for the first time with direct access to the Communist bloc and all that this meant—*i.e.*, plentiful military supplies; a sanctuary for casualties and training camps; and, above all, easy exchange of political delegations with the Communist countries. This made recognition of the DRVN by members of the bloc more than an empty gesture, and by the end of February 1950 all the bloc countries, as well as Yugoslavia, had extended such recognition. It meant further that the regime was no longer as dependent as hitherto on the internal support of non-Communist and bourgeois elements.

The result was that in March 1951 the old ICP was resurrected in the form of a specifically Vietnamese (rather than, as before, "Indochinese," *i.e.*, including Cambodia and Laos) "Workers' Party," or Dang Lao-Dong. Its secretary-general was the same Truong Chinh who had previously been ICP secretary-general and later chairman of the succeeding "Marxist Studies Association." The radicalization of its posture was reflected in a new slogan: "The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles are of equal importance."

At the same time, the Viet-Minh was merged into the broader Lien-Viet front, and traditional Vietnamese Communist predominance in the revolutionary movements of neighboring Cambodia and Laos was reasserted through a meeting (March 3-11, 1951) between Ton Duc Thang, later Vice-President of the DRVN; Prince Souphanouvong of Laos, the leader of the Pathet-Lao movement; and Sieu Heng, the head of the "Khmer [*i.e.*, Cambodian] Liberation Committee." A Communist source provides clear evidence of the importance of the conference:

[10] For a full English text of the 1960 Constitution, see Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit.*

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It was decided to set up a Viet-Nam—Khmer—Lao Alliance which called on the people of the three countries to coordinate their fight to defeat the colonialists. It was on the basis of these decisions . . . that Vietnamese volunteers later entered Cambodia and Laos to fight side by side with the Khmer Issarak forces—by then the Khmer National Liberation Army—and the Pathet-Lao.[11]

The effective satellization of the Cambodian and Laotian Communist movements under Vietnamese aegis was clearly illustrated at the Geneva conference of 1954. There, after some initial skirmishing, the Communist side accepted the fact that the Khmer and Lao "resistance movements" would not be seated at the conference table, and Brigadier-General Ta Quang Buu, the Oxford-educated Vietnamese senior military representative, signed the Cambodian and Laotian cease-fire agreements on behalf of the "Khmer Resistance Forces" and the Pathet-Lao.

The Geneva conference signaled the emergence of the DRVN as a full-fledged power. Its political and administrative institutions were in place, and it boasted a formidable army capable not only of waging a protracted revolutionary war but also of fighting standing battles against relatively well-armed Western forces.

After Partition

The 1954 Geneva cease-fire left the northern sector of Viet-Nam above the 17th parallel in the hands of the DRVN, while the somewhat larger southern part, now inhabited by about 14.8 million people, came under the rule of the anti-Communist government of Ngo Dinh Diem. It is still not entirely clear why the DRVN accepted the compromise of a "temporary" division of Viet-Nam inasmuch as the prospects for the holding of a reunification election within two years, as provided by the Geneva agreements, seemed fairly slim from the outset. Soviet pressure on North Viet-Nam for the sake of improving Russian relations with France—more specifically, for the purpose of inducing Paris to block the creation of a European Defense Community including West Germany—may well have been the main factor behind Hanoi's agreement.

Another probable factor was the pragmatism of the North Vietnamese Communist leadership. Ho Chi Minh has characteristically settled for a safe half-loaf rather than fight to the finish merely to prove a point. Moreover, the consolidation of Communist power in North Viet-Nam after four years of Japanese depredation, one year of Chinese pilfering, and eight years of scorched-earth war with the French was a formidable enough problem to tackle. To be sure, South Viet-Nam's rice surplus would have been of value to the North, but it must not be forgotten that the 1954 agreements provided for unhindered trade between the two zones. The fact that this never materialized no doubt contributed to the DRVN's later decision to attempt a settlement by force.

Following the Geneva accords, the DRVN settled down to the task of transforming itself into a full-fledged "people's democracy." A "Population Classification Decree" issued in March 1953 had divided the population into distinct social categories, and the regime now proceeded to eliminate all landlords by methods of force and terror reminiscent of the Chinese Communists—and with similar results. Exact figures remain unavailable, but the number of peasants killed during the North Vietnamese "land reform" drives from 1954 to 1956 is variously estimated at between 50 and 100 thousand.

This brutal policy led to the outbreak, in November 1956, of a veritable peasant rebellion in Nghe-An Province—the same region which had been the seat of the pro-Communist peasant uprising of 1930. Ho stepped in, as he often had before, to save the unity of his movement without making irreconcilable enemies of the losers—in this case, Truong Chinh and the pro-Peking wing of the party, which stood for all-out collectivization of peasant land. Truong himself was dismissed as party secretary-general, though retaining his Politburo seat, while lower-ranking agricultural officials were purged altogether. (Ho assumed the secretary-generalship himself, occupying the post until 1961 when he relinquished it to Le Duan, a South Vietnamese Communist.) In the ensuing "rectification of errors" campaign, tens of thousands of people were released from prison camps, and the Lao-Dong Party saw its membership drop from

[11] W. Burchett, *Mekong Upstream,* East Berlin, Seven Seas Books, pp. 89-90.

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700,000 to 420,000.[12] It is doubtful that such drastic actions would have been taken had de-stalinization not been the order of the day, but the Khrushchev speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 had apparently not fallen on deaf ears in Hanoi. From the Nghe-An outbreaks of November 1956 until the spring of 1957, the North Vietnamese press freely published graphic accounts of life in DRVN prison camps—something that was matched only years later in the Soviet Union, and never in Communist China, even during the "Hundred Flowers" period.

The relative political calm which followed, coupled with a succession of two good crops in 1958-59, made the situation propitious for a gradual changeover from the makeshift wartime

[12] Kux, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

Life in Hanoi: From a Correspondent's Notebook

. . . The skilled worker makes less than $10 a week, and as his wife works too, he has managed to buy a windbreaker for winter, and perhaps even a radio of the sort that will get only the local station, but does not set him back more than $30. He has a pound a day of rationed rice for 3 cents, and can buy more on the free market if he pays half as much again. Salt and oil are also rationed, and so are woolens and cotton cloth. He may eat pork only once a month, but fish and vegetables are plentiful and fairly cheap.

However, the side streets are unkempt and malodorous, and grass sprouts in the cracked concrete. There is little in the shops beyond cheap china, thick glass, gaudily painted thermos flasks, plastic travel bags, shoddy shoes and junk that almost no one buys. There are many bicycles, but hardly any cars. Power even to feed the people could be disastrously curtailed by one crop failure, and has been achieved only by ruthless emergency measures.

Turn a corner in Hanoi, visitors say, and you may see a deceptively cheerful scene. A few families are boarding trucks with bundles and battered cases, while a crowd sees them off to the country. There are one or two banners, a speech, a bunch of gladioli for someone, waving hands.

But there is little laughter, for the "country" means the wild, forbidding mountains to the north and west of the rich rice-bowl of the Red River delta in which they have lived all their lives. They are "volunteer" migrants, pioneers who will settle where only tough hill tribesmen have lived before, condemned to strange diets of manioc or corn, root crops and yams, hill rice if they are lucky; to the plagues of flies that sometimes smother the palm leaf and bamboo villages they build; to the virgin jungle and timberland they must tame.

More than 300,000 people have so far been expelled from the delta to these ranges, with only the crudest medical facilities, and in some areas the death rate from disease has been disturbingly high.

They must go because the population is increasing by more than 500,000 a year, while pretentious Socialist plans for raising rice production have failed miserably in practice. Deprived of the rice barrel of South Viet-Nam, from which the North formerly drew up to 300,000 tons of grain a year, the Communists announced that they would produce 7.6 million tons of grain in 1960; and, in fact, found their output still below 5 million tons, even two years later. . . .

The people have been told to tighten their belts, to eat more vegetables, for despite $800 million of Communist-bloc aid (the Chinese offering more than the Russians) this country remains obstinately impoverished.

Hanoi nevertheless maintains a regular army of 250,000 men, and last year sent some 20,000 troops, with quantities of arms and ammunition, down the Ho Chi Minh trail to join the Viet Cong guerrillas fighting for mastery of the South. There are empty barracks in Hanoi, troops in full marching order to be seen assembled at the railway station, trainees in uniform in the streets in the evening. The Communists want the South for its rice, and as a market for the industrial products they find so difficult to sell in a competitive world.

—From a dispatch by Dennis Bloodworth, of the London Observer, *reprinted with permission of The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), May 16, 1965.*

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pattern of governmental administration to a more permanent system. At the lower levels, the old CRA's were reorganized in 1958, divorcing the military and party elements (at least officially) from the administrative structure. The new machinery of government was patterned fairly closely after the Soviet model, with locally-elected People's Councils, each of which in turn picks an Administrative Committee from its midst. At the village level, the Administrative Committees are composed of at least a chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary, while those for larger administrative divisions are correspondingly more elaborate.[13] Interestingly enough, the functioning of this machinery has been criticized even in the Lao-Dong's own newspaper, *Nhan-Dan* (Humanity), which charged that members of the People's Councils often fail to listen to the complaints of their constituents and are not familiar with local problems, causing a "loosening of the ties between the government and the people."[14]

In the matter of territorial organization, the DRVN, unlike South Viet-Nam, maintained the established provincial boundaries from the French period, thus leaving the population by and large within a familiar administrative environment. Two "autonomous zones," each embracing several provinces, also were created to accommodate the bulk of the 2.5 million minority tribesmen living in North Viet-Nam: the Thai-Meo Zone (now renamed Tay-Bac, which simply means "Northwest") was created in May 1955; and the Viet-Bac (Northern Viet-Nam) Zone in August 1956. Both have their own zonal assemblies and administrative committees, whose chairmen in both cases are former People's Army generals of tribal origin, as well as their own militia forces.

Central Political Structure

The most important institutional changes, however, affected the central government. From November 1946 until May 1960, the DRVN had operated with the same National Assembly, but the membership of this body had shrunk from 444 to 202 owing to purges of its non-Communist members, the desertion or capture of others during the war, and normal attrition. The low standing of the Assembly was evidenced by the passage of revolution in January 1957—that is, after the 1956 uprising—requesting that the Assembly's parliamentary immunities be respected and that bills proposed by the executive be presented for legislative approval within the proper deadlines.[15] These complaints led the regime to scrap plans for a perfunctory revision of the original 1946 constitution and to charge the committee appointed for this purpose with framing an altogether new constitution. After a year of preparatory work by the committee, in which Ho took a personal hand, the draft constitution was presented for public discussion in April 1959 and, after many amendments, was adopted by the legislature on January 1, 1960.

Consisting of 112 articles divided into ten sections, the 1960 DRVN Constitution is set apart from the run-of-the-mill constitutions of the other "people's democracies" by the virulence of its denunciations of the West and the doctrinaire extravagance of its praise of communism and the personal role of President Ho Chi Minh. The extremely long preamble is a recital of Vietnamese history over the past twenty years and a paean of homage to the "farsighted leadership . . . of President Ho." The latter is vested, in practice, with almost unlimited power inasmuch as the Vice-President, who is empowered by the Constitution to "replace the President by proxy [sic] in all of his powers," happens to be Ton Duc Thang, an old and faithful friend of Ho's, who is in his 80's and hardly likely to step into Ho's shoes. The Premier and five Vice-Premiers wield very little authority, and the unicameral National Assembly—like its prototype, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—is a mere rubber-stamping body.

North Viet-Nam's judicial system also merits a few comments. While nominally guaranteeing the independence of the courts, the Constitution practically nullifies this guarantee by making the courts "responsible" to the People's Councils at each level and placing the Supreme Court under the authority of the National Assembly and its Standing Committee. In addition to the courts, the Constitution makes provision for a brand new apparatus of "People's Control Organs" which seem to combine features of the

[13] DRVN, Law on the Organization of People's Councils and Administrative Committees of October 27, 1962.
[14] *Nhan-Dan*, November 24, 1962.
[15] Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit.*, p. 140.

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Soviet Communist Party's "Control Commission," the Soviet Procurator's Office, and the Chinese Nationalists' "Control Yuan." The "People's Control Organs" have both civil and military sections and seemingly are a law unto themselves, except that the Supreme Control Organ (now headed by a reliable old Communist guerrilla leader from South Viet-Nam, Pham Van Bach) is, like all other government organs, nominally subject to supervision by the National Assembly. A law promulgated in July 1960 gives the Control Organs the power to bring to justice all cases under inquiry, as well as to "suspend prosecution, [to] participate in judicial processes, and [to] appeal judgments of lower courts."

It is readily apparent that the structure of the North Vietnamese state as fixed by the 1960 Constitution contains little that offers any real prospects of liberalization. Elections held since the adoption of the Constitution have amply confirmed this. The elections of May 8, 1960, for the new national legislature followed the standard Communist pattern, with 99.8 percent of the voters casting ballots for a total of 458 candidates "competing" for 404 seats. Two small minority parties (Democratic and Socialist), whose existence is tolerated as long as they obediently collaborate with the Communists, were permitted to put up candidates in certain districts (notably in Hanoi) and won a few seats, but for the most part the voters were offered no choice. The latest regular legislative elections, held in April 1964, brought little apparent change, except for a reduction of the number of seats to be filled to 366, for which 448 candidates ran.[16]

Thus, North Viet-Nam has become a full-fledged Communist state, backed by a strong army and an ubiquitous party. The intellectuals, who enjoyed a brief taste of freedom of expression during the period of relaxed intellectual controls in late 1956 and early 1957, have since been brought thoroughly into line and find themselves literally "frozen out" of any real participation in public affairs. North Viet-Nam's "Hundred Flowers" period, which took its cue from Communist China, lasted less than six months. Phan Khoi, one of the most brilliant Vietnamese intellectuals, succeeded in publishing only five issues of a new literary journal entitled *Nhan-Van* ("Humanism"—a word play on the name of the Communist daily *Nhan-Dan*, meaning "Humanity") before it was banned. As elsewhere in the Communist bloc, the ensuing crackdown covered all branches of the arts from painting to music, and the repressive measures taken by the regime ranged from forced self-criticism—as in the case of one intellectual who was obliged to confess to the sin of reading the French liberal newspaper *Le Monde*—to outright trial for subversive activity. Five intellectuals, including one woman, were tried in January 1960 on charges of having collaborated with *Nhan-Van* and were sentenced to prison terms up to fifteen years. Phan Khoi himself died before going on trial, and his son, Phan Thao, died from unexplained causes seven months later. Thousands of other intellectuals, along with high school and college students, have been conscripted into "education-and-work" programs similar to those instituted in Communist China.[17]

Faltering Economy

Notwithstanding all the confident claims of the DRVN leadership, the overall progress of the economy of North Viet-Nam has not lived up to official expectations.[18] This was acknowl-

[16] Viet-Nam Information Bulletin May 30, 1964.

[17] Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1964, pp. 109-162. Cf. also Fall, *Le Viet-Minh, 1945-1960*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1960, pp. 320-30.

[18] The following table affords some idea of the progress achieved by the North Vietnamese economy in the production of various key commodities, using 1939 figures (adjusted to cover only those parts of Indo-China now included in North Viet-Nam) as a basis for comparison. All statistics for later years are based on unverifiable Communist sources, in some cases representing an average of conflicting figures, and hence should be regarded as only a rough approximation. Nevertheless, they serve to illustrate the relatively low level of economic development to date, especially in relation to population growth. Figures for rice, coal, cement, phosphate and steel are in thousands of tons; for cattle, in thousands of head; for electricity, in millions of kilowatts; and for textiles, in millions of meters.

Commodity	1939	1955	1960	1963	1964
Rice	2,453	3,600	4,146	4,200	4,300
Cattle	1,351	1,084	2,900	2,233	2,326
Coal	2,615	641	2,595	3,300	3,200
Cement	305	9	400	582	590
Phosphate	31	8	65	163	—
Steel	130	0	3	20	50
Electricity	122	53	271	442	530
Textiles	55	39	86	92	—

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edged in the 1964 report of the General Statistical Office, which stated that production in several basic branches of state industry "showed relatively slow growth . . . and failed to respond to the demands of a rapidly-growing national economy."[19] However, it is in agriculture that the DRVN faces it most serious economic problem—a problem aggravated by the fantastic growth rate of the population, amounting to 3.2 percent, or about a half-million new mouths each year. Tran Huu Duc, former Minister of State Farms and a member of the Party Central Committee, wrote in the party's theoretical monthly *Hoc-Tap* (February 1962) that the "ridiculously low" per-capita acreage of available agricultural land posed a "serious obstacle to the raising of living standards." He further warned that the problem would become more critical unless about 600,000 hectares (1.5 million acres) of new land could be brought into cultivation by 1965. Not only has there been no such spectacular expansion of agricultural acreage, but about 260,000 hectares of already cultivated rice land were flooded during the heavy typhoons of 1964.

Although agricultural collectivization has been carried forward in North Viet-Nam at a much slower pace than in Communist China, cooperative farms now embrace about 95 percent of all lowland agriculture. In 1964 there also were some 59 state farms, largely experimental in nature and operated for the most part by the People's Army. Private farming nevertheless continued to account for a substantial proportion of the available food supply and has helped a great deal to prevent the food situation from deteriorating to an intolerable level. In March 1965, the regime openly admitted that the 1964 rice crop was about 5.1 percent below the planned level and only 2.1 percent above the admittedly bad harvest of 1963.

Progress in industrial development has been more satisfactory, but at heavy cost. A basic Three-Year Plan for 1958-60 was never fulfilled, and the first Five-Year Plan (1960-65) had to be extensively scaled downward in 1963 in accordance with a more realistic appraisal of the country's capabilities. Even so, the industrial development program has depended heavily on economic aid from other Communist countries, amounting as of the end of 1961 to $662 million from Communist China, $365 million from the Soviet Union, and $38 million from the East European countries.[20] In recent years this assistance has tended increasingly to take the form of loans and trade credits instead of outright grants, augmenting the long-term burden on the North Vietnamese economy. How heavy this burden could become is clearly indicated by the size of the deficits which North Viet-Nam has been piling up in its trade with the Soviet Union: for instance, in 1962, North Vietnamese imports from the USSR amounted in value to $54.6 million as against exports to the USSR of only $30.1 million.

Hanoi Between Peking and Moscow

Apart from the increasing risks attached to its direct involvement in the struggle for South Viet-Nam, the Hanoi regime faces a delicate external problem in keeping its relations with its feuding Soviet and Chinese allies on an even keel. Some outside observers have tended in the recent past to view the North Vietnamese leadership as leaning more and more towards the side of Peking—so much so, indeed, as to make it questionable that Hanoi's former cordial relationship with Moscow can ever be restored.[21] In fact, however, a closer survey of North Vietnamese actions and statements since the 22nd CPSU Congress in Moscow suggests that the Hanoi regime has sought to maintain a careful neutrality between Moscow and Peking by means of a balanced "dosage" of gestures towards both sides.

For instance, while in Moscow in November 1961, Ho Chi Minh publicly extolled the "unstinting fraternal aid" extended to his country by the Soviet Union and the East European countries, neglecting to mention the large-scale aid also received from China. Yet, when China's Chou En-lai left the 22nd Congress in a huff, Ho also saw fit to depart from Moscow—though only to tour the Soviet Union rather than to return home. Throughout 1962, Hanoi made repeated pleas for unity within the socialist

[19] *Bulletin du Viet-Nam,* March 15, 1964.

[20] Speech by Lê Thanh Nghi, Minister of Heavy Industry, March 18, 1962. No new figures have been made available.

[21] *E.g.,* P. J. Honey, *Communism in North Viet-Nam,* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1964, p. 196.

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camp, obviously seeking to avoid having to choose between Moscow and Peking.

North Viet-Nam's widening intervention in the South Vietnamese insurgency has also been viewed by some Western observers as signifying that the Hanoi regime is more wedded to Peking's ideological line of strident anti-Western struggle in the underdeveloped world than to Moscow's more conciliatory position. This, however, would be difficult to substantiate. Various explanations have been advanced in the West as to the genesis of the insurgency in South Viet-Nam and the North Vietnamese Communist role in it. Two common theses are: (1) that the whole insurgency began simply as an internal response to the repressive nature of the Diem regime, which left the local oppositionists no choice but resistance or extermination; [22] and (2) that the insurgency was instigated from North Viet-Nam pursuant to a policy decision taken in September 1960 at the 3rd Party Congress of the Lao-Dong in Hanoi.[23]

Neither of these theses, however, explains the highly methodical nature of insurgent operations in South Viet-Nam as early as 1957. As this writer has pointed out elsewhere,[24] killings of village officials inside South Vietnam reached the figure of 452 by 1957, and these were clustered in certain provinces, suggesting more than a random pattern. In fact, the geographic pattern of these insurgency incidents closely paralleled that of alleged South Vietnamese violations of the 1954 cease-fire charged in North Vietnamese complaints to the International Control Commission, providing a *prima facie* case for the existence of close coordination between the Communist guerrillas in South Viet-Nam and the North Vietnamese intelligence apparatus. It is also worthy of note that Communist-perpetrated incidents in South Viet-Nam remained at a low level during the 1954-56 period, when there was still talk about the holding of reunification elections (which the DRVN expected to win), but that such incidents picked up in intensity immediately after South Viet-Nam refused to agree to the holding of the elections in July 1956.[25]

This leaves still a third hypothesis regarding the origins of the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, namely, that the DRVN, as a Communist state occupying a sensitive position on the outer perimeter of the bloc, looked upon its South Vietnamese neighbor as a legitimate target for Communist subversive activities, and that the growth of internal tensions there elevated South Viet-Nam from a "random" objective of Communist subversion to a direct "target of opportunity." The North Vietnamese leadership evidently saw little harm in giving first moral and later physical aid to the insurgents, since such aid appeared unlikely to assume burdensome proportions or to entail any major risk of international complications. It probably was only as the United States' countercommitment grew that North Viet-Nam suddenly realized that it was in the process of being drawn into a major conflict.

The Hanoi regime has not, however, shown any intention of backing away from its increasingly burdensome intervention in South Viet-Nam. On the contrary, recent evidences—chiefly in the form of growing numbers of bloc-supplied weapons captured from insurgent forces and the taking of prisoners from such regular units of the North Vietnamese People's Army as the 325th Division—all suggest Hanoi's determination, at least for the moment, to press on with its offensive in the South.

From their own vantage point, both the Soviet Union and Red China must have looked upon the whole Vietnamese insurgency at first as a welcome irritant to the United States—and one which promised not to involve them directly since, on the basis of past performance against the French, North Viet-Nam seemed capable of handling the problem by itself with only a minimal amount of bloc aid. The moment of truth came in August 1964, when American reprisal raids on North Vietnamese patrol-boat bases

[22] This view has often been voiced by French writers. *E.g.*, see Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Viet-Nam," in Honey, *North Viet-Nam Today*, New York, Praeger, 1962; or Jean Lacouture, "Le F. N. L. est-il bien le 'satellite' de Hanoi?" in *Le Monde* [weekly ed.] April 21, 1965.

[23] *Cf.* the *White Books* published by the US Department of State in December 1961 and February 1965.

[24] Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems," *Pacific Affairs*, September 1958; and "Viet-Cong: The Unseen Enemy," *New Society* (London), April 22, 1965.

[25] South Viet-Nam based its refusal on the argument that under the existing conditions it would not be possible to hold elections free of Communist influence and with proper international safeguards.

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made it clear that the DRVN could not defend itself against air strikes, and that Peking had nothing to offer Hanoi in the way of sophisticated aircraft or anti-aircraft missiles—and, in fact, seemed reluctant to become directly involved at this point.

Nor is this apparent reluctance likely to be altogether one-sided, for Sino-Vietnamese relations—regardless of the regime in power in either country—have been notoriously uncordial for something like two thousand years.[26] Hence, an outright Red Chinese military commitment in defense of North Viet-Nam would no doubt be less palatable to the Hanoi regime than was the Red Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950-53 to the North Korean Communists. The North Vietnamese habit, even recently, of boasting of Vietnamese military victories not only against the French but also against Chinese invaders in earlier times clearly indicates how widespread such feelings are even today. Moreover, the obvious inability of Communist China to supply the DRVN with the kind of advanced weapons it needs in its present plight must have contributed further to swinging the balance of political influence in Hanoi away from Peking towards Moscow. Particularly after the Viet-Cong guerrilla attack at Pleiku last February led the United States to intensify air action against North Vietnamese territory, Hanoi's realignment on the Soviet position became no longer a matter of mere ideological or sentimental preference, but one of simple survival. For only the Soviets had the planes and missiles that could save North Viet-Nam itself from destruction, regardless of the effect of such bombings on the guerrilla situation inside South Viet-Nam or on Hanoi's determination to continue supporting the Viet-Cong. Soviet Premier Kosygin's presence in Hanoi at the time of the first American air raids on North Vietnamese soil resulted in a prompt Soviet assurance of all "necessary support and assistance" to North Viet-Nam.

Both Peking and Moscow sought to turn the new situation to their own conflicting advantages. Peking accused the Soviet Union of being slow to fulfill its pledge to go to the aid of the DRVN for fear of becoming directly embroiled with the United States, while Moscow returned the compliment by asserting that China was blocking the transhipment of Soviet arms to North Viet-Nam—a charge that gained credence from Chou En-lai's assertion that Soviet military supplies to North Viet-Nam would only result in an ultimate American-Russian "deal" along Cuban lines.[27]

In the meantime, Hanoi began to give off "signals" suggesting a softening of its previous "hard" position of uncompromising insistence upon the virtual unconditional surrender of South Viet-Nam to the Viet-Cong. These signals, which began almost as soon as American air raids on North Viet-Nam became a daily occurrence in early March 1965, appeared in statements by North Vietnamese leaders which first omitted "immediate reunification" as one of Hanoi's war aims and then ceased demanding the "immediate departure of all US troops" as a precondition for peace.[28]

In mid-April, a high-level North Vietnamese mission went to Moscow, presumably to nail down promises of Soviet support. The very composition of the mission seemed indicative of a victory for Soviet influence in Hanoi over that of Peking. Its leading members were: General Giap, Vice-Premier, Minister of Defense, and Army commander-in-chief, long known as pro-Soviet; Le Duan, the party Secretary-General; and Nguyen Duy Trinh, a South Vietnamese member of the party Politburo and newly-appointed Foreign Minister. The joint statement issued following the Moscow talks, on April 17, contained little new in the way of precise Soviet assurances of military support, but it significantly reiterated the newly softened DRVN position on war aims in South Viet-Nam, adding that the "two parts of Viet-Nam [must] have no military alliances with other countries, and no foreign military bases and servicemen on their territory." This seemed to mean that Hanoi conceded for the first time—at least in principle—that North Viet-Nam was also "neutralizable," and hence not an integral part of the Communist bloc on a par with, say, Hungary or North Korea. It is admittedly dangerous to assume a change of Communist policy on the basis of a single statement, or even of a series

[26] On the historical background of Sino-Vietnamese relations, see Harold C. Hinton, *China's Relations with Burma and Viet-Nam,* New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958.

[27] *The Washington Post,* April 20, 1965.

[28] Text of TV interview given by Gen. Giap to Japanese TV, rebroadcast by Radio Hanoi, March 10, 1965.

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of statements; yet, these signs, considered in conjunction with the ingrained Vietnamese distaste for Chinese domination, the effects of United States military pressure, and the impact of the Soviet rift with China, suggest rather strongly that the present leadership in Hanoi might prefer to opt for a solution of the present situation which—in the words of two French commentators—would not make of "the Viet-Nam war the Spanish [civil] war of the atomic age." [29]

To be sure, Red China will always have geography in its favor: it is next door to North Viet-Nam, while Russia is five thousand miles away. Over the past twenty years, moreover, Moscow has been less than a reliable ally of Hanoi. From 1946 to 1950, it stood aloof from the Viet-Minh struggle against France; in 1954, it compelled the DRVN to Geneva to accept conditions far less favorable than the military situation warranted; in 1956, it failed to press for the holding of the reunification elections in Viet-Nam; in 1957-58, it made only a perfunctory bid for the admission of the DRVN to the UN; in 1960-62, it failed to press the Laotian campaign to a successful conclusion; and over the whole past decade, it did not provide the DRVN with the up-to-date military matériel which it supplies to its European satellites, and which might have helped to protect North Viet-Nam from American air action in 1965.

In sum, the North Vietnamese Communists have succeeded in building a solidly-entrenched, totalitarian regime, based upon a disciplined party structure and the largest land army in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, North Vietnam—like almost every other Communist state—is plagued by a disastrous agricultural situation and cannot find a solution of its acute food problem within the confines of the bloc. It has also become directly engaged in a military contest in which it urgently requires outside support; yet, the availability of such support from Moscow is jeopardized by the Sino-Soviet conflict, while acceptance of large-scale military assistance from Communist China would not only mean committing North Viet-Nam to Peking's alternative of "liberation war *à outrance*," but would also involve sacrificing a relative freedom of maneuver for which Ho Chi Minh and his associates have struggled for almost forty years.

[29] Georges Chaffard and Jean-Francois Kahn, "Ho Chi Minh—L'heure de la vérité," *L'Express* (Paris), May 30, 1965, p. 53.

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A Harebrained Scheme in Retrospect

By Jerry F. Hough

In *A Preface to Politics* Walter Lippmann wrote of the "tinkering reformer"—the man who, as defined by Lippmann, is forever trying to make the existing machinery of government function perfectly in terms of some abstract ideal. Lippmann criticized this type harshly, arguing that he frequently made matters worse instead of better. "Even machines are not altogether inflexible, and sometimes what the reformer regards as a sad deviation from the original plans is a poor rickety attempt to adapt the machine to changing conditions." [1]

Lippmann wrote these lines in 1913, forty years before Nikita Khrushchev rose to the top of the Communist Party hierarchy in the Soviet Union. Yet, in many ways they seem to have been written in the mid-1960's with the 1962 bifurcation of the lower party apparatus in mind. They surely provide the best explanation of the reasons that the decision was recently reversed.

As J. W. Cleary pointed out in this journal,[2] the 1962 reorganization of the party has sometimes been misunderstood in the West. Because Khrushchev stated that the reorganization would "secure more concrete party leadership of industry, construction, and agriculture" and

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[1] Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Politics,* Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, pp. 11-12.

[2] J. W. Cleary, "The Parts of the Party," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1964, p. 55.

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would "give the party organizations the opportunity to concentrate their chief attention on production questions," [3] some have assumed that it transformed the party apparatus from an ideological-mobilizing instrument into a production-oriented one. Nothing could be further from the truth. If anything, the reorganization had the results of strengthening ideological-organizational work among the masses.

The belief that 1962 brought a sharp increase in party concern with detailed administrative and production problems neglects the fact that the party organs were already as deeply involved in these problems prior to 1962 as was conceivable. The rural party *raikom* (district committee) had clearly long been the dominant participant in the most important agricultural decisions made at the *raion* level, while the *obkom* (regional committee) continued in the postwar period to have the same kind of overriding role in agriculture which Professor Fainsod found documented in the archives of the Smolensk *obkom* of the 1930's.[4]

In the industrial realm, too, the party's role was very concrete and detailed, even under the ministerial system. Again and again we find complaints that the industrial department of the local party organs "has been turned into a special kind of dispatcher's apparatus which is . . . completely occupied with operational economic work." [5] The following statement dates from September 1962, but it could have appeared in the Soviet press at any time during the last two decades (and perhaps even earlier):

Sometimes the office of the chief of the industrial-transportation department of the Grodno gorkom, Viktor Yosifovich Piasetski, reminds one of a dispatcher's office. It is as if the two phones are competing to see which can transmit the most conversation while the chief is here and not at an enterprise.

"Viktor Yosifovich? This is the furniture factory speaking. We need sixty railroad cars, but they are not even giving us ten."

"Comrade Piasetski? This is Leather Works No. 4. As before, we are not receiving the necessary raw material. This also threatens our neighbor—the shoe factory." . . .

"Auto Spare Parts Works speaking. We cannot agree with the Minsk Tractor Works about the delivery of forgings." [6]

It is no accident that over the years an increasing number of experienced administrators have been pulled into the party apparatus. For example, in the year 1950 alone, Nikolai Podgornyi—a man who had been working for two decades in high administrative posts in industry—was named first secretary of the Kharkov *obkom;* Olga Ivashchenko—a factory director with seventeen years of industrial experience—was named industrial secretary of the Kiev *obkom;* and Ivan Spiridonov—a factory director with twenty-five years' experience in industry—was selected as the first secretary of a *raikom* in Leningrad.[7]

Efficacy vs. Dissipation

What, then, was the meaning of the party reorganization of 1962? Why did Khrushchev propose and force through an unprecedented change in party structure—a change that was certain to complicate the relationships of neighboring institutions and enterprises which were now subordinated to separate authorities? What were to be the compensating advantages which, *Partiinaia zhizn* later admitted, gave Khrushchev's arguments a "surface persuasiveness?" [8]

The answers to these questions can be found, I suggest, in the long-time official images of the proper role of the lower party apparatus and

[3] N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie selskovo khoziaistva,* Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1963, Vol. 7, p. 323.

[4] Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.

[5] *Pravda,* Feb. 2, 1951, p. 2. For nearly identical statements, widely spaced in time, see *Pravda,* Dec. 9, 1947, pp. 2-3; *Sovetskaia Latviia,* March 25, 1957, p. 2; *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* Feb. 1, 1964, p. 12 (which generalizes about the pre-1962 period).

[6] *Sovetskaia Belorussiia,* Sept. 18, 1962, p. 2.

[7] *Deputaty verkhovnovo soveta SSSR, shestoi sozyv,* Izdatelstvo "Izvestia," Moscow, 1962, pp. 172, 339, 399. These were not the only administrators to be moved to party work in 1950. At least two other future Central Committee members, Konstantin Galanshin and Aleksandr Kokarev, respectively the director of an electric station and a combine works, were also transferred to unspecified party work in that year. (*Ibid,* pp. 9, 214.) While 1950 was a banner year in this respect, it was far from unique.

[8] *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 23, Dec. 1964, p. 4.

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in the persistent failure of actual party work to coincide closely to these images.

Anyone who studies Soviet pronouncements about the work of the party apparatus for some time notices that they portray a group of officials who are to fill a most imposing set of roles. The party officials are called upon to provide ideological inspiration to administrators, workers, and peasants, introducing "a spirit of enthusiasm and of creative labor into the production group." [9] They should be strict guardians of the national interest who "train personnel in the spirit of high responsibility for the business entrusted to them," [10] and who enforce strict adherence to the law and plan. As men without operational administrative responsibilities, they should be detached policy-makers who have the time and perspective to engage in "the solution of basic long-range problems." [11] As representatives of the party of the proletariat, they should protect the workers against "bureaucratic" practices of the administrators, serving not only as "the ultimate dispensers of mercy and patronage," [12] but also as kindly father-figures who will listen to those who "come simply to ask advice on some personal matter or to hear an encouraging word." [13]

For a number of reasons the party apparatus has never been able to satisfy all these demands placed upon it. Instead of concentrating on ideological leadership, on long-range planning, and so forth, the party organs have tended to become deeply immersed in the type of pressing production questions mentioned earlier. They have become preoccupied with "beating out [of] the suppliers the equipment, materials, etc. which the enterprises have been allocated," [14] with resolving a multitude of minor interdepartmental disputes, with putting pressure on the collective farms to ensure the fulfillment of the delivery plan. Lazar Slepov, the leading Soviet authority on party work, has aptly summarized the complaints that have long been directed at party officials:

Officials of the [party] apparatus frequently squander their efforts on trifles. . . . A direct consequence of such a practice is the occurence of "all-hands jobs" or "storming." It is not surprising that under such a system all attention is concentrated solely on pulling up lagging sections and on overcoming difficulties which arise today, while at the same time neglecting long-range, fundamental questions.[15]

In many ways the reorganization of 1962 was a serious attempt to create conditions under which the lower party apparatus could better perform those functions which it had been neglecting. In proposing the reorganization, Khrushchev recognized quite accurately that the work-load of the party organs was simply too great and that party officials did not have time both to resolve the urgent detailed problems brought to them and to provide thorough policy and ideological leadership to all those within their jurisdiction.

In short, the reorganization was aimed not at shifting the attention of the lower party organs to production and administrative questions, but on the contrary at giving them more time for problems of longer-range significance. It was an attempt to free the party officials from the "campaign-character" style of work forced on them by their constant need to switch attention from one matter to another.[16]

Khrushchev also contended that the reorganization would make it easier to ensure that every party secretary had the kind of education and background which was needed to furnish thorough and informed supervision to specialized administrators. He argued that with unified party organs,

. . . [*we often faced difficulty*] *in the selection of first secretaries of party* raion *and city committees because there are both agricultural and industrial organizations in the district. There are also city party organizations which have agriculture as well as industrial enterprises located within the city limits. . . . We must often give preference to an official who knows agri-*

[9] *Pravda,* July 23, 1960, p. 1.
[10] P. F. Morozov, *Leninskie printsipy podbora, rasstanovki i vospitanie kadrov,* Moscow, Izdatelstvo VPSh i AON pri TsK KPSS, 1959, p. 50.
[11] *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 1, January 1959, p. 11.
[12] Fainsod, *op. cit.,* p. 396.
[13] *Voprosy partiinoi raboty,* Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959, pp. 413-16.
[14] *Pravda,* June 10, 1960, p. 2.
[15] Lazar Slepov, *Vysshie i mestnye organy partii,* Moscow, Izdatelstvo VPSh i AON pri TsK KPSS, 1958, p. 124. See Fainsod, *op. cit.,* p. 92, for an almost identical summary statement concerning Smolensk officials.
[16] Khrushchev, *op. cit.,* p. 320.

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culture better, even though agriculture may occupy a lesser place than industry in the given raion, oblast, krai, *etc.*[17]

With the party organs split, he held, it would be possible to select party officials "who know production well and have experience in the appropriate branches of the economy." [18]

Grappling with the Problem

Everyone now knows that Khrushchev's successors did not find these reasons convincing, at least after watching the new system in operation for two years. In fact, the party reorganization was clearly one of Khrushchev's projects which they considered to be a "hare-brained scheme," and the speed with which it was undone suggests that it may have been one of the factors which contributed to his downfall. The recent statements of the new leaders have, of course, been echoes of the original opinion of Western observers.

However, if we are to understand the role of the party apparatus in Soviet society, it is imperative that we do not simply dismiss the 1962-1964 experiments as a nonsensical result produced by the impact of advancing age upon a mind which was already too fascinated with organizational changes. In terms of many of the responsibilities of the party organs, the 1962 reorganization made excellent sense, and it has often been criticized for the wrong reasons.

If the prime responsibility of the party apparatus had been to exercise political control over the administrators *or* to enforce adherence to the law and the plan, then the advantages of the reorganization outlined by Khrushchev would have outweighed the disadvantages. None of these duties was seriously hampered by the existence of independent agricultural (or, more accurately, rural-oriented) and industrial (or, urban) party organizations. Indeed, all of these duties could have been better performed by party officials with a smaller workload and with the appropriate technical preparation.

Even ideological and organizational work among the masses should have been benefited by the reorganization. Each of the new party committees continued to have one secretary (or deputy secretary) who concentrated on organizational work and another who specialized on ideological matters. This resulted not only in an increase in the number of secretaries concerned with ideological work, but also in the creation of two separate agitation-propaganda hierarchies which could vary their appeals more flexibly to correspond with the rather different types of people with whom they dealt. This could have had very major advantages in a transitional, industrializing society, where the peasants could be expected to have a far more traditional frame of mind than the urbanized elements. Indeed, for this reason there was much to recommend the creation of separate educational and cultural administrations as well, through the division of the soviets (*i.e.*, the organs of the state as opposed to the party apparatus) into independent urban and rural units.

Pitfalls and Loopholes

Yet despite all these advantages, the new Soviet leaders were correct in calling the bifurcation of the party organization a hare-brained scheme. It was hare-brained because it complicated the party organs' much-maligned involvement in the resolution of minor departmental disputes and in the regulation of the flow of locally-produced materials to local factories—activities which, however repugnant to the image of the party as the "leading force in society," had in fact been the most significant services that the party organs performed for the Soviet system. They constituted a type of regional coordination which the system desperately needed if it was to function.

Any administrative system with a number of divisions, each of which has subordinates interacting in a particular region, faces a serious need for regional coordination. Although the plans and directives of the divisional units may ultimately be based on the same policy, the regional officials of the various divisions inevitably work somewhat at cross-purposes and come into conflict because of differences in departmental self-interests.

In the Soviet Union the need for regional coordination has been particularly great since all the institutions in the region are really part of one giant hierarchy. Yet there has been no

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 170.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

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organ in the state apparatus which can serve as a true regional coordinator. While the executive committees of the soviets have been able to coordinate the regional offices of such ministries as culture, agriculture, trade and education, the soviets have not had jurisdiction—at least below the republican level—over large-scale industry, important construction, the railroads, and several other significant institutions. In many cases two officials or institutions which have come into conflict have not had a convenient common state superior to whom they could turn for a resolution of their problem. Over forty years ago Lenin could write:

The absence of coordination (soglasovanie) *of the work of different departments in the provinces is one of the greatest evils hindering economic construction. We must devote immense attention to this question.*[19]

Although the problem has worsened since Lenin's day due to the increased centralization in administration and planning, there is still no state organ which can correct the difficulty.

In practice, the solution which, consciously or unconsciously, has been adopted to meet this problem has been the use of the party organs to fill the gap in the administrative structure. Since all important administrators are CPSU members who are obligated to follow party decisions, the party organs have had the type of general authority which permitted them to function as an effective lower-level common superior for local administrators.

To cite some examples: a report of 1960 revealed that in a city like Orsk (population 176,000), "not one significant question falling outside the framework of an enterprise [was] decided without the advice and support of the leaders of the *gorkom*." [20] In the case of a conflict between the plans of a construction trust and the regulations of a heating plant, a local *raikom* had the authority to decide the issue at hand.[21] When a construction administration was unable to acquire two steamshovels which it badly needed for an important project, it turned to the party organs for help; in one case of apparently extreme urgency, "the matter reached the first secretary of the obkom." [22]

Even between 1962 and 1964 the lower party organs were unable to avoid this type of coordinating activity among the institutions and enterprises still within their jurisdiction. The urban party organizations actually found themselves more deeply involved than ever in detailed interdepartmental coordination problems, due to the creation in 1962 of a construction administration independent from the sovnarkhoz (the general economic administration). With the industrial managers (or communal service officials), the builders, and the designers usually subordinated to quite separate administrative hierarchies, the party organs often felt required to conduct regular "operational sessions" (*operativiki*) to fix a daily or weekly work schedule which all officials could follow in conjunction.[23]

The most fundamental shortcoming of the 1962 party reorganization was that it seriously complicated many kinds of regional coordination. As *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* pointed out, "the *oblast* is a single living organism where industry, agriculture, and the sectors serving them are intimately intertwined and interconnected. It is impossible to rupture them without loss." [24] In practice, it was "impossible to differentiate [clearly] the spheres of activity of the industrial and agricultural party organizations," [25] and there were many types of disputes "which were impossible to decide reasonably in the existing conditions." [26]

The gravest problems arose in the rural districts, where the split into industrial and agricultural organizations involved a major reduction in the power of the rural party officials. Earlier the *raikom* had been able to obligate the

[19] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia,* 4th edition, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1950, Vol. 27, pp. 238-39.

[20] *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* April 29, 1960, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.,* March 13, 1960, p. 2.

[22] *Ibid.,* April 10, 1960, p. 2.

[23] For detailed and informative criticisms of extreme examples of such coordinating work in the realm of industrial construction and urban construction, see *Pravda,* Jan. 16, 1965, p. 2, and Feb. 24, 1965, p. 2. By contrast, the creation of an "operational staff" at a construction project at the Groznyi Chemical Combine was praised in one post-Khrushchev article: see *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 22, Nov. 1964, pp. 22-24.

[24] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* Nov. 18, 1964, p. 3.

[25] *Pravda,* Nov. 18, 1964, p. 1.

[26] *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie,* No. 1, January 1965, p. 13. For striking examples of these difficulties, see *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 22, November 1964, pp. 41-42, and *Pravda,* Feb. 6, 1965, p. 2.

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various administrators in the *raion* to take action, but the secretary of the party committee of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz territorial-production administration eventually was reduced to a position roughly equal to that of the head of the administration. In Khrushchev's words, the two officials were to be "like two brothers, senior in like degree (*v "odinakovoi stepeni starshie*)." [27] This not only confused relationships *within* the territorial production administration, but also hampered the coordination of its activities with those of the *raion* soviets, which continued to bear responsibility for education, communal service, culture, etc. If the party secretary was not the senior, where was the common superior to whom the soviet and the production administration could take their conflicts? If the party secretary did handle these problems, would he not likely become the senior on other questions as well? For these reasons it is not surprising that the confusion of authority among lower rural officials received special emphasis in post-Khrushchev criticisms of the party bifurcation.[28]

APROPOS OF LITTLE BOSSES

– Когда будете в следующий раз брать обязательства, меньше кричите и не бейте себя в грудь...

—"When you take on responsibilities next time, don't shout so much and don't beat your chest . . . ."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), Feb. 20, 1965

Back to Status Quo Ante?

Now that the "non-viability" [29] of the 1962-64 arrangements has been recognized, the new party leadership has decreed a return to the pre-1962 forms of party organization. But in one sense the return can never be complete, for the party leaders are now more conscious of certain facts than they were before. The impact of the great workload of the party organs upon their "leadership" functions has been frankly recognized. Those leaders who did not fully realize it earlier surely have come to understand that the lower party organs' persistent involvement in rather minor current problems is not just an aberration of party work, but is rather a function that must be performed if the administrative system—as it is now established—is to work.

What will be the consequences of this recognition? Thus far, party spokesman have done little more than repeat the old warnings that the party organs should not "replace" (*podmeniat*) the state organs—that they should avoid involvement when there are "officials who have the authority and the competency to decide these or those concrete questions" and that they should "concern themselves with their direct duty—the solution of important problems which have policy-political significance and which lie within their sphere of competence." [30] But in the past, of course, these warnings did not solve the dilemmas which led to the 1962 reorganization, and there is no reason to believe that they will be more successful now.

[27] Khrushchev, *op. cit.*, p. 446. The Soviet Smirnitskii dictionary also defines *"starshii"* as the "man in charge."

[28] See *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 23, Dec. 1964, pp. 5-6.

[29] *Pravda*, Jan. 12, 1965, p. 2.

[30] *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1964, p. 4. *"Podmeniat"* can be translated by "replace," "supplant," "take the place of," or "usurp the functions of." There are, however, many ways of demonstrating that the warning to the party organs not to *podmeniat* the soviet and economic organs is simply the Soviet way of demanding delegation of authority on minor details. Perhaps the easiest and clearest is to note that Soviet administrative theorists use precisely the same phraseology when they are obviously discussing delegation of authority from a superior to a subordinate in the state apparatus: "The higher standing administrators, in exercising general supervision of the organs subordinate to them, do not *podmeniat* them." V. A. Vlasov and S. S. Studenikin, *Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo*, Moscow, 1959, p. 68.

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It is possible that the party leadership will be content simply to return to the pre-1962 situation. Yet increased awareness of the real needs of the system served by the party organs could also produce real changes. On the one hand, steps might be taken to make it easier for the party organs to handle their large load of administrative functions. Perhaps the long aversion to an expansion in the size of the party staff will begin to crumble.

Or, on the other hand, those who insist that the party organs should concentrate on their "proper" functions may support changes in the administrative system that would reduce its demands on the party organs. One obvious change among many could be a reorganization in the administration of construction, making it easier for construction firms, industrial managers, and design bureaus to resolve their scheduling disagreements within the state apparatus.

Other, more drastic solutions are possible. The need for a common superior to resolve disputes is a product of a hierarchial situation, and it becomes greatest when all institutions within the society operate under an elaborate set of rules and plans which are centrally established. If financial rewards and penalties were made more meaningful to Soviet state administrators, and if their sphere of independence were enlarged (allowing them, for example, to establish their own relationships with suppliers), many of the disputes which now must be taken to the party organs could be solved without reference to a common superior. The force of habit would be difficult to overcome, but it is at least conceivable that the workload of the party organs might be reduced sufficiently to give them more time for the functions which they tend to neglect.

In 1963 *Partiinaia zhizn* reported in its discussion of the general industrial reorganization of the previous year that "some comrades say the answer lies not in organizational reform but in a skillful use of economic levers." [31] One of the results of the 1962-64 experience may be that those concerned with strengthening the ideological-leadership functions of the party organ will conclude that their cause, too, could be furthered by the use of economic levers. If they reach this conclusion, the "liberal" economists will acquire a rather unexpected ally.

[31] *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 2, January 1963, p. 16.

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Men of Revolution

WINFRIED B. SCHARLAU AND ZBYNEK A. ZEMAN: *Freibeuter der Revolution: Parvus-Helphand, eine politische Biographie.*
Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1964.
ANGELICA BALABANOFF: *Impressions of Lenin.*
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1964.

Reviewed by Abraham Ascher

THE INTEREST and significance of the two books under review derive not so much from any new historical data or interpretations they present, as from the fact that they describe the moral temperament of three prominent Marxists in the first two decades of this century. All three considered themselves "orthodox," and yet the approach to the Marxist creed of each was fundamentally different from that of the other two. Lenin was a dedicated fanatic prepared to pay any price to promote the cause; Balabanoff a moralist for whom socialism was an ethical precept that would only be degraded by the use of morally reprehensible means; Parvus an adventurer and intriguer who had few scruples about how he pursued his political goals, believing that by means of his own self-aggrandizement he could advance the ideal of socialism. The three represented distinct and important types within the Marxist movement and a grasp of their differences may perhaps reveal as much about the divisions within European socialism—so dramatic and momentous after 1914—as an analysis of purely ideological or political controversies.

One of the most admirable features of Scharlau and Zeman's book is their sensitive and judicious, though by no means uncritical, treatment of Parvus as a personality. This was no easy task, for although historians and especially socialist writers have generally acknowledged the boldness and imagination of much of his political thought, they have had a very low opinion of him as a man. Unlike most radicals of his generation, Parvus was not content to restrict himself to politics: he wanted to live the good life as well as influence the course of history, both of which aims he thought he could realize by amassing a fortune. Hence he engaged in economic speculation and cultivated high government officials in various countries; by 1914, when he was in his mid-forties, he had demonstrated remarkable success in both activities, which was enough to raise eyebrows among his socialist colleagues. He came to be known as a "socialist tycoon," and his behavior corresponded to the Marxist caricature of such a man from the capitalist ranks. When he went to Zurich in 1915, for example, he stayed at the most luxurious hotel, was almost always surrounded by "corpulent blond women," and had a penchant for big, expensive cigars and champagne. By the time of his death in 1924, Parvus had had so

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variegated a career that he was reputed to have been, at one and the same time, a speculator, swindler, Turkish agent, German agent, Russian agent, lackey of imperialism and, of course, traitor to socialism.

Scharlau and Zeman discuss in considerable detail all the activities that gave rise to this reputation, but they have wisely concentrated on Parvus' work as a revolutionary, recognizing that he himself did not believe he had ever abandoned his professed creed. In doing so, they have caught the complexity of Parvus' personality without idealizing or exonerating him. After a brief account of his youth in Russia, they depict him as a man who in the 1890's earnestly dedicated himself to work in the German Social Democratic movement because he found life in Russian émigré circles too much given to abstract theorizing and too divorced from reality. They carefully analyze his polemical thrusts against Bernstein's revisionism and then describe his important contributions to the Russian movement in the years from 1901 to 1906, particularly his formulation of the doctrine that became the basis for the theory of permanent revolution developed by Trotsky, then his friend and disciple. By this time Parvus had established himself as a leading socialist theorist, but he was still a man without influence, financial independence, or many friends among his political colleagues. He was already under a cloud for some shady business deals, and he had offended the moral sensibilities of some leading German socialists by his amorous adventures. In 1910 Parvus decided on a change of venue: he would move to Turkey and make a new start. With this decision began the most fascinating, daring and controversial phase of his life, and it is on this last period that Scharlau and Zeman are at their best. By careful digging in several European archives, the authors have been able to describe in detail a story that up to now has been known only in broad outline.

The authors provide a good account of Parvus' business ventures in Turkey, which within four years enabled him to become a millionaire. He traded in wood and steel, imported wheat from Odessa and machines from Germany, supplied arms to the Turks, and took advantage of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 to speculate in weapons. Exactly how he managed his business success still remains something of a mystery; all that Parvus would reveal was that he had an abundance of "capital and connections." Indeed, some of the highest Turkish officials, including Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha and the Minister of Finance became his confidants and looked to him for advice. Parvus was determined to use this influence to promote not only his own fortunes but his ultimate goal, socialism. "Parvus, the theorist of power," according to Scharlau and Zeman, "had unexpectedly transformed himself into the politician and practical man. His aim remained the same, only the methods and means had changed."

HIS GREAT OPPORTUNITY came with the outbreak of the First World War. Convinced that Germany with her powerful labor movement represented progress and that autocratic Russia embodied black reaction, Parvus immediately set about trying to forge an alliance between the German government and European —especially Russian—socialists. Such collaboration was called for, he reasoned, because a military defeat of tsarism would unleash the revolution in Russia and thus set off a chain of events that would end—as he had often predicted—in a socialist transformation of Germany and Western Europe. By February 1915 he was in close touch with the German Foreign Office, which he persuaded of the soundness of at least a part of his plan: that Russian socialists could, with their agitation, help weaken Russia's war effort. As a first installment, the Foreign Office gave Parvus a million marks, and so began his travels to wherever Russian socialists were to be found. Scharlau and Zeman describe his encounters with the socialists, how he argued with them and lavishly dispensed funds, secure in the conviction that money was a potent political weapon. He established a socialist journal in Berlin and a research institute in Copenhagen to disseminate his views, and managed illegally to ship subversive literature into Russia. An indefatigable worker, he still found time in the midst of these activities for his own business deals, often taking advantage of his growing number of important contacts to make yet another fortune.

Parvus spent a large part of the war in Copenhagen, where he gained the confidence of the German ambassador, Brockdorff-Rantzau, and the authors have uncovered much in the German archives concerning the discussions between the two men. Brockdorff-Rantzau, a con-

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servative diplomat of the old school, was fascinated by Parvus' bold political ideas, which he assiduously transmitted to Berlin, usually with his endorsement. In Berlin itself Parvus was several times received by high dignitaries, who also listened to him with great respect and passed on his thoughts to the Chancellor. The safe conduct through Germany granted Lenin in 1917 and the funds given the Bolsheviks during that year were, of course, a logical culmination of this bizarre sequence of events. To be sure, the Foreign Office and Parvus were using each other, and in the end they both suffered a disastrous defeat. Neither wanted a Bolshevik regime entrenched in Russia. But even if Parvus' hope had been realized and Germany had won the war, his expectations would more than likely have been disappointed. For it is hard to conceive of Wilhelminian Germany, fortified by victory, falling prey to the agitation and revolutionary upsurge of German social democracy.

In any event, Parvus was a defeated—and in radical circles a thoroughly discredited—man. He was still resourceful enough to concoct some fantastic schemes to influence the Bolshevik leaders, or, failing that, to overthrow them, all of which are fully discussed in this study. But his contact with political reality was by now quite remote. For the last six years he lived in splendor in Berlin amid rumors of frequent orgies in his palatial home, occasionally saw some of his friends and sometimes even advised the President of the Republic, Friedrich Ebert, but his reputation was too tarnished for him ever again to exercise the kind of power for which he hankered.

The most striking impression of Parvus created by this excellent book is that of a new type of revolutionary: instead of attempting to undermine the prevailing order with dynamite or rousing appeals, he tried to do so by exploiting the tensions within the capitalist system as a whole, even if this involved him in extraordinary collaboration with people who were among the most vehement opponents of socialism. He was also unique among Marxists in adopting as his own the ethic that socialists believed underlay the capitalist order and which they regarded as the most odious: that money was power and that with enough of it the political and social order could be manipulated. These traits did not make Parvus particularly attractive, but the fact that he possessed them demonstrates—if proof were needed—that cynicism is not the monopoly of any class or political movement.

IN HIS PERCEPTIVE foreword to *Impressions of Lenin,* Bertram Wolfe quite correctly points out that the book tells the reader as much about Angelica Balabanoff, the author, as about Lenin. But if anything, this enhances the value of her personal, random reminiscences. For Mme. Balabanoff represents a strand in European socialism that is often forgotten today. Born in 1878 into a Ukrainian family, she developed very early in life a deep compassion for the poor and underprivileged, a compassion that was always at the core of her socialist commitment. In 1897 she went to Western Europe to study, and after avidly reading radical literature for three years she decided to devote her life to the Italian Socialist Party, which she was always prepared to serve without remuneration even though she herself was far from wealthy.

Balabanoff maintained an interest in Russian social democracy and became acquainted with many of its leaders. But her close relations with Lenin did not develop until 1915, when she joined the socialists at Zimmerwald who came out against any civil peace in the warring countries and in favor of an immediate end to the war. A gifted linguist, Balabanoff did much of the translating at the Zimmerwald Conference and was appointed secretary of the International Socialist Conference established there. When Lenin, after seizing power in 1917, made peace with Germany, the pacifist Balabanoff was so deeply moved that she went to Russia and put herself at the disposal of the new regime. Eager to take advantage of her many contacts with leading socialists in the West and her abilities as an orator and organizer, Lenin made her secretary of the new Comintern.

A major portion of the memoirs deals with Balabanoff's subsequent, painful disillusionment with the Communist leaders and the Communist system. Within four years she realized the difference between her outlook and Lenin's: "Her ideal," as Wolfe aptly puts it, "was to serve the masses, his to manipulate them—both for the sake of socialism." Unwilling to compromise her principles, she broke with the Comintern and left Russia for good.

Balabanoff makes it clear that the essential impulse behind her socialism was ethical. Her

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principal aim was to work among the people and help relieve their suffering, no matter how great the personal sacrifice involved. This was for her a moral imperative that constituted the mainspring of her political activities. Hence it came as a terrible shock to learn that Lenin and his collaborators were, if not immoral, totally amoral. As she correctly—though only gradually—perceived, Lenin was a fanatic prepared to resort to any means he thought would promote Bolshevism. "Everything," he once told her, "that is done in the interest of the proletarian cause is honest." Some of the incidents she relates to buttress her assessment of Lenin would be amusing if they were not also so tragic in their implications. She tells, for example, how Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia, "very nearly received an official reprimand because of her occasional absences from party meetings." Equally revealing of his fanatic intensity is the following incident: shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, when an international socialist meeting of women was held in Switzerland to organize a movement in opposition to the war, Lenin sat "for days on end" in the corner of a coffee-house, so that the delegates of his faction could get his orders on every move.

IT WOULD BE WRONG, however, to deduce from this that Mme. Balabanoff depicts Lenin in an entirely unsympathetic light. On the contrary, she stresses his unselfishness, his abnegation, his dedication to what she considers a noble cause. But at the same time she understands that as a man who completely identified the movement with his own personality, he could brook no opposition; anyone who differed with him was necessarily harming the cause, and therefore no effort must be spared to bring such a person to heel or, failing that, to discredit him. Balabanoff is not the first to offer this interpretation, but because she is able to support it with a series of personal reminiscences, it has a ring of persuasiveness and vividness lacking in most studies of Lenin.

Balabanoff became fully aware of this trait in Lenin, and consequently in Bolshevism, when she witnessed the persecution of alleged enemies of the regime. She was so appalled that she begged Lenin to allow her to work in the prisons in order to "save the prisoners and their relatives from tortures, and you [Lenin] from shame, maledictions, and responsibility."

Balabanoff was further distressed by the cynical approach to politics prevalent in the highest circles of Bolshevism. She was outraged by the treatment accorded Serrati, a leader of Italian socialism who, when he visited Russia in 1920, refused to go along with a Bolshevik plan to split the Italian movement in order to make a part of it a subservient tool of communism. Though a militant socialist who had devoted his life to the cause, he was now slandered without mercy by Zinoviev. After Serrati's death, Zinoviev explained his course of action: "We have fought and slandered him because of his great merits. It would not have been possible to alienate the masses [from him] without resorting to these means." At the same time—and Balabanoff cites several examples—no compunction was shown in using men who were weak, untrustworthy and corrupt, for the Bolsheviks needed "accomplices rather than collaborators," men who would carry out orders without being troubled by pangs of conscience.

The Bolsheviks did their best to persuade Mme. Balabanoff of the correctness of their policies, but her moral sense told her that "the means were replacing the end, and the end receded farther and farther into the distance." Unable to suffer the moral torture any longer, she asked Lenin for permission to leave the country. There was a final, moving exchange between them. "Why are you leaving then, why don't you stay?" Lenin asked. "You know . . . ," she answered, "perhaps Russia does not need people like me. . . ." "'She needs them, but she does not have them,' Lenin said in a sad, grave voice." Lenin was right about Russia's needs, though it might be added that Russia was not unique in this respect. People such as Balabanoff are rare in any society.

The three individuals whose characters are revealed in these two books do not by any means exhaust the types to be found in the socialist movement of the 20th century, but they are surely expressive of fundamental currents that emerged with poignant clarity after 1914. Parvus, it may be said, represented the worst in European socialism, Balabanoff the best, and Lenin, because his self-righteous commitment to the cause led him to distort its essential character, the most dangerous. It need hardly be pointed out that the legacy of all three currents is still very much a part of present-day radicalism.

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Of Russia and Russians

LAURENS VAN DER POST: *A View of All the Russias.*
New York, William Morrow and Co., 1964.
ALLEN KASSOF: *The Soviet Youth Program.*
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.
J. C. POLLOCK: *The Faith of the Russian Evangelicals.*
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964.
HENRY W. MORTON: *Soviet Sport: Mirror of Soviet Society.*
New York, Collier Books, 1963.

Reviewed by Philip Ben

EVERYONE WHO HAS traveled to the USSR to study the contemporary scene has probably faced the same problem. He has made a lot of observations which appear to him highly significant. But are they really valid? Has he looked and listened perceptively? Has his experience been based on atypical circumstances or does it represent the general rule? Faced with these questions, one finds it comforting to learn that the symptoms one has noticed, the conclusions one has reached, have also been seen and confirmed by others.

In this respect, Laurens van der Post's *A View of All the Russias* offers a rich catalog of impressions of Soviet life in which this reviewer, at least, could find many parallels to his own experiences during frequent trips to Russia.

The first impressions of the traveler inevitably involve the unbelievable inefficiency of Soviet hotel receptionists, room maids, and restaurant waiters—not to mention the hotel "floor-supervisors," those young and sometimes not so young ladies reputed to have more or less sinister connections with the secret police. Then there is the squalor at the railway stations, the interminable queues in food stores, the lack of telephone directories. Some Westerners, upon being regaled with such "insignificant" details about everyday life in the Soviet Union, heatedly reproach the returned traveler for being petty: "You visit a country which has achieved miracles, built a modern industry, transformed nature, educated tens of millions of illiterates, and you only notice that the hotel furniture is old-fashioned and the restaurant service slow. Is this really important in a country which may soon land a man on the moon?"

This reviewer, for one, has never been able to accept such reasoning. To pay attention to the details of everyday living, including the performance of hotels, restaurants, shops, and other kinds of service establishments, is not to indulge in a taste for the paltry, but to seek for clues to an understanding of Soviet reality. In a country where a customer often has to wait an hour before he gets his borscht, there is reason to draw some conclusions about the efficiency of labor discipline and of economic management in general.

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Mr. van der Post obviously adheres to the same view. He describes at great length a scene at the Moscow National Hotel when he arrived: how many calls the tourist reception girl had to make to learn which room had been reserved for him, how long he had to wait until the waiter in the hotel restaurant noticed his presence, and how many dishes on the impressive menu were available only on paper.

ANOTHER THING that strikes the traveler is the immense difficulty of communicating with the Soviet people. It is not the language barrier: I have been faced with the same difficulty despite the fact that I speak Russian rather well. And although van der Post's Russian is admittedly inadequate, he found that many Soviet citizens were conversant in English, French or German. The basic difficulty in communication is that the facts which are obvious to the foreigner are hardly known to the average Russian. Indeed, he will frequently consider them as ludicrous or contemptible fabrications. And *vice versa*: his conception of the outside world bears little relation to the reality known and experienced by the visitor.

How often I was confronted with the question, posed by Russians in every walk of life, including some (though relatively few) intellectuals: "Why do the Americans prepare an armed agression against the Soviet Union?" In

Reviewers in this Issue

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ERIC BOURNE—British writer, journalist and former war correspondent; since 1950 special correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* stationed in Vienna; also, regular contributor to the foreign service of the London *Observer*.

RICHARD JUDY—Associate Professor of Economics and Computer Science at the University of Toronto, Canada; frequent contributor to American economic journals.

R. ROCKINGHAM GILL—Expert on Soviet military affairs for Radio Free Europe, Munich, Germany.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE—Author of *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York, Dial Publishing Co., 1948) and most recently *Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (same publisher, 1965), as well as many other works on the history of the Communist movement.

MICHAEL LINDSAY—Author of *Is Peaceful Co-existence Possible?* (East Lansing, Mich., Michigan State University Press, 1960); Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.

JOSEPH FISZMAN—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.; specialist on the Soviet and Communist Chinese political systems.

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM—Author of *American Security and Freedom* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1954); well-known writer on Greek affairs; Labor Information Officer of the US Economic Mission to Greece (1950-51).

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reply to denials, the challenger will quote hundreds of "facts": "Is it not a fact that the Americans have given the atomic bomb to the Germans?" "Hasn't the US Secretary of Defense admitted that such plans exist?" There is, as a rule, no point in trying to prove that this is baseless nonsense. While Russians no longer accept everything they read in their newspapers as Gospel Truth, the propensity among them is to believe the worst about the "capitalist" adversary—especially in the absence of any objective sources of information. Mr. van der Post relates a number of such conversations which sound like dialogues from the Theater of the Absurd.

The author notes other things which ordinary tourists often fail to observe or understand. Among such phenomena is the unsurpassed ability of many Soviet citizens, and of virtually every official, to distort even the most obvious facts if they do not accord with the party version of reality. One of the examples he cites concerned officials in charge of the Bratsk hydro-electric construction site, who categorically denied to him that prisoners had ever been employed there. Yet other sources, including one man who had spent many years in a labor camp at the site, provided overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Obviously, in such cases, too, any further discussion between the visitor and his hosts is pointless.

ON THE OTHER SIDE of the coin, there is a danger that the numerous shortcomings of the Soviet system may blind even an experienced observer to its commendable successes, thus preventing an objective and balanced appraisal. Mr. van der Post is fortunately free of this type of myopia. The tributes he pays to Soviet accomplishments are both interesting and in the reviewer's opinion, accurate.

For example, he gives due praise to what he saw of the Soviet educational system. At a boarding school in Tashkent, he was impressed by the high standard of teaching and by the healthy relationship that existed between teachers and students, which he found to be "easy and free" despite emphasis on discipline. He became convinced that Soviet teachers "truly love children" and that the country in general is free of that "terrible phenomenon, the teacher who teaches only because he has not been good enough for anything else." Such comments are useful because Westerners have generally underrated the Soviet educational system, especially in the period when it was subjected to the peripeties of Khrushchev's educational reforms (now abolished). Despite its many shortcomings and distortions, education is—in the reviewer's opinion—probably the strongest asset of Soviet society.

As Mr. van der Post rightly notes, Soviet people in their forties and fifties, meaning those who matured during the Stalin period, are apt to accept the system and the current "line," while those in their twenties and thirties who never knew Stalinism—who were not conditioned through personal bitter experience to believe that the supreme wisdom is to obey—are tending toward nonconformism in increasing numbers. This may not be a very novel observation, but in the reviewer's opinion it is crucial enough to bear repetition. There appears to have been little reason for the fears, long felt by many in the West, that the new Soviet generation born and raised under communism would provide monolithic support for the official ideology.

THE SAME CONCLUSION can be inferred—if indirectly—from the second work under review, Allen Kassof's study of *The Soviet Youth Program*. Through a detailed analysis of the program, which encompasses some 53 million members, Mr. Kassof tries to evaluate the effectiveness of the regime's efforts to shape the image of the future generation. The two main youth organizations, the Komsomol and the Pioneers, are run by the state and their aims are obvious: to strengthen the control of the Communist Party over youth, to prepare young people for future contributions to the economic and social modernization of the country, and to prevent them from coming under the sway of dissident forces. Mr. Kassof rightly stressed the control functions of these organizations over their educational functions, which in any event are directed toward the same ends. The nature of the tasks assigned demands that the top staff of the organizations be paid functionaries, subject to orders from above. Thus the official assertion that the Komsomol and the Pioneers are autonomous organizations of Soviet youth, spontaneously rallying around the party, has no basis in reality. In fact, they are the antithesis of a genuine youth movement; their con-

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gresses and conferences do not formulate or debate policy but simply rubber-stamp actions already initiated by the top leadership.

Curiously, the Komsomol has even been exempted from the process of liberalization initiated by Khrushchev. Reforms adopted in 1962 provided "guarantees" of each member's right to participate in discussion, to submit resolutions, to express opinions on resolutions before they are adopted, and to appear personally at meetings of committees and bureaus where his personal activities are to be discussed. In fact, these so-called "revolutionary innovations" are only small steps toward a situation that the Komsomol claims has always existed. Moreover, nothing in recent practice confirms that the reforms have really been instituted.

WHAT IS SOVIET youth's reaction to this effort at regimentation? Deprived of almost any opportunity for really spontaneous initiative, many Soviet youngsters show boredom with the youth organizations and resentment at the interference in their private lives. They become disillusioned and apathetic. Often the result is hooliganism and juvenile delinquency. Idlers and *stiliagi* (the Soviet version of Teddy boys) are not uncommon phenomena, as is attested by the persistence and rigor of press campaigns against them.

Even while the party shows its fear of losing control over the youth, large groups—particularly students at the big universities—are showing greater independence, and nothing seems to halt the process. Mr. Kassof senses this reaction, but he is very cautious about making any generalizations. His approach is that of the scholar sticking to the information directly available to him and reluctant to speculate in larger perspective. To the reviewer's mind, at least, he does not sufficiently convey the mood that prevails among the more sophisticated young people.

I have met students who unhesitatingly criticized numerous shortcomings of Soviet life and realized that people in the West lived much better than they did. True, they always tried to find a justification for the backwardness of their country. And while they discussed the mistakes and distortions of their political system, they never questioned the validity of the system itself. The important point, however, is that they no longer considered the party beyond criticism and were not afraid to discuss Soviet failures, despite the constant threat that their outspoken opinions might land them in "work colonies." Such attitudes—observed and recorded by a number of recent visitors to the USSR—represent a potentially explosive force on the Soviet scene; in fact, by Soviet standards of conformance, the problem is not just potential but immediate and real.

THERE IS in the USSR an even larger force that remains beyond the control of the totalitarian regime—and that is religion. Though much has been written on this subject, public knowledge of recent developments in this sphere is generally inadequate. The appearance of Russian Orthodox churchmen, as well as Soviet Protestants and recently even Catholics, at various international gatherings has led many people in the West to conclude that the era of antireligious activity in Russia is over. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, since 1958 the Communist Party has resumed a virulent antireligious policy. Insofar as the Orthodox religion is concerned, pressure has been exerted to close down a number of churches and heavy taxes have been imposed on church property and on the income of the clergy.

The campaign is also targeted against minority religions. Visitors to the USSR are sometimes surprised at the number of religious groups and sects that have managed to survive despite official hostility on one hand and an overwhelming Orthodox majority on the other. Yet it is an old tradition in Russia that whenever times are grim and the future uncertain, "holy old men" appear and all kinds of sects flourish. It was so under the Tartar yoke, and again in the 18th and 19th centuries. One interesting sign of the party's concern over the present strength of sectarianism is to be found in the famous antireligious Museum in Leningrad; in the contemporary section there, much more space is devoted to defamation of all kinds of dissident groups than to denunciation of the Orthodox Church.

In *The Faith of the Russian Evangelicals,* Mr. J. C. Pollock tells the story of the Evangelical movement in Russia from Tsarist times to the present, shedding light on the status of other religious minorities as well.

What sparked Mr. Pollock's study was the widely-publicized news account some months

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ago of 32 Evangelicals who traveled the long distance from Siberia to Moscow, hoping to emigrate to America or Israel in search of religious freedom. Ignorant of the fact that Israel is a Jewish state, they imagined it as the Biblical Zion, the Land Of Christ, and—possibly due to anti-American propaganda—they had it confused with America. Why did these people want to leave their home-land? Their plight, as it was relayed to Western news sources, was poignant. When some of the children became upset over atheistic attitudes taught in the public schools, the parents withdrew them. Thereupon the authorities took the children away and sent them to boarding schools. Despairing letters that the children wrote home finally impelled the group's decision to attempt emigration. In their naivété they didn't realize the difficulties involved. They wrote to the Ministry of Interior asking for exit permission and got no answer; they wrote to Khrushchev personally and got no answer; so they journeyed to Moscow. When pleas in person also proved fruitless, they went to the American Embassy hoping for aid, but the Americans were of course powerless to help them leave Soviet territory. Ultimately they were returned to their homes in Siberia.

This story so intrigued Mr. Pollock that he arranged a trip to the USSR to investigate it further. While he soon learned that he would get nowhere in his efforts to interview the group personally in Siberia, he was able to collect materials for his broader study of the Evangelical movement.

IN OLD RUSSIA, as Mr. Pollock relates, non-orthodox Christians were subjected to continuous persecution by the Tsars, inspired in large measure by the official Orthodox Church. The Act of Toleration proclaimed by Nicholas II in 1905 did little to improve their lot. Nevertheless, they not only survived but gained more and more adherents.

Ironically, it was the Revolution and its aftermath that brought the Evangelical Christians and Baptists the greatest freedom they had ever known. During the early 1920's they were allowed to accept aid from abroad and were granted the right to print literature, to travel and preach, and to found a preachers' school and a missionary society. By 1927 they numbered two million.

A new wave of persecution started in 1928. The next year a law was enacted that sharply curtailed the rights of all believers, stopped preachers from traveling from district to district, and broke up auxiliary church activity. While services of worship were allowed, all other gatherings and all religious propaganda became illegal. The Baptists and Evangelical Christians (or "Sectarians," as the Soviets call them) were special targets of the state's attack because of their connections abroad, which were now said to screen sinister counter-revolutionary conspiracies. Arrests of church members as spies and economic saboteurs started to multiply. In the collectivization drive, sectarian farmers—usually hard-working and therefore prosperous—were inevitably dubbed kulaks and deported to remote parts of Siberia or annihilated.

The whole Stalin period was in fact a chain of sufferings and persecution for the Christian population and for the Baptists in particular. The only time of relief came during the "great patriotic war," when Stalin was forced to acknowledge the popular need for churches. During this respite the regime permitted the formation of an "All-Union of Evangelical Christians/Baptists," which has since endured as the major Evangelical group in the USSR (Pentecostalists are also members). The All-Union leaders have paid a price for the regime's toleration. In particular, they have had to contribute vociferously to party propaganda on Stalin's "peace campaign," on "American imperialism," on "germ warfare," on the Hungarian uprising, and so on.

The present situation of religion in the Soviet Union is not much better than it was under Stalin's rule. Despite Khrushchev's famous "Decree on Mistakes in the Conduct of Scientific Atheist Propaganda," which admitted "gross errors" and condemned "offending the feelings of believers in any way," persecution has persisted under the cover of "freedom of antireligious propaganda." Aside from the methods of direct repression already referred to, the current campaign has taken the form of threatening or actually taking away people's jobs, barring their road to career advancement, or denying them entrance to the universities.

Mr. Pollock has unearthed and recorded many instances of such persecution. Yet he ends on a note of conviction that the strength of spirit demonstrated by religious believers will endure against all efforts to undermine it.

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THE FOURTH BOOK under review investigates, in substance, a very different subject—the world of Soviet sport. Yet one does not have to read very far into Mr. Morton's account to find the common thread that runs through all of these books: in sports, no less than in education, religion, and indeed most areas of Soviet life, the authoritarian controls exerted by the party regime have a profound impact. In this respect, Mr. Morton's subtitle, calling sport the "mirror of Soviet society," is aptly chosen.

Soviet sport was a latecomer to the international arena. Soviet athletes and their achievements were almost unknown abroad until the early 1950's. When they finally appeared they surprised the world with their prowess. Yet not satisfied with the immediate recognition accorded the USSR as one of the Great Sport Powers, the Soviets launched an all-out effort to become the Greatest on Earth. Mr. Morton discusses how this formidable "leap forward" has been pursued and why the Soviet rulers have put such emphasis upon it.

The demand for outstanding sports achievement has not always been a feature of Soviet policy, the author tells us. In the 1920's the party regime stressed mass collective play rather than winning and breaking records. While physical culture was encouraged, its chief aim was to prepare the Soviet masses for hardy participation in socialist construction and military service. In 1929 a resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee deplored the malady of "record mania."

As in most other areas of Soviet life, so in sport a radical change of policy occurred in the 1930's. Stalin began to demand records from his sportsmen as one more way to demonstrate the superiority of the Communist system, though his fear of foreign contacts (or perhaps of a poor showing?) ruled out international competition.

When, after the war, participation in foreign games first came under serious consideration, the Soviet Union's preparations were as intense as in its political competitions with the West. Before athletes were allowed abroad, observers were sent to note and to photograph the behavior of Western champions—most notably at the first postwar Olympic games held in London in 1948. When Soviet competitors finally began to travel abroad and to receive foreigners in their own country, the stress on records and victories reached the proportions of hysteria. And curiously enough, Moscow seemed to consider beating athletes from other "brotherly socialist countries" even more important than showing up the "bourgeois West."

Why this urge to win, always win? Because every victory over foreign sportsmen serves as another argument for the Soviet propagandists to "prove" that the Soviet system is unsurpassable. Conversely, defeat is treated as a national disaster. Some of the most interesting pages of Mr. Morton's book are those which describe the Soviet authorities' angry reaction when their athletes fail to come in first. As in the case of nonfulfillment of production quotas in industry or agriculture, "responsibility is established" and "appropriate" sanctions applied. The author quotes many facts concerning coaches and athletes whose careers have plummeted in disgrace. Readers will recall, in corroboration, the vilification heaped upon the Soviet Olympic team coaches whose pupils failed to win many of the gold medals anticipated in last year's Tokyo Games.

A substantial part of the book is devoted to Soviet training methods, which involve an interesting combination of rigorous mass discipline, psychological conditioning, and material incentives to outstanding individuals. Mr. Morton convincingly proves that Soviet athletes are not amateurs in the sense demanded by Olympic regulations, at least on paper. As the author points out, these requirements have become somewhat obsolete for all participants due to modern economic conditions. But he still notes a basic difference: in the West many of the great champions, though not amateurs in the classic sense, nevertheless have other occupations, and their participation in sports performances is not the only aim of their lives. In the USSR an outstanding athlete is a performer employed by the government; he is highly paid for his services but is also obliged to unquestioning obedience. An example of how subsidies are handled is the organization called "Dynamo," which is well known for its outstanding soccer teams in many large Soviet towns and which also produces champion competitors in many other branches of sport. But not many people know that "Dynamo" is actually the sports organization of the Soviet secret police. The Soviet army also has sports clubs to which outstanding athletes belong. Thus, through formal service in either the police or the army, Soviet champions are able to devote full time to pre-

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paring for new victories and new records, for which they are paid high bonuses.

Although there is much evidence that the system of material rewards has been a crucial incentive to Soviet sportsmen—indeed the Communist Party Central Committee has even issued a decree dealing with this problem—Soviet sports authorities nowadays categorically deny that any such system exists. They have to do so because they cannot afford to acknowledge such a basic violation of the regulations governing international competitions.

This is especially unfortunate because there is a lot of discussion nowadays in the "bourgeois" societies about what the proper aims and organizational forms of sports activities should be. An honest exchange of knowledge based on experience—including problems and shortcomings as well as achievements—could possibly be of use to the Soviet Union as well as to other countries. In fact, teamwork might just prove to be more important than competitive spirit as a measure of true "good sportsmanship" in the international arena.

Warsaw and Points South

RICHARD HISCOCKS: *Poland—Bridge for the Abyss.*
London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.
GHITA IONESCU: *Communism in Rumania,* 1944-1962.
London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1964.
H. GORDON SKILLING: *Communism—National and International.*
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964.
G. R. URBAN, ED.: *Talking to Eastern Europe.*
Detroit, Wayne State University Press; London, Eyre & & Spottiswoode; 1964.
JOSEPH ROTHCHILD: *Communist Eastern Europe.*
New York, Walker, 1964.

Reviewed by Eric Bourne

THE PACE OF CHANGE in Eastern Europe is now so rapid that few departures from orthodoxy occasion surprise or seem beyond the bounds of possibility. Indeed, change in the Communist world has been so turbulent that since the books cited above were written, the split of the Communist camp into two blocks has solidified—with most ruling parties acknowledging either Moscow or Peking as the center of influence and doctrinal guidance. The Soviet-oriented group of Communist states is the stronger and the more experienced, though it counts only seven of the so-called "socialist" countries —its six East European allies plus Yugoslavia—as more or less consistent followers. (Yugoslavia is not a formal member of the alliance except through Comecon association, but its attitudes in international affairs and in the Sino-Soviet conflict justify regarding it as part of the alliance.)

Within this group, there are common interests which bind its members to each other and to the USSR. There are, however, also differences of approach and practice which point up the pattern of growing diversity. No two of the East European countries are quite alike any more.

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Traveling from Russia to any one of them—except Bulgaria—means moving from East to West in more than the literal sense.

IN 1956, the Poles jubilantly proclaimed that Poland had "ceased to be a colony and become a dominion"—a somewhat optimistic formulation, as Professor Hiscocks suggests, but one which gained in point over the whole bloc in subsequent years. That same year, President Tito, visiting Bucharest after his first triumphant progress through the Soviet Union, defended the late Rumanian party chief, Gheorghiu-Dej, against the appellation "satellite."

It is an interesting thought that perhaps then and there the seed was sown which several years later grew into the Rumanians' assertion of their right to independent development.

When the assertion was publicly made in 1964, it was the result of a deliberate decision of the party leadership in Bucharest and not the product of a "liberal" ferment that had characterized the conditions in Poland and Hungary immediately preceding the events of 1956. The source of the later Rumanian resistance lay in differences at the official level over economic relations between the "socialist" states and, more specifically, in the determination of Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues to industrialize their country—if necessary against the opposition of the more developed members of Comecon, including the Soviet Union. The increasingly violent Sino-Soviet dispute finally offered a suitable opening, and the Rumanian leadership seized it to assert their national and economic interests. Luckily, the Soviets had not yet forgotten the lessons they had been taught by Tito in 1948 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and they were now careful to avoid actions that might bring them new embarrassment.

While most, if not all, of the East European countries had shared in the past a similar discontent over the economic conditions that the Soviet Union had imposed upon them, the 1956 revolts in Poland and Hungary sprang from a much more broadly based revulsion against the Soviet overlordship, which ultimately made it impossible for the Stalinist regimes to maintain control. In Poland, Khrushchev had sought at first to quench the revisionist fires which he had yet begun to comprehend, but in the end he had the good sense to satisfy himself with the compromise offered by a Communist regime which was prepared to remain a loyal ally in return for non-interference in its own internal affairs.

In Hungary, events left Khrushchev no such choice, and the cold-blooded suppression of the uprising was the result. Yet, in the long run, the outcome in both countries has been similar. Once the new leadership in Budapest, under Janos Kadar, felt itself sufficiently consolidated, it launched a liberalization "from the top" which has allowed the Hungarians most of the relaxations and the milder political climate enjoyed by the Poles. Kadar could argue that much of the aim of the original freedom fighters was conceded.

BY CONTRAST, the Czechoslovak leaders long seemed as impervious as the Rumanians to the crisis of the post-Stalin "thaw." For quite a time there were no significant changes of leadership or policy in Prague, and the failure to destalinize was condoned by Moscow—as Professor Skilling suggests—only because of the regime's complete loyalty to the Kremlin and its apparent domestic stability. Even as late as December 1962, at the 12th Czechoslovak Party Congress, the old leaders, headed by Novotny, were to retain their seats of power, though they were forced to "justify" the slow pace of "liberalization" and to adopt a more friendly attitude towards revisionist and hitherto anathematized Belgrade. But the tide was turning; by the spring of 1963, a deteriorating economic crisis combined with rising intellectual opposition forced Novotny hurriedly to jettison his old Stalinist associates while shrewdly screening his own vulnerability. He has been kept on the defensive ever since.

The new political currents in Czechoslovakia have been associated with liberalizing intellectual activity as powerful as Poland and Hungary had experienced earlier. Mr. Skilling rightly observes that Czechoslovkia's long role as the entirely "silent and passive" satellite was the result of the shattering effect of Stalinism on a country where the democratic tradition was more deeply rooted than anywhere else in Eastern Europe. Because of this deep-seated tradition, it is not impossible that the current trend toward liberalization in Czechoslovakia may establish itself more firmly and in the end move farther ahead than in neighboring countries.

Prague—for all its depressing shabbiness and the shameful disrepair of some of its outstanding

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architecture—is today Eastern Europe's most stimulating capital; exhilaration is evident both in public debate of economic and other social problems, and in the arts, including notably the theater and the film. Many Czechs are now convinced that their "thaw," just because it has come about slowly and less dramatically, will prove more enduring, more capable of resisting regime efforts to impose the cut-backs that were inflicted on the "liberal" movement in Poland.

Poland, indeed, begins to suffer by comparison with present-day Czechoslovakia. To be sure, Poland still has a free peasantry farming its own land, while the rest of the former bloc countries—including Hungary and Czechoslovakia—are heavily collectivized and their agricultural growth thwarted by discredited doctrine; the church in Poland still has more latitude than in other Communist states, even though the Church-State *modus vivendi* of 1956 now runs an uneasy course; and the private Polish citizen is still immune from the old police terror that was halted when Gomulka returned to power (though Poles now exercise more restraint in the presence of Westerners than hitherto).

Yet—for acute economic as well as other reasons—the sparkle and the bloom of 1956 have gone from Polish life. Retrogression has struck hardest in the political and intellectual spheres. In the Sejm (parliament) as Mr. Hiscocks points out, the committees (which include a high proportion of non-party members) are still able to do excellent "citizens' watchdog" work, but the wider opportunities of quasi-independent groups, such as the Catholic Znak and its highly intelligent members, have been much curtailed. The once prying and fearless Polish press has become deadly dull, while the Czech and Hungarian have both gained in spirit. Perhaps worse, many Polish writers have lapsed into resentful, frustrated silence, especially since the clumsy affair of the "letter of the 34" last year and the regime's reiterated demands for more "positive" and less "pessimistic" writing.

The truth is that Wladislaw Gomulka, the Polish leader, is trying to steer a middle course that avoids both Stalinist extremism, which he defeated but failed to liquidate in 1956, and a resurgence of revisionism, to which as a dedicated, orthodox Communist he is equally opposed. He is also convinced that in a divided world Poland's survival depends on a positive relationship with the Soviet Union. This outlook has not been altered by American and other Western aid to Poland in the late 1950's, which, though substantial, did not—as Mr. Hiscocks points out—compare with the long-term impact on the economy of Poland's economic relations with the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In view of Polish apprehensions about political "strings" attached to American aid, as well as Gomulka's well-known loyalty to the USSR, it is not surprising that the United States has always carefully weighed its offers of economic support. But Mr. Hiscocks sees here a "missed opportunity" and implies that more US aid might have had important effects, especially in the period after the Hungarian uprising, when Gomulka found himself isolated and suspect within the Communist bloc. As it was, the Polish leader settled for a large measure of internal latitude in return for diplomatic and ideological compliance with Moscow —a compromise that inevitably put the brake on further liberalization in Poland.

MR. IONESCU'S study, *Communism in Rumania,* ends with a brief reference to the declaration of the Rumanian Workers' Party Central Committee of April 26, 1964, which rejected Khrushchev's idea of a supranational Comecon as inconsistent with Rumania's national and economic sovereignty, and which in effect also announced the party's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Mr. Ionescu holds that this declaration again left the Rumanian party in the fence-straddling, not completely committed position that it has sought to occupy ever since the Tito-Stalin split. However, it surely did more than that for—even though it did not commit Rumania to the liberalizing course followed by Yugoslavia and others—it did spell out Rumania's insistence on the equality of all "socialist" states and the right of each to follow its own "path to socialism." The document was thus clearly polycentrist in content.

Bucharest was astute enough to recognize that any new, independent economic policy, based in part on expanded trade relations with the West, would have to be accompanied by a change in Rumania's well-earned reputation as one of the toughest police states in Eastern Europe. Hence the cessation of the jamming of Western broadcasts and the amnesty of political prisoners last spring. The latter measure coincided with the visit to Washington of a Ru-

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manian economic delegation, which secured a considerable easement of earlier limitations on Rumanian purchases in the United States.

Since then, Khrushchev has been dismissed and Gheorghiu-Dej, the Rumanian party leader immediately identified with the new "national" line, has died, but neither event has so far affected Rumanian policy. From the first this policy has been primarily concerned with internal economic development and external trade relations. There has been no effort to alter the highly centralized system of economic management, and apart from some measures of derussification, little has been accomplished in the way of internal political liberalization. This generally cautious attitude seems to prevail under the leadership of the new party secretary, Nicolae Ceausescu.

The slow progress in the relaxation of controls over the arts is a case in point. Mr. Ionescu describes how, after a minor literary "revolt" in 1956, writers and other cultural workers were given a pacifying share in the prosperity enjoyed by the growing "new class" of officials and technocrats:

The price which the regime exacted for its munificence was total acceptance of party guidance in their creative work. This meant not simply a negative avoidance of party taboos but a positive response to the themes which the party insisted should be part of socialist writing; what and how to write, which problems to treat, what kind of dramatis personae *to present, what solutions to give to moral and sentimental conflicts.*

ONLY RECENTLY have there been signs that more liberal winds might prevail. Mihai Beniuc, chairman of the Writers' Union and Stalinist watchdog of Rumanian literature since 1956, was replaced in March and was not even elected to a secondary position in the Union's bureau or any of its standing committees. This spring, Bucharest, where hitherto young "moderns" have been banned, has seen two exhibits of abstract painting by Rumanian artists, the first of the kind in 20 years of Communist dictatorship. And on May 19, party First Secretary Ceausescu expressed himself cautiously in favor of "diversity of styles in art and the enrichment of the forms of artistic expression." Nevertheless, he qualified this statement by saying that this diversity "must serve the great aim of the cause of socialism" and that "an artist's work will be valuable only to the extent that it expresses the realities among which he lives." [1] This may well herald a more tolerant official attitude toward the arts, but Rumania still seems to have a long way to go before conditions allow the production of plays like Laszlo Nemeth's *The Journey* in Budapest, or the later *For Criminals, Peace* by his fellow Hungarian Gyula Czap, with their acrid portrayal of the hypocrisy and moral backsliding within Communist officialdom.

Perhaps the most striking element in the new Rumanian line is its nationalist *leitmotif*. This has shown itself not only in the drastic reduction of Russian-language instruction in the schools and in the de-emphasis of the Soviet contribution to Rumania's liberation in official history textbooks, but also in ultrasensitive regime reactions in the field of foreign affairs. Last year, for example, the leading Rumanian economic journal, *Viata economica*,[2] reacted with exaggerated alarm to an obscure Moscow university professor's proposal for an economic integration of the Lower Danube region, embracing areas of Bulgaria, Rumania and the USSR. Only a week before, the same journal had responded with great indignation when an East German economic review commented somewhat disparagingly—aiming clearly at Rumania—that certain "socialist" countries "were buying goods from the capitalists" when they could obtain them through Comecon.[3] *Viata economica* retorted: "In plain Rumanian, it boils down to the thesis that some socialist countries should give up the idea of industrialization altogether." [4]

Nor have the Rumanians been averse to applying the needle to neighboring Hungary. Because of the problems created by the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, which after World War II was reincorporated into Rumania, the relations between the two countries have been very chilly. It is within this context that one can understand the furor caused in May 1964 at a historians' congress in Budapest by a Ru-

[1] *Scinteia* (Bucharest), May 20, 1965.
[2] June 12, 1964.
[3] Willi Kunz in *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (East Berlin), August 1964. Radio Moscow had made a similar charge May 30, 1964.
[4] June 5, 1964.

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manian professor's claim that under the Hapsburg Empire Rumanians were exploited not only by the imperial rulers but also by some of the peoples of the Empire, including the Hungarians. Because of current sensitivity in Hungary over alleged discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, both Marx and Engels have been invoked to recall past oppression of the Rumanians *by* the Magyars in Transylvania and by Russia in Rumania's former eastern province of Bessarabia.[5]

MR. IONESCU believes that this nationalism has its source in the older generation of Rumanians. The younger generation he finds imbued with "geopolitical realism": it seeks, internally, "a free Rumania, ruled by constitutional means and by Western values," and, externally, "a *free* association with other Balkan and East European nations." He is further convinced that by the time a new generation takes over, Rumania will—because of last year's stand and the widening relations with the West—feel less dependent on the Soviet Union.

This may be an overly optimistic view, for the ties that bind Rumania and the other countries of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union are many and powerful. But there is no doubt that in varying degrees all the former satellites are now beginning to fend for themselves, and in a way that would have been quite unthinkable only a few years ago. Among the most striking manifestations of this pursuit of self-interest are the new, and in some cases radically new, approaches to economic management and development. Such new departures are usually the product of a marriage between the necessity to solve certain real and pressing social problems and the initiative of intellectuals seeking professionally and morally satisfactory solutions. In their struggle for survival the Communist regimes can never squelch either one of these elemental forces; they can only try to influence the place and time of their encounter.

IT IS WITHIN this context that one should place Mr. Urban's collection of broadcasts and background papers originally commissioned by Radio Free Europe for its Radio University series. The papers were broadcast between 1961 and 1963 and were addressed primarily to managerial and intellectual groups in Eastern Europe. The genesis of the broadcasts, as Mr. Urban explains, came from the conviction that intellectuals matter, especially in East Central Europe, and that it is both possible and realistic to talk with them even in the ideological setting within which they happen to live. The aim, then, was not to air propaganda but to support the development of free thinking and a multiplicity of views—and given the high caliber of most of the essays in the collection, this goal has been admirably served.

Professor Rothschild's book is a fact-packed survey of two decades of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and a useful reference book. In the concluding chapter dealing with the general problems and prospects of the area, the author joins most of his professional colleagues in stressing the growing diversity of Eastern Europe as, one by one, the former satellites grow less dependent on the Soviet Union—a process, Professor Rothchild suggests, that is likely to have a profound effect on the internal development of Russia itself.

[5] Karl Marx, "Notes on Rumanians," and letter by Friedrich Engels of Jan. 4, 1888, both published in 1964 by the Institute of Party History attached to the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

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Perspectives on the Soviet Economy

JANET C. CHAPMAN: *Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928.*
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.
ABRAM BERGSON AND SIMON KUZNETS, EDS.: *Economic Trends in the Soviet Union.*
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.
ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON: *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.*
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962.
ROY D. LAIRD, ED.: *Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs.*
Lawrence, Kans., University of Kansas Press, 1963.
HARRY SCHWARTZ: *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin.*
New York, Lippincott, 1965.
NICOLAS SPULBER: *Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth.*
Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1964.
THEODORE H. VON LAUE: *Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia.*
New York, Columbia University Press, 1963.

Reviewed by Richard W. Judy

KHRUSHCHEV'S KREMLIN successors appear to be bent on balancing the historial account of Stalin's role in World War II. There is no evidence that they contemplate a balanced evaluation of Soviet industrialization under the despot. If they desired to do so, a major rewriting of official economic history would be required.

We are more fortunate than Messrs. Brezhnev and Kosygin. In the twelve years since the old dictator's death, Western scholars have worked to gather and sift the evidence on Soviet economic development during the Stalin period. Recently the fruits of these labors have been gathered in a large number of publications, of which the set surveyed here is but a sample. These studies serve to put Soviet industrialization in the perspective of Russian history and within the general context of economic development in other countries of the world. They allow us to judge the validity of claims that the "Soviet model of industrialization" is a thing unique in its methods and effectiveness, that the pace of Soviet economic progress has been unprecedented, and that Soviet-type planning is a vastly superior method of promoting economic growth.

It is hardly novel to suggest that there are important elements of economic continuity between Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. More successfully than any other scholar, Professor Alexander Gerschenkron has taught us to recognize the effects of Russia's economic backwardness on her methods of industrialization under both Tsars and Commissars. Students of Russia and of economic history can

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rejoice that his eloquent essays on economic development are now collected in one volume, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.*

In a series of classic articles reprinted in this collection, Gerschenkron has sketched out the typical pattern of Russian economic development. This pattern, here crudely oversimplified, runs roughly as follows:

(1) Russia's rulers have had ambitious foreign policy goals but have been frustrated in achieving them because of military inferiority in relation to the Western powers. This inferiority has derived from economic inferiority.

(2) Repeatedly, Russia's rulers have striven to redress the economic imbalance in order to attain military power commensurate with their political ambitions. In so striving, the rulers (*e.g.,* Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great) have caused the state to involve itself deeply and directly in the business of economic development. This involvement has forced growth in the parts of the economy most closely associated with the military needs of the state—in metallurgy, machine building, power, and transportation.

(3) To make possible these spurts of economic development, the state has imposed heavy sacrifices on the population and, to repress the resulting resentment, has dealt harshly with dissent.

(4) Periods of intense pressure and rapid growth have often been followed by the relapse into stagnation of an exhausted people.

A CLASSIC CASE of the Gerschenkron pattern is the rapid industrialization of Russia in the last two decades of the 19th century. Russia's weakness *vis-à-vis* the Western European powers had been demonstrated in the Crimean War and at the Congress of Berlin, which followed the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. In his book, *Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia,* Professor Theodore H. Von Laue relates how suspicion and fear of industrialization were gradually transformed into a conviction that industrialization was necessary if Russia was to compete as a great power. As a result, under Alexander III and Nicholas II the Imperial Government took strong measures to stimulate industrial growth.

The chief executors of the Imperial industrialization policy were two famous Tsarist ministers of finance, I. A. Vyshnegradski and S. I. Witte. Vyshnegradski forged the tools by which resources would be squeezed from the Russian people and devoted to industrial development. He raised taxes sharply and erected Europe's highest tariff walls to protect Russia's infant industry. He earned foreign exchange by exporting grain when there was none to spare: "We must export though we die," became his most famous words.

Sergei Witte, before succeeding Vyshnegradski as Minister of Finance in 1892, had been a railroad manager and entrepreneur. But he was no ordinary *chinovnik;* he had read broadly in economics and economic policy and had published articles and books on these topics. His economics was not the passive *laissez-faire* doctrine of the English classical school; rather, it was an activist creed inspired by the German arch-industrializer, Friedrich List. In accordance with that creed, Witte assigned top priority to state-sponsored industrialization, so that Russia might avoid, as he put it, "the peril of remaining behind."

Witte's aim, suggests Von Laue, was capitalist industrialization after the Western model, but, because of Russia's economic backwardness, he did not expect industrial capitalism to develop unaided. The state would have to prime the pump, and it would do this by concentrating on a few key industrial sectors—railroad construction in particular. The needs of these sectors would then stimulate growth in the main supplier industries, such as metallurgy, machine-building, and fuels. In ever widening circles, the impact of state financing would thus become felt throughout the economy.

To finance the necessary state investment in industry, Witte greatly increased tax rates. Since he preferred indirect taxes to direct taxes, nearly half of the government's income was derived from indirect taxes on consumer goods. Together with the redemption payments (*i.e.,* payments for the land that former serfs received under the emancipation settlements—a legacy of the Reform of 1860) and various other imposts, writes Von Laue, Witte's taxes "took every spare kopek which might have helped the peasant improve his lot."

These draconian measures produced in the 1890's a spurt of industrial development at an unprecedented rate of growth. But the international financial crisis of 1900 and several years of poor harvests spelt the end of the

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Witte era. Witte's policies fell under attack from those who argued that his industrialization drive had "exhausted the paying powers of the population." In the end, these arguments prevailed and in 1902 Witte resigned as Minister of Finance. For Russia—and Witte—there had been, in Professor Von Laue's words, "only the paradoxical and grim choice between remaining poor by spending the available national income according to the wishes of the majority of the Russian people, and remaining poor by investing, under autocratic control, every available kopek in the development of the means of production" (pp. 301-02).

TWO WARS AND two revolutions later, the Bolshevik rulers of Russia faced the same grim choice—or, at least, they thought they did. During the 1920's they searchingly examined the various aspects of that choice in what Professor Alexander Erlich has called "The Great Industrialization Debate." Professor Nicholas Spulber returns to this debate in his book, *Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth.* In the contest, two basic development strategies were outlined. The Rightist position promoted by Bukharin and, for a time, by Stalin, maintained that the quickest and safest route to industrialization lay in strong support of agriculture and those industries furnishing the farms with supplies and manufactured consumers' goods. The Leftist argument, put forward by Trotski and Preobrazhenski, insisted that the road to industrialization had to be paved with massive investments in heavy industry and that agriculture and the peasant population would have to bear the burdens necessary to provide the resources for these investments.

If the "grim choices" were the same for the Bolsheviks as they had been for their Tsarist predecessors, the goals, too, bore a striking likeness. To emphasize the necessity of rapid industrialization, Witte warned in 1900:

If we do not take energetic and decisive measures so that in the course of the next decades our industry will be able to satisfy the needs of Russia and of the Asiatic countries which are—or should be—under our influence, then the rapidly growing foreign industries will break through our tariff barriers and establish themselves in our fatherland and in the Asiatic countries mentioned above and drive their roots into the depths of our economy. This may gradually clear the way also for triumphant political penetration by foreign powers. . . . It is possible that the slow growth of our industries will endanger the fulfillment of the great political tasks of the monarchy. Our economic backwardness may lead to political and cultural backwardness as well. (Quoted by Von Laue, p. 3.)

In 1931, Stalin put it this way:

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish fuedal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for political backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. . . .

Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and lose its independence? If you don't want this, you must liquidate our backwardness and develop a real Bolshevik tempo in building our socialist economy. There is no other road. . . . (Quoted by Harry Schwartz in *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin,* p. 14.)

Facing common conditions of economic backwardness and cherishing the common goal of rapid industrialization, Witte and Stalin chose policies of a common strain.

Witte's strategy was to mobilize resources from the peasantry by means of redemption payments and indirect taxes; with these instruments he extracted grain that peasants would have preferred to eat. The government then invested heavily in a few high-priority sectors such as railroads and metallurgy, and at the same time protected all Russian industry by a high tariff from intrusions of foreign competitors. Stalin's strategy was similar. After he abandoned the Rightist position and embraced the ideas of the Leftists, he set out to mobilize resources from the peasantry through forceful collectivization of agriculture; he was thus able to extract grain from the peasants which they would have pre-

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ferred to eat. He also invested heavily in a few high-priority sectors (called "leading links" by Stalin's planners) such as metallurgy and machine-building, and protected Russian industry through the state monopoly of foreign trade.

AMONG THE MOST significant post-Stalin contributions of Western research on the Soviet economy have been the careful quantitative measurements of Soviet economic development. Perhaps the most ambitious of the statistical studies available in the public domain are researches conducted by Professor Abram Bergson and his associates at the RAND Corporation. These studies culminated in Bergson's monumental *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928*. Soon after its publication a conference was held at Princeton University to examine trends in the economic development of the USSR and, where appropriate, to make international comparisons. The papers read at this conference have been published as *Economic Trends in the Soviet Union* edited by Professors Bergson and Simon Kuznets.

The comparative rates of economic growth in capitalist and in Soviet-type economies has been a topic of intense interest during the past decade. Equally pertinent, but less discussed, is the question of comparative rates of growth of output per unit of productive input. These two important questions were on the Princeton agenda.

Bergson's calculations show that from 1928, when Stalinist planning began, to the late 1950's, Soviet national income grew considerably faster than the American. However, some economists have argued that it is inappropriate to compare the performances of the two economies during this period because the Soviet Union was then in its industrial infancy while the United States was an industrial adult. Furthermore, Professor Kuznets' paper at the Princeton conference indicates that the pace of Soviet economic growth since 1928 (exclusive of 1941-49) has been matched by Japan (in the 1920's and 1930's), the United States (in the 1870's and 1880's), Australia (in the 1860's and 1870's), and in the Union of South Africa (in the first half of this century). If the entire period, 1928-58, is included in the comparison, the Soviet tempo is matched or exceeded by Sweden, Canada, and Argentina during various stages.

In the postwar period 1950-58—still according to Kuznets' calculations—Soviet growth rates were rivaled by those of Western Germany, Japan, Venezuela, Jamaica, Israel, Taiwan, Austria, Greece, Turkey, the Dominican Republic, Burma, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland. What is more, Kuznets points out, the two other industrial countries which were heavily damaged by World War II, Germany and Japan, have grown faster in the postwar period than has the Soviet Union.

NEVERTHELESS the Soviet economy has shown rapid growth over the past 45 years. Was this the result of the efficiencies of Stalinist planning and organization? Or were there other causes? On this problem the Princeton conferees enlighten us greatly. Briefly stated, Bergson's calculations indicate that the superior rates of growth in the USSR have been ". . .due entirely to the more rapid increase of inputs." Labor, capital and natural resources have been poured into the Soviet productive mill at levels whose rate of increase has exceeded the rate in the United States. Rapid Soviet growth, in other words, has not been due to some unprecedented upsurge in output per unit of input; it has been a matter of getting more out by putting more in.

Data compiled by Professor Warren Eason show that the Soviet non-agricultural labor force increased by about 4.5 percent annually over the entire period 1928-59. This compares with annual rates below 1.5 percent in the United States for the same period. Over four-fifths of the Soviet population had lived on farms in 1928, and many were unproductively employed. This rural overpopulation gave Soviet leaders a large pool of manpower which could be drained to form an industrial working force. The migration from farm to city coupled with an extraordinary high employment of women accounts for the rapid growth of the urban labor force.

A major Leftist thesis in the Great Industrialization Debate, later embraced by Stalin, was that the share of national income being plowed back into the economy as investment would have to increase radically. Stalin's methods of doing this are well known: forced collectivization of the peasants, compulsory grain deliveries, low wages, high prices, emasculation of the labor unions and a whole totalitarian edifice designed to repress dissent.

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Given the central role of high investment rates in Soviet development strategy, it is hardly surprising to learn that capital investment rose sharply in the early years of Stalinist planning. Bergson's data indicate that the share of investment in national income climbed from about 13 percent in 1928 to about 26 percent in 1937. Kuznets, however, shows that such a high rate of capital formation is not unprecedented; Argentina, for example, invested about 27 percent of her national income during the first half of this century. "The distinctive characteristic of the overall capital formation proportion for the USSR is not its high level," writes Kuznets, "but the rapidity with which this level was attained."

The corollary of an increasing rate of investment is a decreasing rate of consumption. One cannot invest one's cake and eat it too. This simple truth was reinforced in the USSR by the fact that the share of general administration and defense increased even faster than capital investment. The inevitable consequence was that consumption as a share of national income dropped; by Bergson's data, the decline was from about 84 percent of national income in 1928 to about 60 percent in 1940. During the period 1950-55, Soviet consumers got an even smaller share; in fact, their share was smaller than that of consumers of any other country for which Kuznets presents data. The Belgian Congo was the nearest rival of the Soviet Union in this grim race, but even in the Congo consumption came to about 60 percent of national income compared to about 56 percent in the USSR.

THE CAREFUL STUDIES of Mrs. Janet Chapman bring solid detail to the analysis of Soviet living standards. Her book, *Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928,* concerns the paychecks of Soviet non-agricultural wage earners and salaried employees. Her most optimistic estimates show a drop in real wages of 14 percent between 1928 and 1937; by her pessimistic count, the drop was 39 percent. By the time Stalin died, Mrs. Chapman reckons, real wages had about climbed back to their 1928 level.

Real wages, however, do not tell the whole story. Mrs. Chapman's data show that per capita consumption has fared better. Inclusive of communal services, per capita consumption increased by about 10 percent between 1928 and 1937. By 1958, she reports, the gain was 85 percent above the 1928 level. The apparent contradiction between her data for real wages on one hand and per capita consumption on the other is easily resolved: A larger share of the population was employed in the later period; urbanization brought peasants from areas where they earned practically no money income to cities where they earned some (less, it is true, than had urban workers before Stalin's industrialization drive); and the rapidly increasing contribution of communal services raised real income more than data on real wages show.

IT IS NO SECRET that a major drag on the rise of Soviet national income—and, especially, on the rise of Soviet living standards—has been the sluggishness of Soviet agriculture. This perennial problem of Soviet policy makers is illuminated by the paper of Professor D. Gale Johnson read at the Princeton Conference and by a whole series of papers read at the Conference on Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs held at the University of Kansas in September 1962 and later published under the title *Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs,* with Professor Roy D. Laird as editor. It is impossible within the scope of this survey to do justice to the wealth of material presented at the Kansas Conference. Suffice it to say that for the student of the history, politics, economics, geography, agronomy and anthropology of Soviet agriculture, this collection of essays offers much valuable reading.

IN A SURVEY of literature on the Soviet economy that begins with a rendition of Gerschenkron's pattern of Russian economic history, a comparison must inevitably be made between Stalin's industrialization and spurts of Russian economic growth under earlier tyrants. Many features are obviously shared in common: the importance of political and military factors as motives for the big push, the extraordinary role played by the state, the great emphasis on heavy industry, and the cruel sacrifices demanded of the Russian people—especially of the peasants. But Stalin, with his totalitarian state, was able to maintain the pressure at an intensity and for a duration unrivaled by his predecessors. His accomplishments were commensurate with the effort.

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In his book, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin,* Harry Schwartz sums up this basic fact as follows:

By comparison with Stalin's achievements in this field, those of Peter the Great and Count Witte seem pale indeed. The cost in human suffering and loss of freedom was immense, but no objective historian can doubt that the entry of Russia into the ranks of the major industrial and technological powers of the world will forever be inseparably linked with the name of the Georgian tyrant. (p. 31)

But will the historical pattern repeat itself? Is the Soviet economy bound to relapse into stagnation? Only very few would categorically answer this question in the affirmative. The Soviet leadership, certainly, is as committed as ever to continued and rapid economic growth. As the Soviet economy matures, however, its problems and tasks are changing rapidly and they are of a very different sort from those with which the Stalinist system had been designed to cope. Yet the long shadow of Stalin still haunts the Soviet economic establishment. In the words of Mr. Schwartz, "in its achievements and its failures, the Soviet economy of the 1960's was still clearly the child of the Stalinist economy."

The answer, then, to the question above will depend on the ability of the Soviet leadership to abandon the old-fashioned notions of centralized command planning and to adjust the system of economic planning and management to new needs. There are now hopeful signs that this problem is beginning to be understood in places where it counts.

The Military Scene

THOMAS W. WOLFE: *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads.*
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.
MAJOR EDGAR O'BALLANCE: *The Red Army—A Short History.*
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1964.

Reviewed by R. Rockingham Gill

MOST READERS of *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* will probably agree that this is the most important work in its field since the appearance of the collection of articles edited by Marshal Sokolovski in 1962.[1] The Sokolovski volume offered a broad picture of contemporary military thinking in the USSR and formulated the main outlines of a deterrent strategy based primarily on intercontinental ballistic missiles. In twenty chapters Mr. Wolfe has now provided a moderate and objective commentary on the problems raised by the Marshal's book as well as by the subsequent internal Soviet controversies over resource allocation, the likely duration of a future war and other matters relating to Soviet defense questions.

One of the particularly valuable features of the book is the scope which it provides for further discussion and research. The political role of the Soviet military, for example, has been warmly debated in the past, and Mr. Wolfe's conclusion that its *direct* formal influence on high policy formation, even in mat-

[1] *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrines and Concepts,* New York, Praeger, 1963. Published also with supplementary material by Prentice-Hall, New York.

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ters of defense, is consistently minimal, seems to have been confirmed by events during and since the fall of Khrushchev. The military did not appear to take any active part in the plot against the Soviet leader last October, and the defense policy of the USSR has remained broadly unchanged during the past eight months.

ANOTHER OF THE positive features of Mr. Wolfe's book is its careful and objective appraisal of Soviet policy concerning limited war, local wars, and wars of "national liberation." The chapter dealing with these subjects is particularly interesting to anyone trying to assess today the risks the Kremlin may be willing to take in its efforts to support North Vietnam. It re-emphasizes the Kremlin's preference for material aid to the despatch of troops in such potentially dangerous situations.

A minor failing of Mr. Wolfe's analysis is his assumption in the introduction (page 4) of a "manpower pinch" in the USSR. After six years of the current Seven-Year Plan, during which the state labor targets have been repeatedly overfulfilled, it would be hard to document the existence of any such phenomenon. The arguments marshalled in the past to prove a manpower shortage have certainly been voluminous, but they have also been unconvincing. Now that the post-war baby boom is beginning to make its impact on the Soviet labor market, it is surely time to bury the notion of a "manpower pinch" for good.

One might also criticize Mr. Wolfe's conclusion that under some circumstances the Soviet Union may "entertain what would be in fact, if not in name, a pre-emptive strategy" (pp. 14 and 49-50). The evidence for this claim is weak since it rests on a statement by Marshal Malinovski (quoted in the introduction to the book) that the Soviet armed forces must be prepared to "break up the enemy's agressive plans by dealing him in good time a crushing blow." To the lay reader that Malinovski quotation sounds more like common sense than like an esoteric argument for preemption, and it is by no means clear why a Defense Minister who is presumably fully aware of his country's inferiority in strategic missiles and aircraft would even wish to make out a case for preemption. If the official American estimate is correct, the United States has a three- or four-to-one lead in ICBMs over the USSR; thus preemption is not even arithmetically convincing as a potential Soviet course of action.

THE AUTHOR'S persistent preoccupation with the possibility of a Soviet desire for preemption occasionally leads him to strain his evidence. Thus on page 63 he refers to a paragraph in the Soviet magazine *International Affairs* in which two military writers argue that the Soviet defense command should be able to get its missiles off before the attacker's weapons arrive; this suggests to him "a notion very close to preemption." Perhaps, but it might also be pointed out that if the defense could not fire its missiles in time, it would seem to follow that its radar network would have to be so inefficient as to be useless. If we expect Marshal Krylov to wait until all his launching sites have been hit before pressing the doomsday button, we are asking rather too much of him.

It is a political weakness in Mr. Wolfe's analysis that, like some other military-minded commentators, he discusses the suspension of Khrushchev's troop reduction program in 1961 almost exclusively in terms of an internal debate between the modernist and the traditionalist factions among the Soviet leadership (p. 32). He writes:

Khrushchev's policy position of January 1960 and the program through which it was to be implemented did not remain intact for long. By the summer of 1961 the troop reduction program had been halted.

He then gives the impression that Khrushchev's demobilization program was reversed by the pressure of the marshals on the First Secretary. In reality, a more important reason for the change of policy in mid-1961 was the fact that Khrushchev and the Presidium had decided to exert a serious political-diplomatic squeeze on Berlin, and the cessation of troop reductions, the subsequent increase in the Soviet defense budget, and the resumption of nuclear tests were required to make the Soviet threats against Berlin carry conviction. The effort was of course a failure, and in 1963 the series of cuts in the Soviet military budget was resumed.

Frequently throughout Mr. Wolfe's book (*e.g.*, pp. 148-49) there is a tendency to contrast Marshal Sokolovski's argument that a major war would require a great expansion of the armed forces with Khrushchev's January 1960 speech in which he said that a nuclear war might well end quickly. The author seems to find in the two attitudes a serious difference of opinion. He may be right, but it is as well to

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bear in mind the different timing involved. Khrushchev's early 1960 speech represented the long-term policy of the Presidium, whereas the Sokolovski compilation was written in late 1961, when the Soviet pressure against Berlin was still on and when threats of conventional war were being made for short-term political objectives. Moreover, it seems most improbable that Khrushchev ever excluded the *possibility* of a long war or the need to prepare for it should the threat increase. What he did was simply to turn his attention to preparations for the form of war on which it seemed (and still seems) rational to concentrate.

Later on in the book (p. 212), Mr. Wolfe discusses the Warsaw Pact command structure—a matter of great importance to Eastern Europe. He points out that the various ministers of defense nominally retain command of their own armed forces allocated to the Warsaw Pact, but goes on to argue that this is "contradicted" by Sokolovski's formula, according to which "the command of operational units of different socialist countries can be assigned to the Supreme Command of the Soviet armed forces." However, Sokolovski makes this point only with reference to forces "created to conduct joint operations"—similar perhaps, to the small NATO multinational "fire-brigade"—and he says that these forces *can* be assigned to Soviet command, not that they are or will be so assigned.

Despite these few minor reservations, Mr. Wolfe's book is an invaluable addition to our knowledge of the Soviet military scene, and it will probably remain an essential reference work for several years to come. His documentation of past friction between the party and the military in the USSR is also a useful reminder of how seldom the Soviet armed forces win their internal battles.

THE BOOK BY Major Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army,* is a companion volume to his earlier work, *The Red Army of China.* It outlines the whole history of the Soviet Army from 1918 to 1963 in ten short and easily readable chapters, with the result that many important details are omitted. Nevertheless, the volume provides a useful introduction to the most important phases in the development of the Red Army, including the Civil War, the Polish war of 1920, the effects of the purges in the late 1930's, the attack on Finland and the Second World War.

The author's style is clear and forceful, but as a whole the book is of interest mainly to laymen, since most of the individual campaigns which it describes have been more fully covered elsewhere. Moreover, the author at time does damage to his own credibility by failing to document some of his more unconvincing assertions (such as the statement that Lenin continued to receive secret German aid until the German Ambassador was assassinated in Petrograd in July 1918—p. 30).

Major O'Ballance has deliberately concentrated on the army's military rather than political history, but he does touch lightly on the fall of Marshal Zhukov, who is now undergoing a process of military-historical rehabilitation. The army's passive role in the plot against Khrushchev last October and its lack of success in earning any political promotion for its marshals since then suggest that the author was right in his decision to concentrate on the technical and professional aspects of the subject.

PERHAPS the most interesting chapter of this volume is the last one, in which the author discusses the equipment and organization of the Soviet Army in considerable detail. On the subject of military manpower, however, his estimates turn out to be misleading. It is true that Major O'Ballance was writing in August 1963, when there were still about 3.5 million men in the armed forces—as compared to about 2.7 million today (including security troops), if one is to accept the figure given by Marshal Sokolovski at his press conference in February of this year. But unfortunately Major O'Ballance also uses the unconvincing figure of 175 active divisions in the ground forces, a number which has seemed too high by more than a hundred for at least three years past (see *The Times,* London, Aug. 12, 1963). He also gives an overinflated impression of Soviet strength in a passage dealing with the Air Force, where he quotes 1960 figures of 25,000 aircraft and 700,000 personnel. Today about 12,000 aircraft and 450,000 men would seem to be more accurate; but even in 1963, when the book went to press, the author should have been aware that his figures were misleadingly high.

In sum, the book is more of historical than contemporary interest, and it should be regarded only as a point of departure for further reading.

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Another Un-Book

LOUIS ARAGON: *A History of the USSR from Lenin to Khrushchev.* New York, David McKay Co., 1964.

Reviewed by Bertram D. Wolfe

IN 1962 it seemed a good gamble to Jaspard, Polus et Cie., of Monaco, and Presses de la Cité, of Paris, to arrange for André Maurois to write a history of the United States called *From the New Freedom to the New Frontier,* and Louis Aragon to do *A History of the USSR from Lenin to Khrushchev.* Having examined both of these books and read the second with considerable boredom, I must report that the gamble was not a good one. It is possible to understand why these two volumes might have been of interest to Frenchmen and Monégasques, at least until Khrushchev became an unperson. But why publishers in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Israel, Czechoslovakia, Japan, and Germany chose to publish them in 1964, and why the American publisher should present them to Americans as "an impartial analysis of the two nations" is a little harder to understand. Significantly, though a crypto-Communist organization seems to have conceived the original maneuver, neither volume has been published in Russian in the USSR, nor is likely to be. They are strictly for the heathen.

LOUIS ARAGON is one of that generation of French intellectuals who were outraged by World War I and its Dead Sea fruit for France. He expressed his disillusion and protest first as a Dadaist, then as a Surrealist, and finally—for over a quarter of a century now—as a Communist.

The trajectory is not altogether a unique one. Eluard and André Breton traveled part of the way with him. Camus, André Gide and Malraux was each of them attracted for a time to Communist activism and its apparent embodiment in the Bolshevik dictatorship. But Malraux and Gide and Camus were shocked by the twists and turns, the falsehoods, and the primitive, one-dimensional images and diagrams of reality of the Soviet leaders. Only Aragon has remained through thick and thin, praising the purges when it was fashionable to praise them and condemning them when it was in order to condemn, denying his sympathy and solidarity to the victims of the cultural oppression known as "socialist realism," cultivating the cult of Stalin's genius while he was officially a genius, and now damning it in the present work—perhaps a little less lustily but just as obediently and persistently as yesterday he sang his hymns of praise.

All the things one would expect of a party hack are in this "impartial" history:

—Lenin was not taken by surprise by the downfall of the Tsar but gave the orders for the uprising in October 1916.

—Feliks Dzierzynski, the founder of the Cheka, was a saint.

—American aviators dropped bombs full of disease germs in the Korean War.

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—The Finns started the Russo-Finnish War by firing on Soviet troops in Russia.
—The Lithuanians demanded to have their freedom extinguished and to be annexed by Russia.
—The Stalin-Hitler (or Molotov-Ribbentropp) Pact was a move to preserve the peace and was justified because it gave the Land of Socialism twenty-two months of respite—though, of course, Stalin failed to make good use of the twenty-two months because of the evils inherent in "the cult of the personality."

It took the Red Army so long to lick the Finns because the latter did not react with class-consciousness to Kuusinen's offer to set up a Finnish Soviet Government; because their Foreign Minister, the Socialist Tanner, had "friends in Hitler's Germany" (Aragon forgets to say how many of them were in concentration camps); and because the famous Soviet Army in the land where General Winter is one of the great teachers of military science "was not equipped for a Winter War."

YET THE BOOK has its surprises, for although much of its "research" was obviously not done by the author, but by men and women assigned to do it, no human spirit can be altogether *gleichgeschaltet*. Besides, as Aragon himself observes, "History never pauses for a moment, and one's hasty backward glance is cut off directly."

Among the surprises one finds this on China:

Considering the evolution of the other socialist countries, Khrushchev said that the Communist Party of China had introduced new methods in the building of socialism and that "we have not, and cannot have, any differences of opinion with the Chinese Party," contrary to the calculations that had been made upon the subject in various countries. . . . while at the Congress [the 21st Extraordinary Congress of the CPSU] Chou En-lai expressed his "immense gratitude for the continual help that had been given to China," confirming the absence of disagreement between China and the USSR.

These reassuring words occur on page 631, the last mention of China in the 652 pages, which is understandable since Louis Aragon signs the last page with a flourish, dating it "Paris, May 1, 1962." Verily, "History never pauses for a moment," and now, not even the French Communist Party can circulate the book.

Of a similar nature is the fact that Aragon has shaken the name of Nikita Khrushchev through its pages as if with a peppermill. He is so determined to drag it in that he is capable of starting three or four different thoughts in a single sentence with no more coherence or connection than an identity or near identity of dates. *E.g.*:

March 1934, when Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev was appointed First Secretary of the Moscow organization, at last saw the signing of the agreement for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo.

It was in January 1938, when the third piatiletka *[Five-Year Plan] began, that Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev, elected First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, joined the political Bureau as a Candidate Member.*

Many such sentences make the book virtually unreadable, except in the painful line of duty of one who has agreed to review it. And the tedious flood of relevant and irrelevant mentions of the name of Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev is sufficient to make the book unsalable now among French Communists and Monégasques, not to speak of making it unprintable in the Soviet Union where "History" moves like a juggernaut over the pages of its own chronicles of yesterday.

AS ONE READS these distressing pages it is hard to remember that they are the work, or at least signed with the name, of a novelist skilled in narrative, a stylist who loves his language and in some distorted sense his native land, and has been accustomed, to use his own words, to "make unruly and ardent use of the stupefying image."

Is it too much to ask that this degrading defeat in writing an ignoble book, unsalable even among the comrades of his party, should cause this old iconoclast to ask whether he has not made for himself new icons even less worthy of worship than those he tried to smash? Or is it too much to ask that the French Communist Party at least come to realize that by making such use of a once serious and celebrated writer, it is actually destroying his usefulness even for its purposes?

Unfortunately, I am afraid that in both cases it is asking too much.

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China and the United States

DOROTHY BORG: *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.
ARTHUR N. YOUNG: *China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.

Reviewed by Michael Lindsay

THE FIRST OF these two books gives a very detailed and well-documented account of United States policy in the Far East from the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident to the crisis caused by the sinking of the American gunboat *Panay* by Japanese aircraft in 1937. The author's emphasis is on the policy-making process within the United States government, and her account is fortified by numerous references to the reports, memoranda and letters of responsible officials. The amount of painstaking work that has gone into this study is indicated by the 87 pages of footnotes and the 12 pages of titles provided in the bibliography, which include several unpublished collections of papers.

Because she has concentrated on giving a full and accurate description of US policy, the author offers comparatively little in the way of analysis or explanation, though she does at times point out the relevance of her material to later developments. One very interesting example of this is found in the chapter, "Views on Chinese Communism."

Here, Miss Borg brings out the rather curious fact that during much of the period from 1933 to 1938, there was only one US State Department officer in China who tried to make a serious study of the Chinese Communist movement. He had started this on his own initiative, preparing a lengthy report in 1932 while still a vice-consul. In Washington, however, the Far Eastern Division of the State Department was inclined to take the attitude that material on communism was primarily of interest to the East European Division, while the East European Division failed to appreciate either the difficulties of obtaining material on Communist activities in China or its value and relevance for the division's own work. When, in June 1936, the US Embassy in Moscow started a series of reports on Soviet relations with Far Eastern countries, these covered only Japan and Manchoukuo until after the Sian Incident of 1937, when George Kennan asked permission to include China. Thus, bureaucratic departmentalism within the State Department appears to have contributed importantly to the failure of US diplomatic officers in China to gain adequate knowledge about the Chinese Communists and their relations with Moscow—a failure which was to influence American policy decisively in the 1940's. The author indicates that the situation in this regard began to improve somewhat from 1937 on, but that "during the period of the Sino-Japanese war, most American Foreign Service officers in China worked under near-chaotic conditions" and

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were not likely to have the time or energy to digest background information about the Chinese Communists.

MISS BORG concludes her final summary with this telling evaluation of American Far Eastern policy in the middle 1930's:

In the making of specific decisions, officials in Washington returned again and again to the conclusion that they should avoid any action or should hold action to a minimum. The degree of passivity which the United States government maintained is the feature of our record in the Far East in the mid-1930's that is most likely to seem astonishing in retrospect. For with the benefit of hindsight it is evident that the events which culminated in the second World War were closing in on peoples everywhere with a terrible rapidity.

While the author does not herself attempt an analysis of the causes of this passivity, she provides data from which a number of contributory influences can be deduced. For one thing, the facts suggest that it was especially difficult for the US government to pursue an effective policy during this period because almost any kind of positive initiative in Asia faced united opposition from both the right-wing and the left-wing types of irresponsible domestic public opinion. Since 1945 these have tended to cancel each other out: action which arouses irrational opposition from woolly-minded liberals is likely to win equally irrational support from "know-nothing" conservatives, and *vice versa*. In the 1930's, however, both groups were ardent supporters of isolationism. Many of the editorials and speeches cited by the author from that period are more silly than one would be likely to find from equally respectable sources in the 1950's or 1960's. Thus, during the intervening years, there seems to have been some real progress toward an informed and responsible American public opinion regarding Asia.

Cordell Hull, who was US Secretary of State through the period in question, is shown by Miss Borg to have been fairly consistently opposed to any positive action in the Far Eastern crisis because of his belief in the power of "moral suasion." Hull, she writes, "believed, with a conviction too profound to be influenced by any external factors, that most of the basic problems of international relations could be solved by moral education." (pp. 95-96) This may have made some sense as a basis for long-run policy, but Hull, it appears, would never acknowledge that it was unlikely to produce quick results.

President Roosevelt appears in Miss Borg's account as anxious to "do something" yet reluctant to work out any clear Far Eastern policy. The author devotes an interesting chapter to Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech of October 1937, showing that the passage in the speech about quarantining aggressors was not, as many people supposed, a carefully considered statement, but was hastily drafted by the President himself during a railroad journey as a substitute for rather stronger language which had been used in a memorandum prepared by Norman Davis. According to Miss Borg, Roosevelt failed to follow up the quarantine idea not so much because of isolationist pressure as because he himself never really thought out what he meant by it.

OF COURSE, those who were responsible for US policy in the Far East in the 1930's faced a very difficult real situation. They saw the increasing political power of the military in Japan and realized that the Japanese militarists not only were already trying actively to gain control of North China but probably had much wider ultimate ambitions. They were doubtful of the ability of the Chinese Nationalist government to resist Japan, or even to provide effective government in China, although judgments about the internal Chinese situation apparently became more optimistic from 1936 on. They were inclined to feel, moreover, that other Western powers were trying to push the United States into accepting the main responsibility for action in the Far East.

In this situation there was no clearly satisfactory policy to choose. To acquiesce in Japanese expansion would mean the abandonment of American principles; to take positive action to resist it would involve accepting a risk of war with Japan. Some American foreign policy officials consistently faced up to the real difficulties of the situation and continued to think clearly, even when they could not see a definite solution to their problems: the memoranda of Stanley K. Hornbeck, then the State Department's Senior Adviser on Far Eastern affairs, were outstanding in this respect. Many others, however, tended to shut their eyes to unpleasant

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realities or refused to draw the logical conclusions from their own observations. Thus, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew reported from Tokyo in 1934 that the Japanese military had ambitions of extending their control over the whole area from Eastern Siberia to the Dutch East Indies, including the Philippines, and that it was "thoroughly mistaken" to suppose that there was in Japan "a great body of liberal thought" which, with a little foreign encouragement, would oppose the military. (p. 116) He did not, however, draw the obvious conclusion that, so long as the military remained in control of Japanese policy and so long as the United States remained unwilling to acquiesce in the growth of a great Japanese empire in Asia, the objectives of Japanese and American policy were incompatible. On the contrary, he continued to argue—even after the outbreak of the war in China—that a conciliatory US policy could secure genuine Japanese-American friendship.

The material presented in Miss Borg's book is certainly quite incompatible with the view —so sedulously cultivated by anti-American propaganda—of the United States as a power pursuing imperialist objectives. What it does seem to confirm is the Communist doctrine that effective action is possible only on the basis of adequate theory. Rational decisions on American Far Eastern policy could only have been based on a fairly long-range analysis of the different lines along which the situation in the Far East might develop, of the extent to which the course of development could be influenced by US action, and of both the anticipated gains and the probable costs and risks involved in various policy alternatives. Any such analysis would have involved theoretical assumptions about the relative importance of various American objectives, about the nature and workings of Japanese and Chinese society, and so on. The men responsible for US policy could agree at the highly abstract level on general ethical principles, and at the other extreme they were mostly skilled in commonsense, short-term, practical action. However, when confronted with problems in which general ethical principles had no clear practical implications and where pragmatic common sense was inadequate, some of them simply refused to face up to the real situation, and those who did try to work out an analysis could not secure agreement. Thus, despite the good intentions of those at the helm, American Far Eastern policy seems to have been paralyzed by a curious combination of idealism and pragmatism.

WHILE MISS BORG'S study examines the formulation of overall United States policy in the Far East during the critical mid-1930's, the second volume under review addresses itself to the narrower subject of American financial assistance to Nationalist China over the eight-year period of Sino-Japanese armed conflict from 1937 through Japan's surrender to the Allies in 1945. As an American who served as financial adviser to the Chinese government from 1929 to 1947, Mr. Young writes from the vantage point of a direct participant who had close contacts with both the Chinese and US governments. His book sheds valuable light on the financial and economic relations between the United States and Nationalist China during the period of Sino-Japanese hostilities, and on the management of China's complex foreign exchange problems.

Mr. Young shows that in 1938 and 1939 the Soviet Union was the main supplier of aid to China, Soviet credits totalling $250 million as against $48.5 million from Britain, $25 million from the United States, and $15 million from France. Moreover, the Soviet credits could be used for military supplies, while those granted by the Western governments were tied to non-military uses. The Russians also were sending "volunteer" air units into China at the same time that the more timid elements in the US administration were trying to force the withdrawal from China of American citizens like General Claire S. Chennault of the "Flying Tigers," who were privately helping the Chinese. American aid to China during this period principally took the form of purchases of Chinese silver by the US Treasury, these purchases aggregating $250 million after July 1937. It is clear that Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau was impatient with the passivity of the State Department and was trying to follow a more active policy of aid to China.

Mr. Young gives a very convincing defense of the policy of maintaining a free exchange market in Shanghai—a policy which was criticized on the ground that it dissipated China's foreign exchange reserves at a time when they were sorely needed to purchase war supplies. The author points out that, quite apart from the important psychological effect of maintaining a convertible Chinese currency in contrast to the non-

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convertible Japanese-controlled currencies, foreign exchange operations in Shanghai also helped to slow down internal inflation in China. Given the fact that the Chinese government was financing itself largely by note issue, purchases of foreign exchange with Chinese currency resulted in a real transfer of internal purchasing power to the Chinese government. Mr. Young is critical of the decision to introduce exchange control in 1941 and shows that the drain of foreign exchange was not stopped, that the pace of internal inflation increased, and that the official rate of 20 yuan to one US dollar caused very serious subsequent difficulties.

THE AUTHOR also states a very strong case for the later policy of selling gold in China, although he strongly criticizes the handling of the US Dollar Savings Certificates and Loan in 1942. He points out that in 1944 nearly 2,000 tons of banknotes and banknote paper were flown into China, and that a ton of banknotes realized only about 20 million Chinese dollars whereas a ton of gold realized about 560 million. The sale of gold was not only counterinflationary by itself but also tended to bring hoarded stocks of commodities onto the market because it was much easier to hoard gold. The real cost to the Chinese government of using its foreign credits to sell gold in China was the sacrifice of its postwar foreign exchange reserves, and this sacrifice, in Mr. Young's view, would have been justified if it could have slowed down inflation, which was given added stimulus in 1944 by the huge costs of constructing interior bases for B-29 operations against Japan—a project which eventually made little contribution to the war effort. Unfortunately, however, according to the author, the gold-selling policy was sabotaged by Harry Dexter White in the US Treasury, who did all he could to cut down and delay gold shipments to China. Thus the Chinese government, having announced the policy, ran out of gold to sell; and when shipments were made from the United States, they were sent by sea instead of by air. Since White had been strongly in favor of aid to China in the early years of the war but had become very hostile to the Chinese Nationalist government by 1944, when the Soviet attitude had also turned unfriendly, Mr. Young considers it likely that White acted as an instrument of Communist influence within the US government.

Though Mr. Young notes the failure of the Chinese Nationalist government to set up an efficient system of taxation, he does not seem to emphasize sufficiently the fundamental importance of this failure. The patriotic fervor which marked the first year or so of the war against Japan provided an exceptional opportunity for tax reforms: many educated Chinese would have been willing to accept the discomforts of work in the countryside, and the powerful vested interests opposed to reform could have been justifiably attacked as saboteurs of the national war effort. Most of the high-level problems with which Mr. Young had to deal would have been of a smaller order of magnitude if an effective tax system had been instituted at the local level, enabling the national government to finance its internal expenditures much more from taxes and much less from currency expansion. While such expedients as the gold-selling policy could perhaps have afforded temporary relief from the disastrous effects of rapid inflation, only an honest and efficient system of taxation could have assured the long-run stability of the Chinese Nationalist government.

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A View of the Top

JOHN WILSON LEWIS: *Leadership in Communist China.*
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1964.

Reviewed by Joseph R. Fiszman

THIS BOOK IS A serious and scholarly attempt to explain the dynamics of Chinese Communist leadership in both theoretical-ideological and empirical terms. The author's focus on the close interrelationship between ideology and practice constitutes at once the strength and the weakness of the book. In this respect it perhaps reflects its subject matter: the extent to which the Chinese regime's methods of rule are enmeshed in ideology also constitutes *its* strength and weakness.

In a sense, Mr. Lewis does for China what Nathan C. Leites attempted to do with respect to the USSR in *The Operational Code of the Politburo* and what Alfred G. Meyer did, in part at least, in his *Leninism.*

Mr. Lewis first examines the theoretical assumptions that underlie various leadership principles and techniques. In terms of the stability of the Chinese Communist leadership, these principles have to be considered successful. Important among them is the concept of consensus and voluntary discipline—or "democratic centralism"—upon which the organizational base of the regime is founded, even though it is elitist and hierarchical in structure. To achieve the desired level of consensus—amounting to instinctive unanimity—requires a high level of what Communists call "consciousness." Because the highest level of consciousness is expected to reside in the top leadership, the collectivity is supposed to receive its cues from this source. At the same time the consciousness of the top leaders should represent an ability to sublimate personal interests to the interests of the collectivity. This is achieved through a dialectical process of continuous struggle within the individual, between the individual and the collectivity, within the group, and between the group and society. This struggle is an integral part of a learning process designed to enable the individual to improve his performance of the tasks expected of a member of the New Society. It is a process of socialization which demands continuous study and soul-searching. An important feature of this process is described by the author as follows:

> *Traditionally, the party has stressed the use of individual diaries and the inspection of the diaries at regular intervals. In the Communist judgment, training remains incomplete unless its results are committed to paper so that they can be checked, inadequacies and errors can be revised, and specific judgments can be reached concerning their utilization.* (*p. 151*)

WHAT EMERGES, paradoxically, is that the party born in revolution and committed to change creates its own stifling rituals, complete with a prescribed vocabulary and prescribed modes of doing things.

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Creativity is replaced by approved clichés, perspectives are restricted, and a belief is generated that "what worked as a leadership system in Yenan must be equally effective . . . a decade or so later in Peking" (p. 99). However, this learning by rote, as it were, adds the factor of habit to that of mutual interest, creating, in *toto,* a dialectical unity, a democratically centralized and self-conscious (rather than coercive) social relationship.

This relationship is frequently reinforced, especially at the level of rural leadership, through webs of kinship, nepotism, and the tacit acceptance of traditional Confucian concepts of "relational leadership." It is a form of relationship similar to that between "boss" and "gang," which has had a traditional part in Chinese group and clique politics, but which in the past has worked to prevent rather than promote national cohesion. The Communists are the first in China to superimpose a unifying ideology, a comprehensive "view of life" (*jensheng kuan*), upon the traditional patterns of political power. They have managed to "penetrate the intimate or face-to face social groups within the general society" without, however, "succumbing to the obligational pulls from within these groups" (p. 252).

The impact of ideology is hardly as successful in other respects. For example, stress on the need for models that the masses can emulate has led the Communists to create "ideal" abstractions not unlike the ideal (or "pure") type-constructs known in social science theory in the West. Unlike the social scientists, however, for whom such abstractions are heuristic devices against which to compare realities, the Communists believe that the abstract models can actually be established in the real world. Such thinking affects their notions of economics; administration, and politics, as well as "individual heroism" (the latter a concept more reminiscent of early Hegelianism than of Marx, who thought in larger socio-economic categories); it also imposes upon the party cadres demands and expectations that are impossible to meet.

ON THE WHOLE, Mr. Lewis' discussion of theory is better executed than the empirical section of his study, though the latter may have greater appeal for many readers. In his empirical analysis (perhaps due to the unavailability of appropriate data), the author seems too much bound by the formal organizational structure of power in China. Consequently he overlooks the effects of the clashes of interests which result with the emergence of competing bureaucracies, each with its own special objectives and functions. Political systems born in revolution may be led by charismatic leaders who claim to be ominiscient; but once power is established, the need inevitably arises for specialized competence, which in turn leads not only to competing demands upon limited resources but often to a broadening of the decision-making base (or bases). Yet perhaps it is too much to expect that any writer on Communist China, given the limited amount of knowledge available, would be able to differentiate with precision between the formal power structure and the informal patterns of influence that may actually prevail.

In the process of his investigation, the author traces the course of the party in terms of growth, numerical and political strength, social composition, and organizational structure, tying these factors in with its theoretical development. While he rightly emphasizes the rural character of the party and the increase of rural cadres since 1958, he might have been wise to note that the stress on rurality or urbanity, industry or agriculture, has fluctuated with the exigencies of the economy and ideology in different periods.

The author also pays some attention to problems of policy implementation. While the determination of central policy remains in the hands of a thin layer of veterans, the carrying out of policy at local levels is left to younger cadres (close to 25 percent of the party membership is 25 years of age or younger; 67.5 percent is between the ages of 26 and 45). The cadres are expected to translate central directives in terms appropriate to local conditions. However, because of the way styles and techniques of leadership are routinized, the adaptation of central policies to local conditions is no easy task, and the risks and pitfalls are plenty. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that local cadres prefer the road of least resistance: bombast is frequently used to cover up indecision, pomposity to camouflage ill-training and lack of initiative, and Marxist-Leninist sophistry to conceal corruption and "a marked proclivity toward bureaucratic lethargy and venality" (p. 202).

THE STRICT CONTROL of power by veteran leaders—who are bound together by memories

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of common experiences, and who rule through overlapping party-government posts and interlocking directorates—raises intriguing questions concerning the possibility of a conflict between generations in China—a conflict from which Communist systems are not immune, as the Soviet example shows. While in the Soviet Union Stalin discredited (or liquidated) the old veterans, in China there has been a continuity between generations, and the veterans have concentrated on molding their heirs in their own image. Whether they have succeeded is an issue for the future. It is unfortunate that Mr. Lewis fails to explore this particular problem, especially since he is perceptive enough to point out that pre-Communist China, despite its generational ethics, nevertheless did create conditions of alienation between the young and the old (conditions which in part gave the Communists their chance). As far as Communist China is concerned, all the author does in this respect is to hint at the possibly dire consequences that may ensue when a fully indoctrinated youth, incapable of discriminating between fact and fiction, takes over control. On the other hand, he also touches on (without exploring) the question whether the party, given its all-encompassing role in society, could in time lose its monolithic character and become an umbrella for various competing functional interests.

Like many writers on China, Mr. Lewis has a tendency to generalize from limited examples and statistics. But unlike most other writers, he is generally restrained about the weight he attaches to his findings, and he is cautious with predictions. He is not certain, for example, whether the ideological and organizational mobilization of China will eventually unleash creative energies (as is assumed in Communist theory), or whether it will end in social tragedy. He is also cautious about the effects suffering and hunger may ultimately have on the society's degree of ideological commitment.

He does, however, offer one firm conclusion: that drastic measures were "the only effective ways to attack China's massive difficulties, particularly with respect to capital construction, population control, and national unification . . . although the manipulating hands need not have been Communist" (p. 278). If the experience of some of the non-Communist countries struggling to achieve rapid industrial and technological development proves typical, then Mr. Lewis is undoubtedly right. And if so, we must come to recognize more clearly that communism does not represent the only negative type of leadership and organization that can emerge under the stresses accompanying the drive from tradition to modernity.

Mr. Lewis' book is certainly one of the most impressive, scholarly, and penetrating works on China published in recent years. At the same time, it demonstrates the great need for more research, and primarily for more reliable empirical data, on the new Chinese colossus.

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Communism in Greece

D. G. KOUSOULAS: *Revolution and Defeat, The Story of the Greek Communist Party.* London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1965.

Reviewed by Maurice J. Goldbloom

OF ALL THE East European Communist parties, the Yugoslav alone came to power by its own exertions and without Soviet aid. In December 1944, the Greek Communists, too, would unquestionably have seized power in the same manner—if the British had not intervened. And it is also altogether possible that in 1947 or 1948 the second Communist revolt might have succeeded if at that time the Greek government had not been rescued by the United States.

Despite all the setbacks—including the loss through death or exile of its entire top leadership, of most of its minor functionaries and of about 140,000 of its rank-and-file supporters—the Greek Communist Party commands to this day a substantial following. In the various local and national elections since 1950, the votes of parties supported by the illegal Communist Party and more or less identified with it in the public mind have ranged from a seventh to almost a fourth of the total. In the country's three chief cities—Athens, Salonika and Piraeus—the Communist share of the votes has run a good deal higher, and some of the working-class areas of these cities have shown consistent and solid allegiance to the Communist cause.

A knowledge of a party that has accomplished so much and of the circumstances which enabled it to do so is of considerable importance. Yet very little solid and objective material in English is available on this subject. On the pre-1936 history of the Greek party almost no work at all has been published. On the period covering the war and postwar years, when the military activities of the Communists and the forces under their leadership attracted world attention, much more has been written, but a high percentage of this literature consists of superficial reportage or violently partisan polemics on the one side or the other. The outstanding exception is a work entitled *Apple of Discord*[1] by C. M. Woodhouse, the wartime head of the British Military Mission in Greece and a distinguished historian who has subsequently served both as head of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and as a Conservative M. P. After the end of the Greek civil war the flow of material on Communist activity in Greece came to an end, so that post-1950 coverage is scarcely better than that relating to the pre-1936 period.

PROFESSOR KOUSOULAS'S survey of the entire history of Greek communism is therefore an effort to fill a major gap in the literature on the world Communist movement. To some extent the author succeeds: he presents a continuous, if at times extremely sketchy, account of the development of Greek com-

[1] London, Hutchinson, 1948.

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munism from 1919 to the present day; he touches, though very briefly, on some of the economic and social problems which have weakened Greek society and strengthened the Communist party; and he presents much documentary material that is either new or that has not earlier been readily available in English.

Nevertheless, the present volume is an introduction to the history of Greek communism, rather than a definitive study of it. Many of the movement's important aspects are not covered at all or are barely mentioned. Thus Greek socialism before 1918 is dismissed with the statement that "Greece did not have a Socialist Party with deep roots and traditions." While in a sense this is true, there nevertheless existed two such parties, each of which made a contribution to the future Communist movement. The older, the Greek Socialist Party of Dhrakoulis and Yannios (the latter of whom was the founder of *Rizospastis,* which later became the Communist organ), had been represented in Parliament as early as 1901. The younger and more radical Labor Federation of Salonika, a major constituent of the Socialist Labor Party which was established in 1918 and eventually became the Communist Party, had been a part of the Zimmerwald Left.

The treatment of Greek trade unionism and of the Communists' role in it is also inadequate. To understand the Communist effort to exploit the labor unions in Greece, it is necessary to know a good deal more about the development of the trade union movement, its leadership, and its areas of strength and weakness than one can learn from *Revolution and Defeat.* Particularly unfortunate is the omission of an account of the work of EEAM, the trade union affiliate of the wartime resistance movement EAM. C. M. Woodhouse writes on this subject as follows:

Although EEAM has been the least publicized component of the Greek resistance movement, it was perhaps the most successful. . . . The credit for organizing this movement belongs largely to the Communists.[2]

It was indeed the success of the wartime Communist-controlled EEAM which enabled the Communists to dominate the postwar Greek labor movement—until they were forcibly evicted and their trade union activists arrested. Similarly, no mention is made of the Greek Federation of Maritime Unions (OENO), founded in Cardiff in 1942, which played an important part in the war and later exerted a major influence in Greece's most important industry, even after the Federation was outlawed (1947) and its General Secretary sentenced to death (1948).[3]

THERE ARE other omissions, too. For instance, Mr. Kousoulas does not mention the language question in Greece, although one of the important factors in recruiting intellectuals into the party has been the Communists' championship of the people's language, the *Demotiki,* against the official *Katherevoussa.* Nor does he treat the minorities problem, except when he discusses the Communist Party's wavering line on Greece's territorial disputes with her neighbors, or the adverse effect on the party's fortunes of "anti-national" attitudes adopted by the Communist leadership. Yet Greece has in fact seldom treated her minorities in a way conducive to securing their loyalty to the state. Perhaps the most favorable treatment has been accorded to the Turks of Thrace, protected by the Treaty of Lausanne and by the existence of a much more prosperous Greek minority in Turkey. The Slavophones of Macedonia and Thrace, however, have been subjected to forced Hellenization and discrimination of various sorts even in the best of times; in periods of stress, particularly during the civil war, many of them have reacted by actively supporting the Communists.

MR. KOUSOULAS is also rather uncritical in his acceptance of some of the material he uses. This includes documents of questionable authenticity used for propaganda purposes by the Greek Government[4] as well as self-serving items from the "personal archives" of Constantine

[2] *Apple of Discord, op. cit.,* p. 33.

[3] Because of the intervention of the International Transport Workers' Federation, the President of the United Nations General Assembly, and others, the sentence was not carried out; the official in question, Anthony Ambatielos, was recently freed under an amnesty.

[4] Thus on p. 158, Professor Kousoulas refers to "the notorious agreement of 1 September 1944, by which the ELAS forces guaranteed to refrain from harassing the withdrawing Germans on condition that the German forces surrendered the city of Salonika to ELAS," as if it were of indubitable authenticity. C. M. Woodhouse (*op.cit.,* p. 295 ff.) writes in this connection: "I have avoided all Greek sources, since both hearsay and written evidence in Greece suffer from defects. . . . The use of forged documents to discredit political opponents has frequently been mentioned." He then goes on to cite a number of such documents, of which this particular agreement is one, and to give several reasons why he believes it unlikely to be genuine.

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Maniadakis, Minister of Public Security under the Metaxas dictatorship. On the basis of the latter material he paints a much too friendly picture of that regime. (Not only does he minimize the terror of the Metaxas regime, but he fails to mention the fact that its labor legislation was drawn up under the supervision of Dr. Robert Ley, lent by Hitler for the occasion.) What is more, he also overestimates the damage done by the Metaxas repression to the Communist movement. The Communists were indeed hurt by the terror, but because of the conspiratorial nature of their organization, they suffered relatively less then other groups, and hence were in a far stronger position after Metaxas' death and the collapse of his regime than they otherwise would have been. The hatreds fanned during the Metaxas era also played into their hands. Today, the Greek Communist Party is again illegal, and in some ways it thrives on its illegality. Indeed, in the concluding section of the book, Mr. Kousoulas argues very cogently that legalizing the Communist Party might actually weaken it.

The author takes unnecessary pains to document the theoretical positions which the Greek Communists, in common with the rest of the Comintern, have adopted at various times in their history. Sometimes he draws deceptive conclusions from individual party statements, as when he disregards the time element and uses a document from one period to support a thesis on the party's attitude in another. (The Communists themselves, of course, do the same thing in writing their own history, stressing those elements which conform with their position of the moment and ignoring or explaining away the others; in part, Mr. Kousoulas errs because he takes such Communist accounts at face value.) He also treats the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 as if it had represented a major shift in the relation between Moscow and the foreign Communist parties rather than an empty gesture for the benefit of the Western allies.

TO SUM UP, Mr. Kousoulas has paid too little attention to the conditions in Greek society and political life which paved the way for Communist gains, and at the same time has failed to explore sufficiently the ways in which the Communists made effective use of these conditions. He has also overstressed the party's weaknesses. The average reader might well wonder how such a party could ever have become a major threat to the Greek state.

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Reviews in Brief

Aids to Navigation

THOMAS T. HAMMOND, ED.: *Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism.* Princeton University Press, 1965.

PAUL L. HORECKY, ED.: *Russia and the Soviet Union.* University of Chicago Press, 1965.

OF THE TWO bibliographies under review, Professor Hammond's has the broader scope, covering communism outside the USSR as well as Soviet foreign affairs. It does not, however, include Soviet internal affairs, on which the Horecky work is centered. Hammond lists items in 30 languages (though principally Western and Slavic), whereas Horecky covers only works in Western-languages. Both volumes are adequately indexed, though Horecky's is superior in that it includes listings of titles as well as authors' names.

Hammond's decision to exclude Soviet domestic affairs is curiously restrictive: reports of Soviet Party Congresses and Central Committee meetings, as well as general encyclopedias such as the *Bolshaia* with its annual supplements containing useful data and authoritative statements on foreign affairs, have been left out. In contrast, other general works, such as collections of Lenin's and Stalin's writings and Soviet and Western histories of the USSR and the CPSU, which pertain more to internal than to foreign affairs, have been included. In fact, entries on principal personalities such as Marx, Stalin, and Mao are especially good.

As far as general sections are concerned, some, particularly those on Germany, the USSR and international law, are outstanding, while others seem routine. Hammond's coverage of 1960 and after is very spotty; for example, there is no mention of the memoirs by Ambassador Maiski and by certain other diplomats which began to appear around 1960. This reviewer must also register his complaint that Prof. Hammond saw fit to include trivia which only help to make his volume fat, heavy, and expensive.

ANNOTATIONS ARE inherently somewhat subjective, but a good many in Hammond are extremely so. In the reviewer's opinion, annotations should include only those essential facts about a work and its author which will enable potential readers to decide for themselves whether or not the book will serve their purposes. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the Hammond annotations, which are frequently discursive, tendentious, and lacking in relevant data. The penchant for *irrelevant* information, on the other hand, sometimes finds expression in the identification of authors. Was it necessary, for example, to list the universities where an author has taught when a mere "US professor" would do?

Many of the annotations in Hammond's volume seem to have been designed not so much to inform the reader what is in the book as to warn him against it. The prevailing standard of judgment is what we may label Academic Orthodoxy (AC). Authors both to the "right" and "left" of AC are given short shrift, and their books are said to have a given "point of view" —a description only rarely applied to works that are treated neutrally or favorably. Harrison Salisbury's *To Moscow—and Beyond* is disposed of with the comment: "The reflections on Soviet policy and the recommendations on American policy are very much the author's own." (!) One book of travel notes is censured for its lack of deep scholarship, while another of the same *genre* receives a pat on the back simply because of its more orthodox ideas. The whole volume is peppered with words like "sensational," "uncritical," "execrable," and "very one-sided" (the latter in reference to John Lukacs' *A History of the Cold War.*)

To make matters worse, Hammonds' volume employs a system of "A"s and "B"s for the top 10 percent and the next 20 percent of the listed books, presumably as an aid to the reader who has time to read only ten or 30 out of a given 100 books. The value of this system is rather questionable, inasmuch as priorities must be related to individual needs, which vary

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from reader to reader. What does *not* seem to vary, however, is the opinion of a good many of the compilers regarding their own works: almost without exception, they have graded them with an "A" and described them in flattering terms.

HORECKY'S bibliography impressed this reviewer both with its higher professional standard and more uniform quality. To be sure, with only 2,000 to Hammond's 7,000 items, with a simpler focus and with a restricted group of languages, Dr. Horecky faced a more manageable task. The result is that his annotations are briefer and more to the point than in the other volume, and that his contributors succeed in maintaining a generally judicious tone. Yet even here there are some polemical bits and pieces; being told, for example that a book on Russian education must be "not read, but studied" could well discourage the potential reader from opening the book at all.

The selection of titles—as severe a problem for Dr. Horecky as it must have been for Professor Hammond—gives cause for some bafflement. Why was there space for a mention of "The Reindeer and Its Domestication" (the prerevolutionary reindeer at that), but none for John Reed's *Ten Days That Shook the World?* Stalin's 1952 pamphlet, *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,* is cited, but not his 1950 articles on linguistics, which certainly deserved inclusion. Like Hammond, Horecky treats the Stalin collection of World War II pronouncements in a rather peculiar fashion. Hammond cites only the Russian edition, as though it had not been published in Western languages. Horecky lists an English version, but implies that the famous 1945 toast to the Russian people was omitted from the English versions, which is certainly not true of all editions.

Despite the faults of these volumes, they will be of great and continuing utility to all students in the field, professional and amateur, beginning and advanced, in school and out. The task of compiling such massive bibliographies is staggering, tedious and rather thankless. The carping critic has a much easier job.

Thomas B. Larson

1905

SIDNEY HARCAVE: *First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905,* New York, Macmillan, 1964.

PROFESSOR HARCAVE has written the first book-length study in English of the Revolution of 1905. The thesis of this general, somewhat text-bookish account is that the revolution "had provided the *means* for finding the middle ground" or a "state of equilibrium" between the "two Russias" that were pitted against each other around the turn of this century, but that the "atmosphere" was not favorable for such an outcome. The government, determined to resist all the pressures for a genuine liberalization of the existing order, proved to be too resourceful and resilient. "Society," representing the educated, progressive elements who wanted to modernize the country socially and politically, was divided and lacked the experience necessary to hold on to the gains made in 1905. The revolution, in brief, was a missed opportunity.

Although little of the evidence is new and although Prof. Harcave does not press his analysis very deeply, he has performed a useful task in bringing together material from a large variety of sources. His summaries of the programs of the oppositional groups and the attitudes of the Tsarist officials are accurate, as are his descriptions of the mood of the people caught in the revolutionary maelstrom. The treatment of the major events in 1905—Bloody Sunday, the general strike in October, the unrest in the countryside—is informed and judicious. The beginning student in Russian history and the non-specialist will benefit from reading this book.

Abraham Ascher

Master and Victims

CAROLA STERN: *Ulbricht.* Cologne-Berlin, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964; in English, New York, Praeger, 1965.

THIS IS A BOOK that is not only lively and stimulating, but also remarkably objective. Since the subject of the study is a humorless politician without charm or human warmth—"the most hated man in Germany"—and since the author herself is a former East German resident, the even, dispassionate approach needs to be stressed. Indeed, Miss Stern's judicious temper allows Ulbricht's personality to emerge in a better light than is usually the case; thus, for example, she exonerates him from the oft-repeated accusation that he bears responsibility for the imprisonment and death at the hands of the Nazis of the prewar German Communist leader, Ernst Thälman.

The author sees Ulbricht as an efficient administrator and shrewd *apparatchik* rather than an imaginative leader. Yet she does not deny him the ability to take an independent course of action whenever his interests are at stake. Thus, when after Stalin's death the new unsteady leadership in Moscow had begun appraising all comers and Ulbricht was told to relax his regime in East Germany, he refused to budge, believing the counsel unwise and dangerous. He did so again during the crisis that followed Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and threatened to demolish everything that Ulbricht had stood for. In this period of the upsurge of

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revisionism all over Eastern Europe Ulbricht proved himself to be the master of intrigue and double-talk, as well as a man of great ruthlessness and political acumen; eventually he skillfully isolated, confused and finally crushed all his more liberally inclined opponents in the SED. Only then was he ready to liberalize his rule. What is particularly remarkable about this performance is the fact that in spite of his manifest political failures in the GDR and in spite of the many irritations he must have caused in Moscow, Ulbricht has always succeeded in convincing his Soviet masters that he was irreplaceable.

Yet by any broader standards Ulbricht's political life remains a failure. Instead of seeing his fellow German Communists rise in revolution, he witnessed German workers in Hitler's armies march against the Soviet Union. He had to return home from exile in the USSR not as the representative of a Soviet Germany—his old dream—but as the executor of Stalin's will over a conquered and hate-filled people. On June 17, 1953, he was forced to call out Soviet troops and armor to quash in the streets of Berlin and other cities the workers he once fancied as his own comrades-in-arms. Today, after twenty years of brutal effort and vain promises, he still rules by the grace of Soviet tanks.

ERICKA VON HORNSTEIN: *Staatsfeinde*. Cologne-Berlin, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964.

This volume contains the stories of seven victims of political persecution in the "German Democratic Republic," compiled and narrated by the author. Miss von Hornstein has not picked her subjects at random; they are meant to represent, she writes, a cross-section of the nearly one quarter of a million East Germans who have gone through jails and concentration camps in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The men and women whose testimonies make up this book (all have eventually escaped to West Germany) come from widely differing backgrounds. One or two are former Nazis. One was a parson who believed he was doing his Christian duty when he came to loggerheads with Communist authorities. Another is a Social Democrat who before his arrest had attained a position of some importance in the GDR. Still another was an idealistic young Communist who concerned himself—in thought, not action—with the problem of how to bring East German reality into harmony with his conscience, only to be sentenced to four years in prison as a deviationist and revisionist. Finally, there was Erika Fischer, a rather ordinary young woman with no great ambition and only a desire to live a normal life. Somehow, at the age of twenty-two, she was caught in the web of police repression and spent the next eleven years in East German prisons and labor camps, for no apparently valid reason.

All these depressing stories have one thing in common: in each case the persecution inflicted upon the victim was out of proportion to the "crime" committed, even when judged by the relevant rules of East German law. The book, moreover, brings out once again the fact that totalitarian regimes, whatever their nature, often victimize the same people. A good illustration in the present volume is the case of a man who found himself under the Communists in the same prison in which he had been jailed years earlier by the Nazis.

Miss von Hornstein's main purpose is to shake people who live in freedom—especially West Germans—out of their complacency. With her forceful style she may be quite successful in this mission. On the other hand, the book adds little to the now vast fund of published information on Communist methods of terror and prison life. Some readers, moreover, may be discouraged by the bathos that permeates portions of the narrative.

Anthony Sylvester

Roads and Crossroads

ADAM BROMKE, ED.: *The Communist States at the Crossroads between Moscow and Peking*. Introduction by Philip E. Mosely. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

BASED ON A series of lectures in the winter of 1964, this volume by thirteen authors traces the growing diversity in the Communist world. There are country studies for each of the Communist states except China and Albania (the reason for these omissions is not entirely clear), as well as chapters on Sino-Soviet relations, economic relations among Communist states and a concluding essay by the editor, Adam Bromke, on the implications for the West of what is happening in the Communist world.

The complexity of the themes in the volume is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in its title, which seems in large degree a misnomer. Communist countries are clearly at a crossroads; but whether that point is located "between Moscow and Peking" for all of them is open to question. Rumania, for one, as J. F. Brown makes clear in his contribution, seeks substantial independence, and probably would be more accurately described as traveling on a road leading away from both Moscow and Peking, rather than as being poised between them. Clearly, the growing heterogeneity of the Communist bloc has made it difficult even to find a title which would aptly describe the existing situation.

The individual studies are solid pieces of work, even if they are slightly outdated on occasion: the proposed Czechoslovak economic reforms, the apparent attenuation of Soviet-North Korean relations, and the renewed involvement of the USSR in Vietnam, for example, came too late to be taken into account. Given this unavoidable time gap, Paul F. Langer's warning, in his chapter on the Asian Communist states, against assuming

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that Hanoi's alignment with Peking in early 1964 is irrevocable is particularly welcome.

Especially to the point, too, is Philip E. Mosely's reminder that the Soviet Union's more sober conduct in world affairs during the last part of Khrushchev's tenure may not represent a permanent change, what with the intensified Soviet involvement in the underdeveloped world and especially in Vietnam. Indeed, the post-Khrushchev leaders give evidence of having decided to combine a relative moratorium on open polemics with a more active attempt to contest the Chinese position around the world, the better to demonstrate the vigor of their own "anti-imperialism." This is an aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute to which Adam Bromke's final chapter might have given more attention, since the benefits of the fissures in the Communist world could be largely offset if the Soviet leaders conclude that the most effective way to combat Peking is to outdo it in the support of "wars of liberation" and other "anti-imperialist" ventures.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Bolshevik Checkmates

I HAVE ALWAYS been aware of the fact that about ninety years ago Wilhelm Steinitz started modern chess. But it never occurred to me or to anyone else to consider him as the leader of an "English school." Halfway between then and now, in the 1920's, chess almost came to a grinding halt, when the grand masters had at last figured out what constituted the strongest moves—first, second, third, and so on. The notorious tournament between A. Alekhine and J. Capablanca for the world championship (1927), in which the two players actually played the same game over and over to a stalemate, so disgusted the great Lasker that from then on he switched to "Go."

Fortunately, a few young geniuses brought about a new revolution in chess and liberated its strategy from the pedantic theories that had dominated it so long. A number of Russians both inside and outside the Soviet Union, as well as descendants of Russian emigrants, were among the leaders of this movement.

And no wonder—Russia has always been a great producer of chess masters. The Soviet Union is also the only country where chess is taught in school and where one may say that a veritable chess culture exists.

But does this mean that there is a uniquely *Soviet* school of chess? Former world chess champion, Mikhail Botvinnik, is of this opinion. He says:

Is there a Soviet school of chess? I think there is. As a matter of fact, it developed before my eyes. . . . A galaxy of first class masters has come forward. They have created their own style and their own method of studying chess and have produced numerous highly interesting games. A characteristic feature of this style is militancy. Among the prerevolutionary generation there were masters . . . whose style was characterized by a tendency to wait passively for developments.

THE QUOTATION is from a beautiful Capricorn book: *Soviet Chess* by Nikolai Grekov.[1] The book contains 108 great games in which Russian masters have participated. But Alekhine, the greatest of former Russian masters and the only one to die without losing his title, is poorly represented. Since he was a traitor to the Fatherland (a prisoner during World War I, he elected to stay in Paris), he appears only once in a game which he lost to a Soviet Russian, Botvinnik; and the grand master E. Bogoliubov, who also deserted the Fatherland (his story was similar to Alekhine's) goes completely unnoticed. Not even the post-thaw revision (the last games included took play in 1962) has reclaimed any of the lost sheep for the "Russian style".

On the other hand, Grekov attributes the birth of the Russian school not so much to the revolutionary impulse which Botvinnik seemed to invoke, but to a national tradition going back to Mikhail I. Tchigorin (1850-1908), whom he calls a romantic, a man alien to all dogmas, a man who infused life into the calculating game of cold logic which the Anglo-Saxon Steinitz—by birth a Viennese Jew—had designed. Theory, he quotes Tchigorin as saying, is "a lack of originality."

The Sovietologists, into whose field I am here intruding, may not be surprised to find such patriotic or revolutionary motifs in a simple book on chess. But a lover of the old game, once he gets over his initial shock, might have to admit that there is some justification for the unusual book title, *Soviet Chess* (I don't think there is any book called *German Chess*). Notations in the book are scholarly, but they are also more deliberately didactic than in comparable books published in Europe or the United States. Not only is the Soviet Union shown to be a country with a great chess culture; its champions—all strong and imaginative—emphatically display that revolutionary "militancy" to which Botvinnik refers. Other commentators who are quoted constantly emphasize the dynamic theories with which contemporary Soviet military doctrine is also presumably imbued. They are full of admiration for moves that "crush the enemy defenses," and they exhort Soviet students of this mighty national sport to be bold, to be daring, and to use offensive tactics.

Henry Pachter

[1] Translated by Theodore Reich, and updated by David Bronstein; New York, Putnam, 1962.

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The Coup and After: III

EDITORS' NOTE: This is the third and last installment of our discussion on the nature and significance of Khrushchev's removal from power last October. The first item below is a critique of Mr. Lowenthal's article, which appeared in the January-February issue. There follow replies from Messrs. Conquest and Lowenthal to the various comments published in the course of the discussion.

An Unstable Leadership

By Seweryn Bialer

A political scientist or sociologist who has chosen the Soviet Union as the object of his studies often finds himself in the unfortunate position of having much more attention paid to his estimate of the near or distant future of the Soviet system—an area that normally is only marginal in his preoccupations—than to his analysis of the current state of Soviet society or the Soviet polity. It is therefore not surprising that any momentous event on the Soviet scene touches off a retrospective discussion concerning which of the Soviet analysts were right and which were wrong in their evaluations of the course of events. The enforced retirement of Khrushchev in October 1964 was no exception to this rule. The discussion launched in the January-February 1965 issue of this journal has been devoted in part to the issue of which of two schools of thought among analysts of the Soviet system had come closer, if not to predicting the events of October 1964 (since Khrushchev's dismissal was more or less of a surprise to everybody), then at least to analyzing the Soviet scene in terms consistent with what actually did take place.

Mr. Richard Lowenthal's answer to the question of which of the two schools—*i.e.*, the "conflict" school or the "Khrushchev-in-command" school—had been more correct in their assessment of the Soviet political situation in the 1960's was unequivocal: both were basically wrong. "Clearly," wrote Mr. Lowenthal, "the outcome has not been consistent with either hypothesis."

I should like to take exception to Mr. Lowenthal's opinion. One can, to be sure, sympathize with his view that even the conflict school did not provide a detailed and precise assessment of the relation of forces in Soviet politics. Admittedly, too, the partisans of the conflict model seldom, if ever, went so far as to predict Khrushchev's probable forced departure from the Soviet political scene. (Neither Mr. Linden nor Mr. Conquest, both prominent representatives of this school, envisaged such a turn of events as likely.) One is inclined, moreover, to share Mr. Lowenthal's doubts about the correctness or sufficiency of the theory, so much favored by the conflict school, of a division of the Soviet leadership (or even of the broad elite strata) into contending conservative and liberal camps. (This is a basic

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assumption of such conflict-model Sovietologists as Mr. Ploss and Mr. Linden.) Yet, in spite of all this, Mr. Lowenthal's conclusion that Khrushchev's ouster showed both schools of Sovietology to have been wrong in their perception of the Soviet scene still strikes me as unsatisfactory.

If one agrees that there are degrees of right or wrong, and that in the social sciences there is no such thing as total and complete truth, especially in such an area as Soviet studies where so little "hard evidence" is attainable, it seems to me that the conflict-model school was more right than wrong, or at least much closer to the mark than its opponents were. It is not simply that they were obviously nearer the truth in their evaluation of Khrushchev's personal power. More important, the general image which they presented of the Soviet internal situation in the 1960's was correct. It is important to recognize this because, if the image they presented was true before October 1964, it remains equally true in the post-Khrushchev era. The point is that *the conflict school recognized the basic instability of the Soviet political leadership in the 1960's while its opponents conveyed a picture of fundamental stability.*

It is perhaps doubtful whether the present condition of the *Soviet system,* as distinguished from the political leadership, can be described as unstable. After all, the Soviet Union has risen to become the second most powerful country in the world as far as its military, scientific and industrial capacities are concerned; and while the level of national achievement in these fields is not of itself a guarantee of the stability of the socio-political system under which it was achieved, one must nevertheless admit that the political controls characteristic of the Soviet system of government still remain very tight and strong. The Soviet economy, too, notwithstanding the fact that it is besieged by a multitude of difficulties and shows a perceptible slowdown of its rate of growth, must be recognized as a matured and going concern. Finally, the system derives a certain stability from the fact that the Soviet public at large remains an amorphous creature, a non-participating silent "partner" in the political process.

As opposed to the Soviet system, however, the Soviet political leadership does seem, to this writer at least, unquestionably lacking in stability. Instability of political leadership, under Soviet conditions, means the absence of a supreme arbiter who can, both nominally and in fact, reconcile the conflicting claims and attitudes of divergent interests within the Soviet power structure. It means the development of permanent divisions and semi-autonomous groupings in the Soviet establishment, without institutions that would provide a legitimate framework and establish constructive rules for their activity. In a centralized command system like the Soviet, such instability of political leadership involves vacillation and indecisiveness in attempting to solve pressing problems, a decline of administrative effectiveness, and the choice of compromise, half-measure innovations in situations where decisive changes are required, or where even the preservation of the status quo would be preferable to "too little, too late" solutions.

Under Soviet conditions, instability of the political leadership is not an isolated, self-contained phenomenon, but one which directly affects a number of other areas. It affects, for instance, the health and performance of the economic sector, the degree of flexibility and speed of response of Soviet foreign policy, and the ability to map a clear policy for dealing with the creative intelligentsia. By the same token, whether the Western analyst recognizes, or fails to recognize, the basic instability of the Soviet political leadership necessarily colors not only his assessment of the power relationships among the top Soviet leaders but also his explanations of Soviet behavior (*e.g.*, the zigzags in Soviet economic policy during recent years can be viewed simply as the result of Khrushchev's erratic behavior, or of what are now described as his "harebrained schemes," or they can be related to the divergent pressures and conflicts within the ruling hierarchy).

Most important, whether or not we recognize the instability of the Soviet political leadership must of necessity influence our judgment as to the likelihood that the various measures undertaken by the present leadership, with a view to rationalizing the Soviet system and improving its performance, will bear fruit. To take a current example, the leadership's decision in March 1965 to reduce the grain delivery quotas of the kolkhozes and to keep them constant for the next five years is a rational and timely measure which, if carried out, should have a salutory effect on the level of kolkhoz production in the coming years. However, if one sees the present political leadership as fundamentally unstable, how can one be sure that this stabilizing measure will be adhered to over the next five years? It is very doubtful indeed whether any experienced Soviet kolkhoz director himself puts any faith in the assurances of the present leadership that the level of his delivery quotas will remain unchanged for that length of time. And without such faith, the stimulating effect that this rational measure might be expected to have on agricultural production is likely to be very limited, if not lost altogether.

Because they recognized the instability of the political leadership in Khrushchev's Russia, the

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Sovietologists of the conflict-model school were also, I believe, more realistic in their assessment of the gravity of the economic (especially agricultural) difficulties confronting the Soviet Union, as well as more skeptical about the outcome of Soviet efforts to improve administrative efficiency, and about the attainability of Soviet long-range goals, than those who saw the Soviet political leadership as basically unified and stable. This instability of the political leadership looms as an even more crucial factor in analyzing social, political or economic developments in post-Khrushchev Russia, for Khrushchev's overthrow has rendered the political leadership more unstable than at any time in the last eight years.

Replies

May I comment briefly on some points made in this discussion? Clearly, no "model" can be predictive in the sense that anyone could have simply foretold Khrushchev's fall—no more than even the soundest theory of strategy can foretell the results of a given battle. A sound view of Soviet politics, on the other hand, could have stipulated Khrushchev's fall as a *possibility*. There may be some version of a "conflict model" which denied this possibility but *all* non-conflict models must surely have done so *à priori*.

Again, it is true that "conflict models" often spoke in terms of a "conservative" faction opposing Khrushchev's policies, though it was not by a conservative revolt that he was finally overthrown. But this very fact emphasizes the power, as against the policy aspect, and thus supports a conflict model even further removed from the conventional view.

This is not to dismiss the idea of a "Kozlovite" conservatism. It is clear, moreover, that such a position gained majority support in the party Presidium in the first months of 1963, and was therefore not incompatible with the opinions of the lesser Khrushchevites. In a body like the Presidium it is doubtless wrong to seek any clear-cut factions voting regularly on factional lines. Moreover, the available opposition leader in any polity to some degree determines the lines of opposition policy; or, to put it another way, opposition rallies round a leader or group on the power issue, and on the policy issues it must to some degree go along with his or their decisions. In the last great showdown, in June 1957, the two opposing groups were not united on the basis of a joint policy platform: the anti-Khrushchev forces comprised a whole spectrum of diverse personalities from Molotov to Shepilov.

Thus, I am in agreement with Professor Rigby's analysis of the coup, but not with his implication that the overthrow of Khrushchev by a secret conspiracy means that there was not earlier a more "political" and "factional" attempt to block him. On the contrary, the failure of such a more-or-less open attempt, led by Kozlov, may well have forced Khrushchev's opponents to engage in conspiratorial methods.

As Professor Ulam rightly remarks, we are not likely to learn the full story of Khrushchev's rule and downfall for a long time. Our choice, therefore, is either to say nothing about it at all, or to construct as sound a *hypothesis* as possible. As I have suggested elsewhere, the trouble is that those who go on record as rejecting Kremlinology do not really do so. Instead, they avoid the necessary study, they ignore the available evidence, while at the same time continuing to construct Kremlinological pictures of their own—reminding one of the old saying that the man who says he is not a philosopher is just a bad philosopher.

Professor Ulam questions my remark that the "Soviet system has . . . entered a general crisis," saying (truly enough) that Soviet politics have always been replete with crises. The answer is that I was referring not only to politics, but to the whole system. I have the impression that the cumulative economic, social and intellectual pressures (or "contradictions") in the USSR are now so powerful, and press so strongly on the obsolete political integument, as to have brought the country to the stage of a "General Crisis" in the sense in which the word has often been used in Communist literature with regard to the "General Crisis of Capitalism." The events of the past few years seem to indicate that the crisis has now reached the political level.

Robert Conquest

I should like to reply briefly to those contributions which deal with the nature and importance of conflicts within the CPSU leadership.

The first of these is Mr. Linden's defense of his view that a "conservative" faction opposed to Khrushchev's "reformist" policy survived his victory in May/June 1963 and played a major role in his overthrow. Mr. Linden does not explain why men like Brezhnev, Podgorny and Mikoyan, who were clearly on the "reformist" side in 1963 and were accordingly entrusted with key positions after Khrushchev's victory, should have turned "conservative" in 1964. He does claim that the statements and actions of Khrushchev's successors prove a turn

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towards a "conservative" policy; but his evidence for this seems to me unconvincing—much in contrast to the impressive case he made for the period of the winter and spring of 1962-63.

The policy issues on which this earlier struggle centered, in addition to the issue of Khrushchev's methods and the extent of his power, appear to have fallen into three major groups: first, the allocation of resources between the defense, engineering and metal industries on one side and agriculture, chemicals and consumer goods on the other, and the related issue of decentralizing planning reforms aimed at increasing managerial independence; second, the importance of the party's political and ideological role compared to its task in raising productivity, and the related issue of the extent of party interference in various fields of intellectual life; and third, the tactics to be pursued in relations with the Chinese Communists—or more concretely, whether to make ideological concessions or to aim at a formal showdown with Peking. If Khrushchev had been overthrown by a conservative faction, we should expect (as some advocates of this theory did expect) his successors to have strengthened defense expenditure at the expense of agriculture and the consumer, to have put an end to economic reforms, to have tightened party controls over intellectual life and to have called off the preparatory international conference to which the Chinese objected. But this is not what has happened.

In economics, Khrushchev's successors have reacted to years of indecisive tinkering with agriculture by an overdue decision for major investment in that long neglected area, and have made concessions to the peasants with regard to their private plots (an issue on which Khrushchev was a "conservative"). Decentralizing planning reforms along Libermann lines have been accelerated. Investments in chemicals will increase more slowly than planned by Khrushchev but at a faster rate than was actually the case under his tenure; Western economists agree that Khrushchev's plans were technically impracticable. In short, "reformism" in the economic field is being pursued with both greater consistency and greater rationality than under Khruschev, hence with better chances of success.

Ideologically, the rescinding of Khrushchev's party reform has indeed been accompanied by an increased emphasis on the party's political and ideological role. Yet in practice, the new men work to a greater extent than before through the state bureaucracy, as Mr. Linden states himself; Leonid Ilichev, the CC secretary in charge of ideological matters, who carried through Khrushchev's (and Kozlov's) 1962-63 campaign for the control of writers and artists, has been replaced by a man (Demichev) who rose as an industrial administrator; and the final liquidation of Lysenkoism on the one hand, and the honors conferred on modern economists on the other, indicate an increased determination to get rid of doctrinaire impediments to economic progress.

As far as China is concerned, the new leaders have certainly made efforts to get off the "collision course" in state relations; but they have refused to call off their preparatory international conference—although they must have foreseen that it would be a pathetic failure, and although they could have avoided it by disavowing Khrushchev's initiative. In effect, they have refused to admit that the Chinese were right on any issue of substance. In the circumstances, the greater stress on anti-imperialist and national liberation struggles pointed out by Mr. Linden should be seen, like the Soviet effort to aid the Vietnamese Communists, as a result of intensified competition with the Chinese for the allegiance of national-revolutionary movements rather than as a concession to them—a tactic comparable with Soviet behavior in the months between the Bucharest and Moscow conferences of 1960.

The changes, then, amount to a disavowal of Khrushchev's methods of rule and of reforms directly endangering the cohesion and primacy of the party, combined with new and bolder reforms in some fields and tactical vacillation in others. They are not consistent with the victory of a conservative faction in the Kremlin—unless conservatism is defined simply as the rejection of Khrushchev's improvisations and capriciousness. But neither do they indicate the emergence of a coherent overall policy; on the contrary, the continuing chorus of discordant voices on the relative importance of consumption as against defense, of material as against ideological incentives, suggests that the lack of a recognized single leader does not facilitate agreement on policy among the party oligarchs in a situation where international tensions and domestic expectations give rise to competing claims on scarce resources, and where the role of a ruling party that can no longer transform society at will remains undefined.

This brings me to Mr. Bialer's emphasis on the instability of leadership arrangements within a single-party regime. His point seems to me both important and convincing, but more relevant for the future than for the past: Mr. Bialer does not accept the "factional" explanation of Khrushchev's overthrow any more than I do, while so staunch a defender of the "Khrushchev in Command" model as Professor Rigby agrees with him in pointing to the instability of "Thermidorian" oligarchies. From a slightly different angle, the basic inadequacy of the institutions of one-party rule for securing legitimate, stable and continuous leadership for a great power is also stressed in Myron Rush's new book, *Political Succession in the USSR*.

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In fact, the alternatives within the system appear to lie between personal dictatorship with insecurity for the elite and uncertainty of succession on the one hand, and oligarchic committee rule making for indecisive and vacillating leadership on the other. In the USSR as elsewhere, one-man-leadership has so far been the rule, but the Stalinist experience has produced so strong a reaction that the pendulum has now swung to the oligarchic solution (*e.g.*, the overthrow of Khrushchev); at the present time we are observing the difficulties of decision-making inherent in the second alternative. The absence of a legitimate supreme arbiter may produce a lengthy period of vacillation with changing groupings at the top, conceivably ending in a "Bonapartist" solution as it becomes clear that collective rule causes paralysis and weakness. It may also lead, much more easily than under Khrushchev, to the formation of coherent, competing factions and, after a period of struggle, to the eventual rise of the head of the stronger faction as recognized leader. Finally, in the present stage of evolution of Soviet society it is at least conceivable that a majority faction should recognize the inevitable connection between authoritarian rule and the tendency towards personal dictatorship, and should try to insure itself against the latter by accepting institutional limitations to the party's power.

In any case, both power struggles and further institutional changes may be expected to play an important role in the next phase of the Soviet leadership, and the "conflict model" is likely to have increased relevance for the understanding of Soviet policy. To this writer, it seems impossible to foresee which of the possibilities named—paralysis leading to Bonapartism, factional struggle ending in the return of a single party leader, or stabilization of the oligarchy by institutional reform—is most probable at this stage. But it seems plausible that the last-named, comparatively "rational" and "liberal" solution will have the less chances the more difficult the problems and tensions, and the harder therefore the choices, that will confront the Soviet leaders in the years ahead.

Richard Lowenthal

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